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

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THE JOURNAL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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From the Editor:

In this issue . . .

GARY C. JACOBSON examines the 1994 House elections. He finds that although House elections were nationalized to a greater extent than they had been in decades, local variation was as pronounced as ever, and for the usual reasons: incumbency, the quality of challengers, campaign spending, and the interaction of national issues with local circumstances. He argues that the Democrats' loss of majority status has altered the strategic environment, leaving Republicans in a better competitive position than at any time since the New Deal realignment.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY shows that arguments for dismantling the federal social safety net and devolving parts of it to the states have been based on six major claims about reality, but that five of those claims are fictional and the sixth only partially true. Nevertheless, he concludes that the forces for dismantling the safety net and for cutting the federal government's revenues to make it constantly broke have formidable staying power and may eventually succeed in weakening the federal government as an effective instrument of governance.

BRUCE RUSSETT offers various criteria by which one might evaluate proposals for restructuring the United Nations, including those in a Ford Foundation-sponsored-report on the future of the international organization.

MARK J. ROZELL and CLYDE WILCOX investigate the political strategies and grassroots activities of the Christian Right movement in Virginia and assess the potential for that movement to expand its impact on Republican party politics and public policy more generally.

JUAN D. LINDAU looks at the impact of technocratization on the ruling style of Mexico's political elite. He argues that most of the effects commonly linked to the rise to power of technocrats have not in fact occurred because of the authoritarian nature of the Mexican political system.

JOHN W. GARVER traces the improvement of Chinese-Indian relations during the late 1980s. He concludes that Sino-Indian rapprochement has affected Pakistan-Chinese relations only around the margins and that the core of the Sino-Pakistan entente remains solid.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

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The 1994 House Elections In Perspective

GARY C. JACOBSON

The 1994 elections set off a political earthquake that will send aftershocks rumbling through national politics for years to come. For the first time in forty-two years, Republicans captured the House of Representatives. The fifty-two-seat gain that gave them a 230-204 majority was the largest net partisan swing since 1948.[1] Republicans also took control of the Senate, taking eight seats from Democrats, immediately adding a party-switching opportunist (Richard Shelby of Alabama) to end up with a 53–47 majority. After a two year hiatus, the United States again has divided government—one party controlling the presidency, the other party controlling the Congress. But in a startling reversal, this time the White House belongs to the Democrats, while Congress belongs to the Republicans. The Republican congressional triumph led a national sweep for the party. Indeed, the only reason the election brought divided government rather than unified Republican control is that Bill Clinton was not on the ballot.

Clearly the results of the 1994 elections—particularly the House elections, which are the focus of this article—were extraordinary. The question for political scientists who study elections, however, is whether the process that produced them was also extraordinary. Does the Republican victory mean that the electoral world depicted by the conventional literature changed fundamentally in 1994? Or can we account for it within the framework of currently accepted ideas about congressional elections? These are the questions I begin to address here. My answers must be far from definitive at this date, before all the relevant data are in hand for analysis. Nonetheless, the evidence available so far suggests that

[1] Bernard Sanders of Vermont, the lone independent, survived.

GARY C. JACOBSON is professor of political science at the University of California, San Diego. He is the author of *Money in Congressional Elections*, *Strategy and Choice in Congressional Elections* (with Samuel Kernell) and *The Electorial Origins of Divided Government*. The fourth edition of his *The Politics of Congressional Elections* will be published this fall.

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while the electoral processes shaping 1994 differed in important respects from those of recent decades, most of the familiar patterns held for 1994. Although House elections were, as the postelection commentary emphasized, nationalized to a greater extent than they have been in several decades, local variation was as pronounced as ever, and for the usual reasons: incumbency, the quality of challengers, campaign spending, and the interaction of national issues with local circumstances.

I begin by presenting a stylized account of the Republican victory in the 1994 House elections, with special attention to how the nationalization of local contests contributed to the party's success. Marketable national campaign themes did not by themselves give the Republicans their House majority, however. National issues needed effective local sponsors to influence House voters. To win House seats, Republicans still needed plausible candidates with enough money to get the messages out to district voters. In the second section, I show how the effects of national issues were mediated by candidates and campaigns in what continued to be a predominantly locally-focused electoral process.

Why Did the Republicans Win the House?

Why did Republicans, after four decades of futility, suddenly win a clear majority of House seats? The short answer is that they won by inverting political patterns that had given Democrats comfortable House majorities, despite a generation of Republican superiority in presidential elections. In my earlier work on divided government, I offered this summary explanation for the Republicans' inability to win control of the House:

> Republicans have failed to advance in the House because they have fielded inferior candidates on the wrong side of issues that are important to voters in House elections and because voters find it difficult to assign blame or credit when control of government is divided between the parties.[2]

In 1994, the Republicans won the House by fielding (modestly) superior candidates who were on the right side of the issues that were important to voters in House elections and by persuading voters to blame a unified Democratic government for government's failures.

Until 1994, Democrats were able to maintain House majorities despite Republican dominance of presidential contests by persuading electorates to use different criteria for making presidential and congressional choices. Most Americans want low tax rates, low inflation, a less meddlesome government, a strong national defense, and law and order at home. Republican presidential candidates capitalized on their party's superior reputation on these issues to win five of the last seven presidential elections. But most Americans also oppose cuts in middle-class

[2] Gary C. Jacobson, *The Electoral Origins of Divided Government: Competition in U.S. House Elections, 1946–1988* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), 3.

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entitlements and many other social programs and fear unemployment, greater exposure to market forces, and greater environmental risk. Democrats held onto their congressional majority in part by promising to protect popular programs, benefits, and safeguards.

House Democrats also promoted and thrived on a candidate-centered election system in which, as former Speaker of the House Tip O'Neill famously put it, "all politics is local." As the party believing in the value of government and thus of governmental service, Democrats fielded a higher proportion of ambitious, experienced, talented candidates who were willing to do the hard work it took to build and maintain a personal following back in the district. House Democrats became adept at building local majority coalitions out of whatever material was at hand. The party's fractious diversity, which frustrated its presidential candidates' efforts to construct majority coalitions, was no barrier to success in local politics. Democrats ran as staunch friends of organized labor, civil rights activists, feminists, or the environmental movement, when doing so attracted votes. They avoided such alliances when it did not. Southern Democrats, for example, were able to portray themselves as fiscal and social conservatives despite their national party's image. By keeping the electoral focus local in districts where the national party's liberal reputation was a millstone, Democrats were able to capture and retain House seats that otherwise had distinctly Republican coloration.[3]

All politics was not local in 1994. Republicans succeeded in framing the local choice in national terms, making taxes, social discipline, big government, and the Clinton presidency the dominant issues. They did so by exploiting three related waves of public sentiment that crested simultaneously in 1994. The first was public disgust with the politics, politicians, and government in Washington. The second was the widespread feeling that American economic and social life was out of control and heading in the wrong direction. The third was the visceral rejection of Bill Clinton by a crucial set of swing voters—the Reagan Democrats and the supporters of Ross Perot.

An Angry Public

Public contempt for members of Congress as a class has been growing for more than two decades. All of the regular polling questions measuring attitudes toward government have found an increasingly angry and distrustful public. Disapproval of Congress's performance reached an all-time high of 79 percent in one 1994 poll, but this was only the latest incremental extension of a long-term trend. Rising distrust and anger have been fed by several streams. One major stream flowed directly from the politics of divided government during the Reagan–Bush years. Divided government encouraged the kind of partisan posturing, haggling, delay, and confusion that voters hate whenever Republican presidents and Democratic Congresses faced major policy decisions. It also guaranteed that voters

[3] Ibid., 129–133.

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would wind up feeling betrayed by the inevitable compromises that made agreement possible, as they did in 1990 when George Bush and the Democratic Congress cut a deal to reduce the deficit through a combination of tax increases and program cuts.[4]

The formal end of divided government in 1992 was supposed to end gridlock. It did not. Many of the Clinton administration's most ambitious plans—notoriously, health care reform—died in an agony of conflict and partisan recrimination. The truth, revealed early in the 103rd Congress when Bob Dole led a successful Republican filibuster against Bill Clinton's economic stimulus package, was that, as Keith Krehbiel's insightful analysis makes clear, divided government had not ended at all. Divided partisan control of policy making persists as long as the minority party holds at least forty seats in the Senate and can therefore kill any bill it wants to kill.[5]

The illusion of unified government put the onus of failure on the Democrats; the reality of divided government let Senate Republicans make sure that the administration would fail. Clinton was elected on a promise of change. Senate Republicans could prevent change, and they did. It was not difficult, for while everyone may agree that change is desirable, rarely do we find ready consensus on what to change to. The health care issue is exhibit A. If voters did not get change with Clinton—or if they did not like the changes he proposed—the alternative was to elect Republicans.

Public anger at a government paralyzed by gridlock was intensified by the widespread sense that the problems the political establishment has failed to address are indeed serious. The benefits of economic growth during the Reagan years went largely to families in the top income decile. The broad middle class has by many measures made little economic progress for two decades; even the most upbeat observers admit that the incomes (including fringe benefits) of the families in the middle half of the distribution were nearly flat over the two decades between 1973 and 1992.[6] Moreover, middle-class incomes have become more volatile from one year to the next, so that even if middle-income people have not done worse on average, their level of uncertainty about the economic future is appreciably greater.

Although the economy grew during the first two years of the Clinton administration, the fruits of growth again went largely to families at the upper end of the economic scale. Hence, in the October *Los Angeles Times* Poll, 53 percent of the respondents thought the economy remained in recession. The economic discontent that elected Clinton in 1992 had barely faded by 1994, and this time it helped to elect a Republican Congress. In 1992, 79 percent of the voters in

[4] Gary C. Jacobson, "Deficit Cutting Politics and Congressional Elections," *Political Science Quarterly* 108 (Fall 1993): 375–401.

[5] Keith Krehbiel, "A Theory of Divided and Unified Government" (manuscript, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, 1994).

[6] Paul Richter, "It Just Seems We're Worse Off," *Los Angeles Times*, 26 January 1995.

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the national exit poll thought the economy was in bad shape, and 62 percent of them voted for a Democrat for the House. In 1994, 75 percent said they were no better off financially than they had been two years ago; 57 percent thought the economy was still in bad shape, and 62 percent of this group voted for the Republican.[7]

Economic prosperity, moreover, is not the only measure of the quality of life. The public institutions that serve ordinary people—public schools, police, courts—seem to be in trouble. The issues of crime, illegal immigration, and unmarried teenage welfare mothers that dominated the 1994 campaigns in many places were not new, but they gained new urgency as signs that American society was out of control. For millions of Americans, government has delivered neither physical nor economic security and has failed conspicuously to reverse what they see as moral and cultural decline. The large majority that believed the nation was on the wrong rather than the right track (57 percent compared to 37 percent in the exit poll) indicates that the longing for "change" that put Clinton in the White House had not been satisfied. Two-thirds of those who thought the nation was on the wrong track voted for the Republican House candidate, compared to only 29 percent of those who thought the nation was on the right track.

Stagnant incomes, declining public services, and the rising fear of crime leave large segments of the population with poorer lives and diminished prospects. It is in this context that the perks and peccadillos of politicians—scandals involving senior leaders in the House and the Keating Five in the Senate, bank overdrafts, unpaid restaurant bills, post office shenanigans, and pay raise subterfuges—were so damaging to members of Congress. The image of representatives as self-serving, easily corrupted, and indifferent to the needs of the average citizen or the good of the nation had pervaded the 1992 elections and helped produce the largest turnover in the House since World War II. Members were unable to shake that image in the 103rd Congress, and now that Democrats were ostensibly in full control of the government, they became the principal targets of popular wrath and disappointment. In 1992, angry and dissatisfied voters had voted Democratic in House elections 56 percent to 44 percent; in 1994, they voted Republican, 64 percent to 36 percent.[8]

The Clinton Problem

Bill Clinton's reputation as a leader was, of course, the chief target and victim of the Republicans' gridlock strategy. But this was not the only problem Clinton posed for congressional Democrats. Although his overall performance ratings were not, comparatively speaking, all that bad, he had thoroughly alienated important groups of swing voters: the so-called Reagan Democrats and much of

[7] Gary Langer, "'94 Vote: Republicans Seize the Reins of Discontent," ABC News Analysis, 11 November 1994.

[8] Ibid.

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the largely male Ross Perot constituency. The cultural symbolism portrayed by many of the administration's actions was anathema to socially conservative white men, especially in the South. The conspicuous attention to race and gender diversity in making appointments called to mind the affirmative action programs they detest. Support for gays in the military and gun control, appointees like Lani Guinier (failed) and Jocelyn Elder (successful), the role and style of Hilary Rodham Clinton reminded these swing voters of the cultural liberalism that was at the core of what they did not like about the Democratic party. Clinton's reputation with this segment of the electorate was probably worsened by one of his most notable successes: the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement, which put him at odds with traditional blue-collar Democratic constituents.

Exit polls revealed that only 40 percent of southerners approved of Clinton's performance, compared to 51 percent in the northeast and 45 percent elsewhere. Among white southern men, Clinton's approval stood at a dismal 27 percent. Moreover, the relationship between presidential approval and the House vote was notably stronger in 1994 than in other recent midterms. According to the exit poll, about 86 percent of House votes were consistent with presidential ratings (that is, for the Democrat if the respondent approved of Clinton's performance, for the Republican if the respondent disapproved). The comparable figure for 1990 was 68 percent; for 1986, 72 percent; only in 1982 did consistency approach the 1994 level (82 percent). Clinton's low level of approval was thus more damaging to his copartisans than usual and was concentrated among swing voters. Support for Democratic House candidates among white southerners was 12 points lower in 1994 than it had been in 1992 (35 percent compared to 47 percent). Fully 44 percent of the white southern males said that their House vote was a vote against Clinton (20 percent said it was a vote for Clinton; for nonsouthern males, the comparable figures were 33 percent and 24 percent). The House vote of white males nationally was 11 points more Republican in 1994 than it had been in 1992; Perot supporters, who had split their House votes evenly between the parties in 1992, voted 2–1 Republican in 1994.[9]

In short, voters in 1994 were angry with government; Democrats were the party of government, not only because they were in charge, but also because their party believes in government. Republican candidates, who like to claim that they do not, offered themselves as vehicles for expressing antigovernment rage by taking up the banner of structural panaceas—term limits, a balanced budget amendment, cuts in congressional staff and perks—that were broadly popular and had special appeal to the alienated voters who had supported Perot. The policy issues that resonated best with voters in 1994—crime, immigration, welfare dependency, taxes, big government—were also Republican issues. Recognizing Clinton's unpopularity, especially in the South and especially among

[9] Ibid.; "Portrait of the Electorate: Who Voted for Whom in the House," *New York Times*, 13 November 1995.

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white males, Republican candidates sought to portray their opponents as Clinton clones; many of them used TV ads that had a picture of their opponent's face digitally morphing into Clinton's face.

Republicans were thus able to frame the choice in many swing districts as not between an accomplished provider of pork and diligent servant of district interests and a challenger whose ability to deliver the goods was at best doubtful, but between a supporter of liberal elitist Bill Clinton, big government, high taxes, and politics as usual, and a challenger opposed to these horribles. The House Democrats' customary strategy of emphasizing the projects, grants, and programs they have brought to the district and the value of their experience and seniority not only failed but was turned against them. The more they reminded people of pork and clout, the more they revealed themselves as insiders, that loathed class of career politicians. With the choice framed this way, the old ploy of running for Congress by running against Congress—joining the chorus of criticism to put oneself apart from and above the institution[10]—was rendered threadbare as well. The Democrats were unable to duck individual responsibility for the House's collective shortcomings.

Ironically, the Republicans' "Contract with America," which became so prominent in setting the Republican agenda after the election, had in itself little impact on the voters. On 27 September 1994 more than 300 Republican House candidates signed a pledge on the steps of the capitol to act swiftly on a grab-bag of proposals for structural and legislative change, including constitutional amendments requiring a balanced budget and imposing term limits on members of Congress, major cuts in income taxes, and reductions in spending on welfare programs for poor families. Although the contract got some attention in the media and was a target of Democratic counterattacks, most voters went to the polls blissfully unaware of its existence. The *New York Times*/CBS News Poll of 29 October–1 November found that 71 percent of respondents had never heard of the contract and another 15 percent said it would make no difference in how they voted. Only 7 percent said it would make them more likely to vote for the Republican House candidate, while 5 percent said it would make them less likely to do so. The most prominent Republican effort to nationalize the campaign thus remained almost invisible to voters. This does not mean that individual parts of the contract were not used effectively by Republican campaigners. But the contract itself had far more impact on Republican candidates, before and after the election, than on voters.

Nationalizing the Vote

Although the contract had little to do with it, Republicans did succeed in nationalizing the elections to a much greater degree than usual in recent elections. They

[10] Richard F. Fenno, Jr., *Home Style: House Members in their Districts* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978), 164–168.

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TABLE 1

District Partisanship and Electoral Outcomes in 1994 House Elections (Percentage of Republican Victories)

	District Leans:		
	Republican	*Democratic*	*sig.*
Seats Held by Democrats			
Incumbents	28.8	8.6	p<.001
	(73)	(152)	
Open Seats	100.0	40.0	p<.001
	(16)	(15)	
Seats Held by Republicans			
Incumbents	100.0	100.0	n.s.
	(141)	(16)	
Open Seats	100.0	20.0	p<.001
	(16)	(5)	
Total	78.9	19.1	p<.001
	(246)	(188)	

Note: Republican-leaning districts are defined as those in which the two-party vote for George Bush, averaged across 1988 and 1992, was greater than 50 percent; Democratic-leaning districts are those in which this average fell below 50 percent; the number of districts from which the percentages were computed are in parentheses.

won the House by tying congressional Democrats to Clinton, a discredited government establishment, and a deplorable status quo. In effect, Republicans ran a set of midterm congressional campaigns that mirrored their successful presidential campaigns. As a result, their House victories echoed their presidential successes far more clearly than at any time during the last forty years.

Most of the seats Republicans took from Democrats were in districts that leaned Republican in presidential elections. A serviceable measure of a district's presidential leanings can be computed by taking the average division of its two-party vote between the presidential candidates in 1988 and 1992.[11] The national mean for this measure of district presidential voting habits is 49.9 percent Democratic; its median is 48.3 percent Democratic. As Table 1 shows, Republican gains in 1994 were heavily concentrated in districts where the Democrat's vote, averaged over the two elections, fell below 50 percent. For example, thirty-one open seats formerly held by Democrats were at stake. Republicans won all sixteen open Democratic seats in districts where George Bush's share of the two-party vote, averaged together for 1988 and 1992, exceeded 50 percent; they won only six of the fifteen where the Democrat's presidential average exceeded 50 percent. Republican challengers defeated 21 of 73 (28.8 percent) incumbent Democrats

[11] The 1988 district presidential vote was recomputed for each district to adjust for redistricting after 1990; the data are from Michael Barone and Grant Ujifusa, *The Almanac of American Politics 1994* (Washington, DC: National Journal, 1993).

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in districts where Bush's average exceeded 50 percent, but only 13 of 152 (8.6 percent) where Bush's average fell short of this mark.

The handful of switches to the Democrats followed the same pattern: Democrats took four of five open Republican seats where the Democrats' average share of the presidential vote exceeded 50 percent; they won none of the other sixteen open Republican seats and defeated no Republican incumbents. The net effect of seats changing party hands in 1994 is a closer alignment of district-level presidential and House results than we have seen in any election since 1952—all the more remarkable because no presidential candidates were on the 1994 ballot. Notice, however, that alignment was much closer when incumbency did not intervene; 88 percent of the open seats went to the same party as the district's presidential majority, compared with 79 percent of incumbent-held seats. The simple correlation between the district's 1988 and 1992 presidential vote (averaged) and the 1994 two-party House vote was .88 for open seats, .73 for seats with Democratic incumbents, and only .47 for seats with Republican incumbents.

Republicans won the House in 1994 because an unusually large number of districts voted locally as they had been voting nationally. The same is true, necessarily, of individual voters. According to the exit poll, 89 percent who had voted Republican for president in the previous election voted for the Republican House candidate in 1994 midterm; the comparable figures for 1982, 1986, and 1990 were 69 percent, 65 percent, and 63 percent, respectively. This change arose from a sharp increase in party loyalty among self-identified Republicans; in 1994 only 7 percent of Republican identifiers reported voting for a Democrat, compared to 15 percent in 1992 and 23 percent in 1990. Democratic candidates lost the support of Republican defectors who had in the past helped them win Republican-leaning districts. Democratic identifiers were also more loyal in 1994 than they had been in recent elections (10 percent defected, compared to 11 percent in 1992 and 21 percent in 1990), so the 1994 elections divided the electorate on a more strictly partisan basis than has been typical in recent years.[12]

The Republican party's strong organizational effort to nationalize the campaign was helped enormously by the new national networks of conservative talk-show hosts and conservative Christian activists. Conservatives in general and evangelical Christians in particular turned out at notably higher rates than other voters and comprised a significantly larger proportion of the electorate than in 1992.[13] Republican leaders did an outstanding job of organizing and mobilizing the groups in their coalition and of coaching their candidates in the art of using the party's themes effectively against Democrats. Newt Gingrich earned his speakership.

[12] "Portrait of the Electorate," *New York Times.*

[13] According to a survey sponsored by the Christian Coalition, 33 percent of the 1994 voters were "religious conservatives," up from 24 percent in 1992 and 18 percent in 1988 (*Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 19 November 1994, 3364); in the 1994 exit poll, 38 percent identified themselves as "conservatives," compared with 30 percent in 1992 (*Hotline*, 12 November 1994).

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Still, the Republican most responsible for Gingrich's ascension to Speaker of the House in 1995 was not Gingrich, but George Bush. The termination of divided government in 1992 was an essential to its return, transposed, in 1994. Bush's failure to win reelection put the full force of public anger and frustration with gridlock, policy failure, and the president behind Republican House candidates. Republicans have always done best in House elections when an unpopular Democrat sits in the White House.[14] Robert S. Erikson once offered the tongue-in-cheek argument that losing the presidency was the Democrats' rational strategy for maintaining control of the House.[15] Congressional Democrats may well wish that they had been as shrewd as Erikson supposed.

The House Elections in Perspective

If the key to the Republican victory in 1994 lay in nationalizing the House elections, does this mean that the candidate-centered, locally-focused electoral politics of the textbooks (mine included) went by the boards? The evidence suggests otherwise. Contests for open seats have always reflected national forces—including district presidential preferences—more accurately than have contests for incumbent-held seats.[16] The connection was unusually strong in 1994, to be sure, but that reality alone is insufficient to argue that the conventional understanding of House elections is (at least temporarily) obsolete. Moreover, by all of the familiar aggregate indicators, local variation was as prominent as ever, and for all the usual reasons; national issues mattered in 1994, but the degree to which they mattered depended on how effectively they could be turned into local issues by the candidates and their campaigns.

To begin, the 1994 elections were not nationalized in the sense that electoral forces operated more consistently across districts than they have in other recent elections. Although the mean district vote swing to Republicans was by recent historical standards quite large (5.9 percentage points, the largest since 1974), it was no more uniform than the recent norm.[17] The standard deviation of the swing serves as a straightforward measure of electoral heterogeneity among districts.[18] Figure 1 plots the standard deviation of the swing for all contests and for contests involving incumbents only over the postwar period. The 1994 observations are by no means out of line with those of the post-1964 electoral

[14] Jacobson, *Electoral Origins of Divided Government*, 134–135.

[15] Robert S. Erikson, "Why the Democrats Lose Presidential Elections," *PS: Political Science and Politics* 22 (March 1989): 30–34.

[16] Jeffrey J. Mondak, "Presidential Coattails and Open Seats: The District-Level Impact of Heuristic Processing," *American Politics Quarterly* 21 (July 1993): 307–319.

[17] The swing is defined as the change in the division of the two-party House vote in the district from 1992 to 1994.

[18] There are others; see Jacobson, *Electoral Origins of Divided Government*, 15–19; and Donald E. Stokes, "A Variance-Component Model of Political Effects" in John M. Claunch, ed., *Mathematical Applications in Political Science* (Dallas: Arnold Foundation, 1965).

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FIGURE 1

Variability of the District Vote Swing



era (1966 conventionally marks the beginning of the modern era of highly candidate-centered congressional elections). The standard deviation of the swing for all contests in 1994 was 7.9, compared with the post-1964 average of 8.4; for contests involving incumbents, it was 7.0, compared with the average of 7.7 for the post-1964 period; in neither case is the difference statistically significant.[19]

Second, the electoral value of incumbency remained at a high level in 1994. The Gelman–King index puts it at 10.1 percentage points, though its value was higher for Republicans (11.9 points) than for Democrats (7.1 points).[20] Figure 2 traces the Gelman–King index over House elections since 1946. The 1994 elections were on this dimension again entirely normal. Lucky for the Democrats that they were; the pattern of results displayed in Table 1 suggests that, without the incumbency advantage, the Democratic minority in the 104th Congress would be considerably smaller.

[19] I omitted elections in years ending in "2" from these comparisons because of redistricting.

[20] Gelman and King estimate the incumbency advantage by regressing the Democrat's share of the two-party vote on the Democrat's vote in the previous election, the party holding the seat, and incumbency (which takes 1 if the Democrat is the incumbent, −1 if the Republican is the incumbent, and 0 if the seat is open). The coefficient on the incumbency variable estimates the value (in percentage of votes) of incumbency for the election year. See Andrew Gelman and Gary King, "Estimating the Incumbency Advantage Without Bias," *American Journal of Political Science* 34 (November 1990): 1142–64.

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FIGURE 2

House Incumbency Advantage, 1946–1994



Third, strategic behavior both reflected and magnified election year trends. Democrats behaved as if they expected it to be a bad year for their party and helped to make it so.[21] Strategic Democratic retirements clearly hurt their party's overall performance. Although about the same proportion of House Democrats and Republicans retired (11 percent), most of the Republicans left to run for higher office (13 of 20, 65 percent), while most of the departing Democrats (20 of 27, 71 percent) did not. Among retirees who did not leave to pursue another office, age is the only variable with any predictive power for Republicans, while age, previous vote margin, and district presidential partisanship all contributed significantly to Democratic retirements; the closer the margin in 1992 and the more Republican the district in presidential voting, the more likely a Democrat was to retire. In simple percentages, 18.0 percent of the Democrats in districts that leaned Republican in presidential elections retired, compared with only 7.2 percent of the Democrats in districts that leaned Democratic in presidential elections ($x^2 = 6.94$, $p < .001$). The retirements of the former group proved disastrous for the party; Republicans took every one of the 16 seats thereby exposed.

Another sign of the Democrats' strategic response to expectations was the unusual distribution of uncontested seats. Observe in Figure 3 that for the first

[21] For a discussion strategic candidacies, see Gary C. Jacobson and Samuel Kernell, *Strategy and Choice in Congressional Elections*, 2nd ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983).

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FIGURE 3

Uncontested House Seats, 1946–1994



time in the entire postwar era, Democrats conceded more seats to Republicans (35) than Republicans conceded to Democrats (17) in the general election. The principal explanation for the long-term trend displayed in Figure 3 is of course the rise of the Republican fortunes in the South, but the circumstances prevailing in 1994 certainly contributed to the striking inversion of the usual pattern.

The quality of challengers also reflected rational career strategies, though as usual, potential Democratic challengers were much more sensitive to election year expectations than were Republicans.[22] Democrats have long enjoyed a stronger farm system supplying experienced House candidates, because they hold more of the lower-level offices that form the typical stepping stones to Congress, particularly in state legislatures. Normally, therefore, Democrats have a substantial advantage in experienced challengers. On average over the previous twenty-four postwar congressional elections, 26 percent of the Republican incumbents, but only 16 percent of Democratic incumbents, faced challengers who had previously held elective public office. Prior to 1994, Republicans fielded the more experienced crop of challengers only twice: in 1966, when they picked up 47 seats; and 1992, when they picked up 10 seats while losing the White House. They did so again in 1994, but mainly because so few experienced Democrats were willing to take the field; only 14 percent of Republican incumbents faced

[22] Jacobson, *Electoral Origins of Divided Government*, 57–63.

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TABLE 2

Campaign Spending Patterns in 1994

	Democrats	*Republicans*	*sig.*
Incumbents:			
Average Expenditure	$608,443	$460,393	<.001
More than $500,000	50.2%	36.3%	<.01
More than $700,000	32.0%	15.3%	<.001
More than $1 million	13.8%	1.9%	<.001
Challengers:			
Average Expenditure	$152,659	$244,042	<.01
More than $300,000	18.9%	31.1%	<.05
More than $500,000	6.3%	17.8%	<.01
Open Seats:			
Average Expenditure	$557,660	$597,655	n.s.
More than $500,000	50.0%	60.4%	n.s.

Source: Computed from data reported in Federal Election Commission, "1994 Congressional Fundraising Climbs to New High," news release, 28 April 1995.

experienced Democratic challengers, the second lowest proportion in any postwar election.

The Republicans' proportion of experienced challengers (15 percent) was merely average for them, but then many of their most highly touted challengers were unapologetic amateurs running as antigovernment outsiders. Despite all of the rhetoric condemning career politicians, however, experienced Republican challengers greatly outperformed the novices, picking up significantly more votes and victories. Experienced Republican challengers won 44 percent (15 of 34) of the races they entered, compared with 11 percent (19 of 174) of inexperienced Republican challengers. Naturally, experienced challengers were more common in districts with Republican presidential leanings. But even controlling for local partisanship and other relevant variables, experienced challengers did significantly better on election day, as we shall see in the analysis presented below.

One reason experienced Republican challengers did better on election day than the amateurs is that, as always, they raised and spent much more money. The distribution of campaign funds in 1994 followed the expected pattern in a year when campaign activists expect a strong partisan tide.[23] The data reported in Table 2 show that Republican challengers were significantly better funded than Democratic challengers. Not only was their average spending higher, but more of them were financed beyond the threshold usually required for a competitive campaign. Experienced Republican challengers were especially well funded, spending an average of $471,564 compared with $199,837 for the other Republican challengers. Democrats, on the defensive, channeled relatively more money to incumbents; Republican incumbents had far less to worry about and could get

[23] Gary C. Jacobson, *The Politics of Congressional Elections*, 3rd ed. (New York: HarperCollins, 1992), 165–169.

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away with lower spending. As usual, both parties generously funded any of their candidates for an open seat who was remotely competitive, regardless of national trends.

The strategic allocation of Republican campaign funds was also strongly influenced by local conditions. Republican challengers raised and spent more money in districts that leaned Republican in presidential elections, particularly in districts where Democratic incumbents had made themselves vulnerable by supporting their party and president on key roll-call votes. For this analysis, the measure of party support on key votes is a simple additive index of support for the Clinton administration's position on three major votes in the 103rd Congress. The votes were the 1993 Omnibus Reconciliation Bill (HR 2264), which attacked the deficit by cutting programs and raising taxes (thus opening members who voted for it to the charge of supporting "the biggest tax increase in history"); the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Implementation Bill (HR 3450), which had bipartisan support but was opposed by the Perot constituency; and the 1994 Omnibus Anti-Crime Bill (HR 3355), attacked by Republicans for including what they charged were pork-barrel projects and opposed by the gun lobby for its ban on assault weapons.[24] The index is the number of times the Democrat voted with the Democratic administration; it thus takes values from 0 to 3.

Table 3 shows that the vigor of a Republican challenge, at least as measured by campaign spending, was strongly related to both the local political climate and the Democratic incumbent's degree of party loyalty on tough votes. Democratic loyalists in Republican-leaning districts were the principal targets of the most lavishly-funded Republican challenges. Not surprisingly, the data show that they were most likely to lose the election as well.

Table 3 makes it plain that the fates of Democratic incumbents in 1994 were shaped by their own behavior, as well as by the strength of their opposition and the district's political leanings. To further clarify how these variables worked, I estimated some regression models of their effect on the Democratic incumbent's share of the two-party vote. The independent variables include the Democratic candidate's vote in 1992, district presidential partisanship, the challenger's experience, campaign spending, and the incumbent's support for the administration's position on key votes. District presidential partisanship is estimated by the average district share of the two-party vote that went to the Democratic candidate in 1988 and 1992. Experienced candidates are defined as those who have previously held elective office. Campaign expenditures are entered as the log of total spending, with a minimum of $5,000 assumed for all candidates (spending below this total

[24] Initially I also included the Brady bill (a gun control measure), but it provided no additional explanatory punch, so I dropped it. I substituted *Congressional Quarterly's* presidential support score (averaged for 1993 and 1994) for the key vote index in the regression analyses reported below, but it had much less explanatory power than this three-vote index.

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TABLE 3

The Democrats' Party Loyalty on Key Votes and Republican Challengers' Campaign Spending and Percentage of Republican Victories, by District Presidential Leanings

		All Districts	*Leans Democratic*	*Leans Republican*
Party Support on Key Votes				
0	Spending	$156,564	$42,378	$185,111
	Victories	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
		(5)	(1)	(4)
1	Spending	$180,885	$70,258	$300,361
	Victories	13.5%	7.4%	20.0%
		(52)	(27)	(25)
2	Spending	$220,696	$145,739	$417,806
	Victories	15.3%	7.0%	37.0%
		(98)	(71)	(27)
3	Spending	$355,327	$292,115	$519,677
	Victories	22.6%	15.8%	40.0%
		(54)	(39)	(15)

Note: Democratic-leaning districts are those in which the Democratic presidential candidate's share of the vote, averaged over 1988 and 1992, exceeded 50 percent; the others are defined as Republican-leaning districts; the number of districts from which the spending averages and victory percentages were computed are in parentheses. Spending data are from the Federal Election Commission news release of 28 April 1995.

need not be reported to the Federal Election Commission). The results appear in Table 4.

According to the first two equations in Table 4, campaign spending, challenger experience, and district voting patterns all had their expected large effect on the results of these races. The challenger's level of spending was strongly related to the vote. The incumbent's spending was not, but at least its coefficient displays the expected sign, which is by no means always the case in ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of this sort. Other things equal, the presence of an experienced Republican challenger reduced the incumbent's vote by nearly 2 percentage points, a figure comparable to other recent election years.[25] District presidential partisanship and the Democrat's performance in the previous election were also strongly linked to the Democrat's vote.

The equations in Table 4 also demonstrate that the Democratic incumbents' own behavior affected their electoral fates in a major way. Not only did support for the party's and administration's positions hurt Democrats indirectly by stimulating better funded opposition (recall Table 3), it hurt them directly as well. Equation 1 shows that each of the key votes was individually damaging. By this evidence, House Democrats did not suffer across the board in 1994 for the alleged sins of their party and president; their difficulties were proportional to their support for the administration on the most visible issues before the 103rd Congress. Put another way, the Republicans' national campaign themes were evidently effective

[25] Jacobson, *The Electoral Origins of Divided Government*, 55–57.

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TABLE 4

Impact of Supporting Clinton Administration Positions in the 1994 Election

	All Districts		*South*	*Nonsouth*
	Equation 1	*Equation 2*	*Equation 3*	*Equation 4*
Constant	36.37***	41.98***	68.57**	35.17**
	(9.90)	(9.70)	(25.78)	(10.72)
Democrat's vote in 1992	.39***	.38***	.32**	.39***
	(.05)	(.05)	(.11)	(.07)
District presidential partisanship	.29***	.13	.10	.16
	(.05)	(.07)	(.15)	(.09)
Challenger has held elective office	−1.87	−1.91*	−4.40	−1.47
	(.97)	(.93)	(2.62)	(1.03)
Log of challenger's spending	−2.31***	−2.29***	−1.41*	−2.43***
	(.29)	(.28)	(.69)	(.31)
Log of incumbent's spending	.97	1.23	−1.10	1.62*
	(.66)	(.65)	(1.77)	(.70)
Voted for 1993 budget	−2.30*			
	(1.06)			
Voted for NAFTA	−1.86*			
	(.72)			
Voted for crime bill	−1.15			
	(.79)			
Party support index		−7.23***	−8.45*	−5.83*
		(2.10)	(4.31)	(2.60)
Party support index X District presidential partisanship		.10**	.12	.08
		(.04)	(.08)	(.05)
Adjusted R^2	.80	.81	.70	.84
Number of cases	194	194	53	141

Note: The dependent variable is the Democrat's share of the two-party vote; standard errors are in parentheses.
***p<.001
**p<.01
*p<.05

to the degree that individual Democrats were vulnerable to the charge of supporting the administration on controversial issues. If this is so, we would also expect national campaign themes to have been more effective in districts with a stronger inclination toward Republicans in presidential elections and where Bill Clinton was especially unpopular—the South. Equations 2 through 4 test these hypotheses.

Equation 2 examines the interaction between party support (here entered as the additive index to avoid proliferating interaction terms) and district presidential partisanship. The positive coefficient on the interaction term indicates that the Democrat's level of support for Clinton's policies affected different constituencies differently, costing more votes the more Republican the district had voted in recent presidential elections. Equations 3 and 4 estimate the same model separately for southern and nonsouthern districts. Regressions with interaction terms can be opaque, so Table 5 reports the effect of different levels of support for the

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TABLE 5

The Electoral Penalty Paid by House Democrats for Voting with the Party on Key Votes

District Presidential Partisanship (%)	*Frequency of Party Support*		
	1	*2*	*3*
All Districts			
40	−3.1	−6.2	−9.3
50	−2.0	−4.1	−6.1
60	−1.0	−2.0	−3.0
70	0.0	0.1	0.1
80	1.1	2.1	3.2
South			
40	−3.8	−7.5	−11.3
50	−2.6	−5.2	−7.8
60	−1.4	−2.9	−4.3
70	−0.3	−0.5	−0.8
80	0.9	1.8	2.7
Nonsouth			
40	−2.6	−5.1	−7.2
50	−1.7	−3.5	−5.2
60	−0.9	−1.9	−2.8
70	−0.1	−0.2	−0.4
80	0.7	1.4	2.1

Note: Entries are difference in the Democrats' predicted vote percentage under the alternative conditions as estimated from the equations in Table 4. District presidential partisanship is measured as the two-party vote for Michael Dukakis and Bill Clinton, averaged over the 1988 and 1992 elections; the key votes were on the 1993 Omnibus Reconciliation Bill, NAFTA, and the 1994 crime bill.

party for a range of values of district presidential partisanship estimated by these equations.

Although not all the key coefficients meet the conventional standard of statistical significance, the results are consistent with the view that the incumbent Democrat's roll-call record had a larger impact in the South, where its effect was also more strongly mediated by the district's level of support for Democratic presidential candidates. Both the impact of the voting record and the mediating effect of presidential partisanship were considerably smaller outside the South. In nonsouthern districts, local political conditions—as measured by the incumbent's vote in 1992 and district presidential partisanship and campaign spending—were more strongly related to the vote. Notice that the coefficient on the Democratic incumbent's spending in districts outside the South is both positive and significant; the only other subset set of incumbents for which this has been true since reliable campaign spending data have become available were the Republican incumbents in 1974. In extraordinarily adverse circumstances, incumbents appear to get some benefit from spending money even according to OLS models.

In sum, although all politics was not local in 1994, the electoral effect of national issues varied across districts and regions, depending on incumbency,

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the quality of candidates, the level of campaign spending, the partisan makeup of the district, and the behavior of the incumbent. Wielding potent campaign themes drawn from national issues, Republicans needed only reasonably attractive and well financed candidates to take seats from Democrats in districts that leaned Republican in presidential elections. Democratic retirements from such districts created a host of open-seat opportunities that well funded Republican candidates exploited to the hilt. Against incumbent Democrats, Republicans did best where they fielded experienced, well financed challengers against Democrats whose votes tied them to the Clinton administration in districts where the president (and his party more generally) were relatively unpopular—where, in other words, the local campaign could give their national themes the most extensive publicity, and the local context gave these themes their greatest resonance. Poorly funded Republican challengers were largely unsuccessful, even in districts where the Democrat should have been vulnerable.[26] The central issues in the 1994 House elections may have been national, but how they played out depended strongly on local circumstances.

1996 AND BEYOND

Whether the nationally focused local campaigns of 1994 set a precedent for future House elections is uncertain. Irrespective of that question, however, the election will have profound consequences, for the Democrats' loss of majority status in the House has altered the strategic environment in a way that leaves Republicans in better shape than they have been at any time since the New Deal realignment.

First of all, Democrats have little prospect of taking back many of the seats lost to the Republicans in 1994, particularly in the South, and they are quite likely to lose more of them. The logic of electing conservative Democrats rather than Republicans to protect local, southern interests no longer prevails now that Democrats have lost the special influence wielded by members of the majority party. The same is true in districts outside the South where Democrats have held on through their ability to deliver the goods despite being out of ideological or partisan sync with their constituents.

Second, and equally important, the Democrats will no longer have their majority status and committee power to attract political action committee (PAC) contributions from business interests. The pragmatic corporate and trade association PACs that were happy to make a marriage of convenience with Democrats as long as Democrats were running the show are now free to pursue a love match with the ideologically more compatible Republicans. Their fondness for

[26] Against incumbent Democrats in Republican-leaning districts, 49 percent (19 of 39) of the Republican challengers who spent in excess of $300,000 won, whereas only 6 percent (2 of 32) of the challengers who spent less than this sum managed to defeat the incumbent. If analysis is further confined to Democratic incumbents who supported the Clinton administration on at least two of the three key votes, the respective percentages are 52 percent (14 of 27) and 13 percent (2 of 15).

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Democrats has never extended to challengers, and now they have less incentive to contribute to incumbents as well.[27] They also have less reason to worry about contributing against incumbent Democrats, whose ability to retaliate against PACs who fund their opponents has diminished. Because such groups supply about 60 percent of all PAC donations, Democrats face the prospect of a severely unfavorable imbalance of campaign resources in future elections.

Third, despite the Republican gains in 1994, Democrats still have more House seats at risk by at least two measures. Although the parties won a similar number of the most marginal seats (those won with less than 55 percent of the two-party vote) in 1994, 36 of the 44 marginal Democrats were incumbents, whereas 38 of the 41 marginal Republicans were newly elected and so can expect the sophomore surge to raise their margins next time. Furthermore, only 36 Republicans represent districts that, on average, voted Democratic in 1988 and 1992, whereas 52 Democrats represent Republican presidential districts, 26 of them in the South. As the insults of minority status inspire an additional round of Democratic retirements, Republicans are poised to pick up even more seats.

Finally, all of these developments come on top of the boost given to Republicans by the redistricting that followed the 1990 census. In my earlier work on divided government, I took pains to show that, contrary to Republican allegations, gerrymandered districts were not to blame for their inability to make headway in the House. Their problem was not the way Republican voters were distributed, but that Republican candidates simply did not attract enough voters.[28] In 1994, they finally did attract enough voters. For the first time since 1952, Republicans won more House votes than Democrats (53.6 percent of the two-party House vote went Republican); and for the first time since 1952, they won more House seats than the Democrats. Still, there is no question that reapportionment and redistricting did contribute to their victory. The states in the South and Southwest that gained seats after the 1990 census are notably more Republican in their voting habits than the states in the Northeast and Midwest that lost the seats. The drawing of minority–majority districts also strengthened Republicans by packing African-American (that is, overwhelmingly Democratic) votes into minority districts.[29] The effects of reapportionment were muted in 1992, because George Bush was a drag on the whole Republican ticket, but the potential was evident in the party's gain of ten House seats that year despite losing the White House. In 1994, Republicans more than fulfilled that potential.

Taken together, these circumstances suggest that, despite the Republicans' relatively narrow majority (narrower than any of the Democrats' majorities during

[27] Gary C. Jacobson, "Parties and PACs in Congressional Elections" in Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, eds., *Congress Reconsidered*, 4th ed. (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1989), 117–152.

[28] Jacobson, *Electoral Origins of Divided Government*, 94–96.

[29] Kevin A. Hill, "Does the Creation of Black Majority Districts Aid Republicans? An Analysis of the 1992 Congressional Elections in Eight Southern States," *Journal of Politics* 57 (May 1995): 384–401.

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their forty uninterrupted years of control), the Democrats face an uphill battle in trying to take the twenty or more seats they need to regain control.[30] On the other hand, House Republicans so far seem bent on the high-risk strategy of tying their fates to their party's collective performance in delivering on the "Contract with America" under the singular leadership of Newt Gingrich. If they succeed and voters like the results, then Republicans will pick up additional seats in 1996. Neither success nor voter approbation is remotely guaranteed, however. Republicans cannot cut taxes, spend more on defense, and balance the budget without slashing middle-class entitlements and terminating entrenched programs supported by powerful constituencies. Devotion to the contract ensures that, in the 104th Congress, Republican members are the ones casting politically dangerous roll-call votes, forcing the familiar trade-off between individual responsiveness and collective responsibility.

During the decades of Democratic control, individual responsiveness to local interests almost always trumped collective party responsibility.[31] Adopting the contract as a focus and delegating more power to party leaders than any House majority since the revolt against Joe Cannon in 1910, the Republicans have tried to commit themselves to a far greater degree of collective responsibility. Whether they hold to that commitment against pressures from district interests targeted to bear the immediate costs of carrying out the contract's fiscal promises will do much to shape future House elections. If they hold fast, then the heightened impact of national issues observed in the 1994 House elections should continue; the 1996 elections will turn into a referendum on the Republican Congress as well as on the Clinton administration. If they do not, the diffuse, locally focused electoral politics of the recent past could reemerge, with individual members saving their own skins but weakening their party collectively in the process. What happens will depend on how many Republicans give high priority to reelection (not a few of the first-termers deny interest in a congressional career) and whether those who care about reelection believe they would be hindered more by their party's falling short on the contract or by voting to inflict the pain that enacting key parts of the "Contract" would require. For students of the electoral connection, the 104th should turn out to be the most interesting Congress in years.*

[30] The initial Republican majority of 230 had grown to 236 by early 1996 through party switches (5) and special elections.

[31] See David R. Mayhew, *Congress: The Electoral Connection* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974); and R. Douglas Arnold, *The Logic of Congressional Action* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990).

* Slightly different versions of this article have appeared as "The 1994 House Elections in Perspective" (paper prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 6–8 April 1995) and in Philip A. Klinkner, ed., *Midterm: The Elections of 1994 in Context* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996).

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Dismantling the Federal Safety Net: Fictions Versus Realities

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

Since 1981, Republican office holders in the White House and in Congress have been trying to dismantle the fifty- to sixty-year old constellation of federal grants giving financial aid to poor people and poor cities. The Reagan and Bush administrations did succeed in actually eliminating some grant programs to city governments that helped poor people indirectly – general revenue-sharing and urban development action grants. And they cut others – community development block grants, economic assistance grants and loans, mass transit grants – some drastically in constant dollars.[1] But neither the Reagan nor Bush administration was able to cut out the social safety net programs that provided benefits to poor people directly or even to keep spending on those programs from rising.

With the purported objective of both balancing the federal budget and giving an income tax cut of $245 billion over seven years, the new 1995–1996 Republican congressional majorities have been trying to eliminate the federal social safety net that has guaranteed some minimum floor below which the living conditions of poor people – including mostly poor children – would not be allowed to fall anywhere in the United States. In place of that safety net, the Republican majorities would substitute capped block grants of money to each state for the purpose of covering the needs now addressed by safety net programs like welfare, Medicaid, food stamps, and school lunches and leave to state governments the defining of eligibility for benefits and what kinds of benefits to provide.[2] The new congres-

[1] For a fuller discussion of this part of the cutbacks, see Demetrios Caraley, "Washington Abandons the Cities," *Political Science Quarterly* 107 (Spring 1992): 1–30.

[2] This article will not discuss the 104th Congress's proposals for cutting projected increases in spending for Medicare, because Medicare is not a means-tested program and its beneficiaries have contributed to it through payment of the Medicare payroll tax.

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sional majorities would also cut the federal Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) for the working poor, thus decreasing their after-tax earnings.

The Republican arguments for dismantling the federal social safety net and devolving parts of it to the states have been generally consistent over the years and have been based on five major claims about reality, though in 1995–1996 there was an additional claim specific to the 104th Congress:

- The federal government's intervention to fund individual benefits for the poor was an unconstitutional usurpation that started during Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal and greatly expanded during Lyndon Johnson's Great Society, presumably against the wishes of state and city officials and electorates.
- Government spending—or throwing money at problems—cannot help the conditions of the poor.
- Local and especially state governments—the so-called governments closest to the people—are better equipped than the federal government to make choices about what mix of taxes and levels of spending their citizens should have for essential services, amenities for the middle class, and benefits and services for the poor.
- Block-granting and capping federal spending programs and devolving them to the states is a technical, win-win solution that will both improve effectiveness and save money without hurting anyone.
- The 1994 congressional elections gave the 1995–1996 Republican congressional majorities an undeniable electoral mandate to enact the "Contract with America," and that mandate specifically included proposals to cut or cap safety net spending, to block-grant to the states as many federal social spending programs as possible, to give a large tax cut concentrated on upper middle-class and upper-class taxpayers, and to eliminate completely the $150 to $200 billion annual deficit within seven years.
- The federal government is essentially broke. Being broke, the federal government is unable to maintain the level of spending necessary to continue benefits under current law to the existing eligible population of poor people. Drastic cuts in spending for the poor are absolutely necessary to bring the deficit under control and eliminate it by FY (fiscal year) 2002.

"If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences."[3]

Given their values, it is what policy makers and voters define as reality that controls the positions they take in policy disputes. This article's argument is that only one of the realities summarized above is even partially true and that the

[3] W. I. and Dorothy Swain Thomas, *The Child in America* (New York: Knopf, 1928), 572. For more on what has been called the "Thomas Theorem," see Robert K. Merton, "The Thomas Theorem and the Matthew Effect," *Social Forces* 74 (December 1995): 379–424.

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other five are fictional and cannot provide intellectual support for dismantling the federal safety net and devolving it to the states. The remainder of the article will analyze each of the claimed realities in turn and then offer some likely scenarios for the nation if the 1995–1996 Republican-type devolution proposals were to be adopted and implemented in future administrations or Congresses. It should be noted that President Bill Clinton indicated his readiness to sign the welfare reform act that passed the Senate in the fall of 1995[4]—even though that bill would have devolved the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program to the states. Furthermore, in May of 1996, Wisconsin announced that subject to a federal waiver being approved, it would completely eliminate welfare payments and substitute a program of subsidized private jobs or public service jobs that would pay qualifying poor people only for work performed; Clinton immediately announced in his regular Saturday radio program that the Wisconsin program looked interesting and that a waiver would be granted. Also in the spring of 1996 the Clinton administration was working with the Republican congressional leadership on a bill that would consolidate almost all housing programs into two block grants. In short, even if Clinton were to be reelected with new Democratic congressional majorities, the devolution proposals would not be dead.

Political Setting

Despite questions about the validity of their rationales, at different points in the 1995 and 1996 legislative process the Republican leadership was able to secure majorities in the House or the Senate for most of its proposals to dismantle the federal safety net. The major pieces of legislation that were passed in both chambers and sent to the president—the welfare reform act (also called the Personal Responsibility Act of 1995) and the FY 1996 Reconciliation Act (also called the Balanced Budget Act)—were both vetoed by President Clinton.[5] The Republican majorities made no attempt to override those vetoes, since the legislation had passed narrowly in the Senate and by smaller than two-thirds majorities in the House. The Republicans did try to force Clinton to sign various parts of these proposals into law by attaching them in late 1995 and early 1996 as riders to appropriations acts, appropriations continuing resolutions, and bills raising the

[4] The Senate passed the welfare bill 88–12 with only eleven Democrats voting against it. Clinton warned that if the Senate bill were not preserved in the conference version and objectionable features of the House bill, such as a lower maintenance of effort level or bans on additional welfare payment to welfare mothers who had another child were added, he would veto the bill; such House features were added to the conference report and Clinton vetoed the bill.

[5] Congress approved and President Clinton signed a bill in April 1995 that allowed self-employed people a tax deduction for health insurance premiums; as part of the bill and because of the need to "pay" for the new deduction under relevant budget act provisions, Congress and the president agreed to deny any EITC to people who had incomes in excess of $2,500 from interest, dividends, rental properties, or royalties.

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federal debt ceiling—measures that were necessary to keep the federal government open for business. Nevertheless, Clinton refused to sign the measures, large parts of the federal government closed down on two occasions, and eventually the Republican majorities voted the measures needed to reopen the federal government.

Since safety net entitlements have mandatory appropriations, not changing the legislation that authorizes them allows spending to continue on the same basis as in previous years, so none of the proposed curtailments on the entitlement safety net programs was implemented. But spending levels for discretionary spending programs helping poor people and poor cities—for example, legal services to the poor, mass transit—have to be set annually, and the new Republican congressional majorities were able to pass with Clinton's signature continuing resolutions or appropriations acts reducing the spending for those programs by about 15 percent from FY 1995.[6] And if the voters were to elect a Republican president in November 1996 or increase the Republican majorities to two-thirds in both houses of Congress, the Republican block-granting and devolution policies would come back in the 105th Congress as very live issues.

Five Fictions

The "Federal Usurpation" Fiction

The fiction that the federal government has usurped state and local government powers in undertaking social spending and grant programs and for that reason should return those powers to the states is disconnected from historical fact.

Federal grant programs like AFDC cash-welfare payments, Medicaid, community-development block grants, grants for mass transit, food stamps, nutritional programs for pregnant women, infants, and other children, etc. can, quite literally, never be *returned* to the states, because the states never had them to begin with.[7] The language of ostensibly impartial publications like the *New York Times* and the *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, as well as of academic analysts, has been so captured by the rhetoric of the Republican devolution advocates that they too talk almost always of returning, rather than simply turning over to the states for the first time, the social safety net for the poor and other urban aid programs.

Despite attacks on the federal government's purported usurpation, most federal social welfare programs have been based on the so-called spending power

[6] By contrast, spending on discretionary programs that were not targeted to poor people was decreased by only about 5 percent. See "The House and Senate Omnibus Appropriations Bills: How Would They Affect Low-Income Programs?" (Washington DC: The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 1996), 25 March 1996.

[7] Some states had mothers' pensions for widows with children, but these programs ran out of money during the Great Depression.

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of Congress, which derives from its constitutional authority "to lay and collect taxes. . . to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States."[8] As Congress exercised it since adoption of the Constitution and as the Supreme Court eventually ruled in 1936,[9] this clause permits the spending of federal monies not only in the substantive areas that Congress can regulate under its various enumerated powers, but also for any purpose that comes within the meaning of the broad terms "general welfare" or "common defense" of the United States.

Nor did the federal government establish individual safety net programs against some great opposition from states that it simply overrode. In reality, federal spending programs for poor people were taken on because city or state officials evidenced either an unwillingness or an incapacity to act. State and local government participation has been voluntary in virtually all grant programs. Indeed, state and local governments did not get supplanted by a federal bureaucracy but were the governments that actually administered, albeit subject to federal regulations, the programs receiving federal aid. Also, federal grant and individual aid programs were not developed in a vacuum by some federal establishment insulated in Washington, DC, with little contact or awareness of state and local conditions and needs. Federal benefit programs were developed in full consultation with state and local officials, who both testified and lobbied on different aspects. They had to have been approved by a majority of a Senate whose membership is elected from the fifty states and a majority of a House of Representatives elected by 435 local subdivisions of states. In this kind of governmental system, no federal program that has strong opposition in many states or localities can pass. Thus the federal involvement with social welfare and other grants to state and local governments reflected not a usurpation of power, but the traditional pattern in American government that if a serious domestic problem is to be solved, the federal government must join in a cooperative effort to cope with it.

Moreover, this expansion of the federal role was something the constitutional Founders foresaw and planned by putting the "necessary and proper" clause in Article I and the "supremacy" clause in Article VI of the new Constitution of 1789.[10] James Madison, no friend of federal usurpation, asked rhetorically in *The Federalist*, No. 45, when he was urging the New York State convention to ratify that constitution:

[8] U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 8.

[9] *U.S. v. Butler*, 297 U.S.1 (1936).

[10] The "necessary and proper" clause reads, "To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." Art. I, sect. 8. The supremacy clause reads, "This Constitution and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." Article VI.

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> . . . if . . . the Union be essential to the happiness of the people of America, is it not preposterous to urge as an objection to a government . . . that such government may derogate from the importance of the governments of the individual States? Was, then, the American Revolution effected, was the American Confederacy formed, was the precious blood of thousands spilt, and the hard-earned substance of millions lavished, not that the people of America should enjoy peace, liberty, and safety, but that the governments of the individual States, that particular municipal establishments, might enjoy a certain extent of power and be arrayed with certain dignities and attributes of sovereignty? . . . [A]s far as the sovereignty of the States cannot be reconciled to the happiness of the people, the voice of every good citizen must be, Let the former be sacrificed to the latter. . . .[11]

It was very early in the nation's history, in 1819, when John Marshall was chief justice and many of the other Founders were still alive, that the Supreme Court held in the case of *McCulloch v. Maryland* that Congress could legislate not only on the specific subjects actually mentioned and enumerated in Article I, but also on whatever was "necessary and proper" to carry out these enumerated powers and all other powers vested in the federal government by the Constitution. The major issue in the case was whether Congress had the power to charter a Bank of the United States, even though chartering banks was not specifically mentioned in Article I. As Chief Justice John Marshall wrote, "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with letter and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional."[12] The Court's reasoning was that such a bank was "necessary and proper" for carrying out enumerated powers to "collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises," to "borrow money," to "coin money," and "regulate the value thereof."

In 1995–1996 some Republican devolutionists further claimed that despite Congress's general constitutional reach under Article I, Congress was acting beyond the scope of its powers when regulating or spending in many social and economic matters, because it intruded in areas reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment. The text of that amendment—part of the original Bill of Rights—reads:

> The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.

When campaigning in the 1996 Republican primaries, Senator Robert Dole would wave a notecard that contained the text of the Tenth Amendment and claimed that if elected he would "return" many programs to the states, "where they belonged."

Yet it was also in 1819 in *McCulloch v. Maryland* that the Supreme Court ruled the Tenth Amendment could not be used to nullify a federal exertion of power that was justified under Article I's enumerated powers including the "necessary

[11] *The Federalist*, No. 45.

[12] *McCulloch v. Maryland*, 4 Wheat. 316.

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and proper" clause.[13] While in the next hundred years there were a few cases in which the Supreme Court abandoned the Marshall Court's view and used the Tenth Amendment's "reserved powers" to overturn congressional legislation, by 1941—some fifty-five years before the 104th Congress—the Court returned to the Marshall Court's position and held that, "[t]he power of Congress" under its enumerated powers "is complete in itself [and] may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations other than are prescribed in the Constitution." With respect to any Tenth Amendment reserved powers belonging to the states, Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone said for a unanimous Court:

> Our conclusion is unaffected by the Tenth Amendment which . . . states but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered.[14]

The "You Can't Solve Problems by Throwing Money at Them" Fiction

This fiction is one way of justifying massive cuts in government spending. If one can be made to believe that spending money doesn't work anyway, then that person can conclude that cutting isn't going to hurt anyone and may even do some good by allowing tax cuts.

Of course, in expensive federal spending programs, just as in spending programs of large private corporations and nonprofit organizations, there are millions and perhaps even billions of dollars that are not helping to solve problems, because those dollars are being siphoned away by what is commonly referred to in government parlance as fraud, waste, and abuse. Everyone agrees that this kind of unnecessary spending must be eliminated. Furthermore, it is widely understood that some major social problems are caused by self-destructive and other antisocial human behavior that we do not yet know how to change for the better, regardless of what kinds of spending may be available.[15] We don't yet know, for example, how to change the behavior of unmarried teenage mothers having babies without fathers of their children to marry them or without having jobs to take care of them; we don't know enough about how to stop violent criminal behavior except through very expensive incarceration; we don't know a great deal about how to improve learning in schools in poor neighborhoods.

[13] Ibid., 406.

[14] *United States v. Darby,* 312 U.S. 100. But see *Garcia v. San Antonio Metro,* 469 US (1985) 528, where it was only a slim 5–4 majority that held to the position that the Tenth Amendment provided no substantive impediment to the exercise of federal power and that the only protection for states came from their role in the national political process. Also see not a Tenth but an Eleventh Amendment case where the Supreme Court with a different, but equally slim 5–4 majority ruled that Congress had unconstitutionally exceeded its powers by requiring suits involving certain disputes between state governments and Indian tribes to be settled in federal trial courts. *Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,* 116 S. Ct. 1114.

[15] See Demetrios Caraley, "Epistemological Obstacles," *City Government and Urban Problems* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1977), chap. 18.

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But there are many other problem areas where we do have the necessary knowledge, where the technology does already exist, and where all that is needed to improve conditions is to spend substantially more money. This applies to governmental housekeeping services like sanitation, highways, water supplies, and the like. If various governments threw a lot more dollars at the sanitation departments of different cities so that, say, they could double their budgets, they could then double the number of sanitation trucks, double the crews, and their cities would be a lot cleaner. If New York City had a lot more money to spend during the 1970s, it could have taken care of decaying bridges through preventive maintenance and would not have had the West Side Highway collapsing. More money for libraries would allow them to stay open more hours and to buy more new books. And federal general revenue sharing in the 1970s and 1980s—essentially six billion dollars of block-granted funds, two-thirds of which went directly to local, and one-third to state governments—gave local and state governments additional funds to strengthen programs that they decided just needed more money in order to work better.[16]

One major justification often advanced by the 104th Congressional Republicans specifically for cutting safety net programs is that hundreds of billions or even trillions of federal dollars have been thrown at poverty since Lyndon Johnson's War on Poverty, yet poverty persists and is severe. But the reality is that even at the height of spending on Johnson's War on Poverty, there was never any authorization or appropriation for simply giving more money to the poor. That could theoretically have been done through a federally-mandated increase in minimum welfare payments or through a negative income tax or even through a massive program of job creation. But this was not done then and has never been done since. In FY 1994, the median state's maximum AFDC payment was only 38 percent of the poverty threshold and when combined with the value of food stamps, it was still only 69 percent of that threshold.[17]

The most successful federal antipoverty programs have been those that actually did give out more money—by increasing social security payments with cost-of-living increases (COLAs) to the retired and by giving larger earned-income tax credits to the working poor. Furthermore, the money spent on welfare, Medicaid, food stamps, housing assistance, and other safety net programs has in fact been highly successful, if success is defined not as eliminating poverty but as keeping poor adults and children at least from starving or dying from lack of

[16] General revenue sharing was begun in 1972 at about $6 billion a year in funding and was additive to federal funding for specific grant programs; the state portion was ended in 1980 under the Carter administration and the local government part, in FY 1986 under Reagan.

[17] Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, *Overview of Entitlement Programs: 1994 Green Book: Background Material and Data on Programs within the Jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994), tables 10–11, 366–67.

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medical care or freezing on the streets as homeless families. This kind of success through governmental spending is a substantial accomplishment.[18]

Many of the same people, incidentally, who say that throwing money doesn't help on domestic problems, have acted on the premise that throwing money at the Defense Department does do a lot of good. They believe that our military buildup in the 1980s bankrupted and then destroyed the Soviet Union, created a war machine that won the Gulf War in record time, and even in 1995, when every other area was being cut, they added more money in defense appropriations for an antiballistic defense system. And even on domestic problems, the most conservative Republican critics of governmental spending will agree that the crime problem will be reduced by spending to build more prisons and put more police on the streets.

The "Superiority of State and Local Choice" Fiction

This fiction says that even if the federal government does have the constitutional authority to fund social welfare spending programs, it is local and especially state governments—the governments closest to the people—that are better equipped to make choices about the mix of taxes and spending on benefits and services for the poor.

But that justification is based on a false premise—that all units of state and local government have choices open to them and can just choose differently on the basis of different traditions, priorities, values, or even taste. In fact, different state and city governments have vastly different taxable resources and poverty-related needs. One simple set of statistics from the 1990 census using median family income as an indicator of a state's ability to impose taxes shows that the four poorest states—Mississippi, West Virginia, Louisiana, and Tennessee—had median family incomes averaging about $22,000. This was *only slightly more than half* of the median family income of the richest states—Connecticut, Alaska, Hawaii, and New Hampshire—with family incomes averaging $39,000.

Furthermore, when a state's poverty rate is examined as one measure of the need for costly services and programs, the range is striking, from an average of 22.5 percent of the population in poverty in Mississippi, Louisiana, New Mexico and Arizona to an average of 6.7 percent for Connecticut, New Hampshire, Delaware, and Rhode Island, *a difference of over three to one.* Finally, if one calculates as an indicator of fiscal capacity and hence of the ability to make *real* choices, the amount of family income available to be taxed for each one percent of poverty, the range becomes tremendous. The 1990 median income per one percent of poverty for Mississippi and Louisiana was at $949 and $785, only about one-seventh of the $6,500 available in Connecticut and New Hamp-

[18] For other successes, see Susan Mayer and Christopher Jencks, "War on Poverty: No Apologies, Please," *New York Times,* 9 November 1995.

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FIGURE 1



Source: Derived from data in *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1992*, Table 701.

shire. Figure 1 shows visually the great disparities among states in resources relative to their poverty needs.

It could get worse.

New York Governor George Pataki—a conservative Republican in a traditionally liberal state—proposed in early 1996 that there be further devolution of responsibilities for poor people to city and county governments, presumably with capped block grants and the opportunity for cities and counties to spend their own funds if they wanted more coverage or benefits or if they exhausted the state appropriation. No doubt other governors would also try to devolve these expensive responsibilities.

Yet the disparities among city and other local government jurisdictions in taxable median income and poverty needs are even wider than among state governments. Statistics from the 1990 census show that for the fifty largest central cities, the poorest city, Miami, had at $19,725 only about two-fifths the median family income to be taxed of the richest city, San Jose, with $50,281. With respect to the poverty rate, the range goes from 32.4 percent in poverty for Detroit to 9.3 percent for San Jose—a difference of 3.5 to 1. Finally, with respect to the amount of median family income available to be taxed for each one percent of poverty, the range becomes immense. In 1990 among central cities, that median income for Miami at $632 was less than one-eighth that of San Jose's at $5,407. When one adds the data for suburban local governments, the Milwaukee suburban

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

Source: Derived from data in *1990 Census, Social and Economic Characteristics: Metropolitan Areas*, series CP-2-1, B.

ring[19] had $14,414 for each percentage of poor in its population while the city of Miami had only $632, a difference of 23 to 1.

Figure 2 shows visually the great disparities even among central cities in resources relative to their poverty needs, and the broad concentration of central cities in the low resources/high poverty needs quadrant and of suburban rings in the high resources/low poverty needs quadrant.

Clearly, real choices about levels of taxes, housekeeping services, and benefits for the poor are open only to wealthy states, cities, and suburbs with modest poverty needs, while poor jurisdictions have choices only in theory. In reality, poor states and cities cannot *choose* but are simply forced into the "provide-less, cut-more, and tax-more" vicious circle that makes their jurisdictions less and less attractive to families and businesses wealthy enough to be able to move

[19] The statistics for suburbs are those given by the Census Bureau for the "Remainder of Metropolitan Area." These suburban rings are, of course, only statistical artifacts and represent no real governmental jursidiction. Each ring may have from a score to a hundred suburban municipalities, which themselves vary in capacity. But the differences between central cities and the aggregate of local governments in suburban jurisdictions is so wide that it is not misleading to make comparisons between central cities and their suburban rings as wholes, as does the Census Bureau.

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away. This moving away of the more affluent inevitably further erodes the tax bases of the worst-off states and cities, requiring some combination of higher rates to collect the same revenues and further cutbacks in services, thus providing even stronger incentive for middle class flight and an ever-present chilling effect against more spending on services and benefits for the poor.

The transfer to states and localities of more funding responsibilities for social welfare programs means that there will be a tremendously wide range both in the ability and in the inclination to replace lost federal aid with funds generated by state and local taxes even in a prosperous national economy. Jurisdictions with high taxable resources and low concentrations of poor people—for example, thriving high-tech areas, high-income suburbs, and even some sunbelt central cities like San Jose—have the capacity to keep services high, to continue to provide, if they are inclined to do so politically, the preexisting levels of benefits to the small concentrations of poor people within their borders, and to keep tax rates low. But even the wealthiest states and localities are unlikely to want to become known as jurisdictions with especially good benefits for the poor, because they would not want to become welfare magnets.

Jurisdictions with low taxable resources and high concentrations of poor people—for example, the larger, older declining cities primarily of the East, Midwest, and even the South with high concentrations of ghetto poor, and snowbelt states with high levels of structural unemployment—have little or no capacity to substitute state- or locally-generated revenues for lost federal aid. The Republican devolution policies would strengthen the vicious circle through which rich jurisdictions get richer and better served while poor jurisdictions get poorer and even less well served, because the amount of federal money available would not, as under existing law, have automatically increased during recessions as more people needed benefits. Also in times of recession when revenues drop, state and local governments, because they are required by law or state constitutional provision to have annual balanced budgets, will have less, rather than more, funds to take care of the increased numbers of unemployed who drop into poverty.

In sum, state and local governments are actually the worst possible levels of government for service and benefit programs that intend to redistribute money through taxes and spending from the better-off to help the poor. This occurs because the smaller the governmental jurisdiction, the greater the likelihood of a mismatch between needs and resources, with jurisdictions with the most poor having the fewest taxable resources to help them. Federal funding of safety net programs for the poor means that the cost of helping the disadvantaged can be shared by taxpayers throughout the country, as are the costs of major floods, hurricanes, and other natural but very expensive disasters. For just as in natural disasters, it was not the actions of state or city governments that caused the high rates of poverty and welfare dependency, violent crime, AIDS, homelessness, and the escalating cost of medical care in state and city jurisdictions; nor do states or city governments cause national recessions that savage the revenues of states and local governments.

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The "Superiority of State Block Grants" Fiction

The fiction that capping federal spending programs and devolving them to the states as block grants is in reality a technical win-win solution that will both improve efficiency and save money without hurting anyone is implausible on its face. There are already many forms of federal block grants that have been tried, and it is clear that whether block grants benefit or hurt particular beneficiaries depends on the allocation formula, the total amount of funds to be available for block grants, the base line for the size of the first round of block grants, whether there are mandatory pass-throughs to lower levels of government, and what had been the previous method of federal funding. There have also been successful block grants that send federal money not to states, but directly to cities, such as community development block grants and the discontinued general revenue sharing payments to local governments.

With respect to technical efficiency, there is no evidence to support a proposition that all state governors, legislatures, and bureaucracies are more efficient and dedicated than the organs of the federal government and through some magic are better at "doing more with less."[20] There is also no evidence to show there are such huge inefficiencies in the safety net programs that funds saved from eliminating them in Medicaid, for example, would equal the $182 billion the Republicans would cut in funding over seven years or the over $282 billion they would cut in all means-tested entitlement programs combined—Medicaid, food stamps, child nutrition, EITC, and Supplemental Security Income (SSI). And since all evidence shows that many governors are poised to withdraw state funds from these same programs for which matching or maintenance of effort is required, the total cuts presumably to be made up with greater efficiencies are even larger than that.

Furthermore, the reality is that devolution does not have to be all or nothing; in order to give state governments greater leeway to deal with the particularities of their own states, federal guarantees of certain minimum benefits and minimum coverage need not be scrapped.

The welfare and Medicaid systems that evolved by 1995–1996 were able to do just that, because they allowed many state-by-state variations in detail through waivers while also still insisting on some federal minimal guarantees to protect the most vulnerable people from falling through the cracks. Although various Republican governors like John Engler of Michigan and Tommy Thompson of Wisconsin have complained about being strangled by the federal bureaucracy administering welfare, they have also taken credit for large-scale changes that they were able to impose in their respective state's welfare programs under existing federal welfare legislation. Some required getting waivers from the Department

[20] For one analysis of the possibilities and limitations of doing more with less, see Demetrios Caraley, *Doing More with Less: Cutback Management in the Koch Administration* (New York: Columbia University Public Affairs Program, 1982).

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of Health and Human Serivces (HHS) in Washington. But by the spring of 1996, thirty-seven states had won waivers of federal welfare regulations, either to adopt time limits for AFDC benefits or to impose other restrictions, including stringent work requirements and a denial of additional benefits to women who have more children while on welfare.[21] In Connecticut, Governor John Rowland in 1995, after having won a federal waiver and his legislature's approval, imposed the nation's strictest time limit, twenty-one months, on benefits for welfare families. To make such waivers easier, President Clinton announced at the summer 1995 governors' conference in Burlington, Vermont, that he had instructed the Department of Health and Human Services to act on waiver requests within thirty days of their submission by states.[22]

Furthermore, even having or not having an AFDC program has since its beginning in the Social Security Act of 1935 been a state option. Strictly speaking, the entitlement nature of AFDC is not for individuals but for states to receive matching federal dollars (on a variable matching formula depending on a state's per capita income) for every dollar they spend under that program, first on poor children and eventually on poor children and their unemployed parent or parents. State governments have also always had the option of setting benefit levels, as evidenced by the very wide range among the states: in 1994, for example, Mississippi, Alabama, South Carolina, and Texas had maximum monthly benefits (per one-parent family of three) of $121, $164, $200, and $184 respectively; while New York (in New York City), Washington, California, and Hawaii had $577, $546, $607, and $712, differences of over three to one between the most generous and least generous states.[23] So it is hard not to agree with Democratic Governor Thomas R. Carper of Delaware, when he reflected at the 1995 summer governors' conference about block-granting the safety net programs, "In the end, it's the money, . . . We have all the flexibility we need."[24]

With respect to help given to poor people who do not qualify for AFDC because they have no dependent children but are receiving some kind of "welfare" loosely defined, the states are completely autonomous. Michigan's Governor Engler in 1991 won his state legislature's approval to completely eliminate Michigan's general assistance program, which had paid $147 a month to each of 83,000 adults; by 1995 half a dozen other states, including Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, followed the Michigan example and eliminated general assistance altogether. In New York, Governor Pataki in 1996 proposed a sixty-day limit during each twelve-month period for aid under Home Relief, which is New York's general assistance program.[25] Pataki claimed that his proposed reductions in

[21] "Welfare Revamp, Halted in Capital, Proceeds Anyway," *New York Times*, 10 March 1996.

[22] Governors Split on Welfare Plans," *Washington Post*, 1 August 1995.

[23] *1994 Green Book*, 366-367, tables 10–11.

[24] "President to Order Changes in Welfare: Food Stamp Rules, State Waivers Addressed," *Washington Post*, 31 July 1995.

[25] "Welfare Revamp," *New York Times*.

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general assistance and AFDC benefits would put New York in line with some surrounding states, including Pennsylvania, but would make it less generous than some other northeastern states like Vermont and Rhode Island.

In sum, if 1995–1996-style capped block grants were adopted, they could not guarantee painless large-scale savings. They would only guarantee reduced federal and state outlays for safety net programs, but at unpredictable costs in contraction or denial of benefits to poor children, poor parents of those children, and elderly individuals who were poor after using up their resources and were in long-term-care nursing homes or receiving home health services. Medicaid is perceived by many as another form of welfare for "undeserving poor" AFDC mothers and their children. While those two groups constituted in the last available tabulation 71 percent of Medicaid recipients, they accounted for only 29 percent of Medicaid expenditures; the aged, the blind, and the disabled, on the other hand, constituted only 29 percent of Medicaid recipients but accounted for 69 percent of total Medicaid expenditures.[26]

The "Contract with America" Mandate Fiction

The "Contract with America" fiction by its very terms has only been used during the 1995–1996 Congress. Specifically, the newly elected Republican majorities claimed loudly that they had a mandate from the voters to enact all the very specific cutback, devolution, and tax cut proposals they put forth in their welfare reform and reconciliation legislation. They accused their opponents of being undemocratic by not approving what the voters wanted.

But the reality is that the "Contract with America" document that was available to the voters before the 7 November 1994 elections was a short one of 964 words that said nothing at all about capping and block-granting welfare or Medicaid to state governments; nor did it talk about a $245 billion tax cut or a tax increase for the working poor; nor did it mention making massive cuts in projected Medicare spending in order to finance the tax cut; nor did it mention any seven-year timetable for eliminating the deficit completely. The bulkier version of the "Contract," including detailed draft legislation that came out as a short book, went to press in late September, and did not come out until after the election in December.[27] Its content, therefore, could scarcely have been in the minds of voters.[28]

[26] *1994 Green Book,* tables 18.15, 18.16, 799–802.

[27] Ed Gillespie and Bob Schellas, eds., *Contract With America: The Bold Plan by Rep. Newt Gingrich, Rep. Dick Armey and the House Republicans to Change the Nation* (New York: Times Books, 1994).

[28] See James G. Gimpel, *Fulfilling the Contract: The First 100 Days* (Needham Heights, MA: Allyn & Bacon, 1996). As the author put it in a personal communication: "The Contract was never a static, completed document. There are general principles, and they are adequately summarized in the Contract book the Republicans put out, but many things were in a state of flux from the beginning—and still are. . . . The Contract book went to press in September and came out just after the election. Note that the book is very general and does not contain any of the bells and whistles that were added later. . . . Few people in the Republican conference took the content and thrust of this legislation very seriously until after the November election when it dawned on them that they'd have to act on this

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Moreover, various opinion polls show that only a minuscule number of voters in the 1994 congressional elections was even aware that the "Contract with America" existed, let alone knew of its content and had that content determine their voting decision on members of Congress. In a paper assessing the 1994 elections for the House, a leading political scientist summarizes the impact of the "Contract" as follows:

> Ironically, the Republicans' "Contract with America," which became so prominent in setting the Republican agenda after the election, had, in itself, little impact on the voters. On September 27, more than 300 Republican House candidates signed a pledge on the steps of the Capitol to act swiftly on a grab-bag of proposals for structural and legislative change, including constitutional amendments requiring a balanced budget and imposing term limits on members of Congress, major cuts in income taxes, and reductions in spending on welfare programs for poor families. Although the Contract got some attention in the media and was a target of Democratic counterattacks, most voters went to the polls blissfully unaware of its existence. *The New York Times*/CBS News Poll of October 29–November 1 found that 71% of the respondents had never heard of the Contract and another 15% said it would make no difference in how they voted. Only 7% said it would make them more likely to vote for the Republican House candidate, while 5% said it would make them less likely to do so.[29]

Another leading political scientist looking at all the polling results of the 1994 elections concluded that surveys showed "that most voters had little if any specific knowledge of the 'Contract' proposals."[30] But he does also point out that most Republicans were running "limit the role of government" campaigns, so that some of the general ideas of the "Contract" did seem to enjoy popular support.

In short, given the opinion data we have about the thinking of voters during the 1994 elections and given our general knowledge from political science research on voting behavior, we know that American voters, to the extent they take performance and policy stances of candidates into account at all when voting, do so retrospectively, reacting to past performance rather than to promises about the future. We also know that winners of elections claim whatever mandate they can from the election returns, mainly to try to make opponents of their policy positions appear undemocratic and, therefore, illegitimate in opposing them.[31] The results of the 1994 congressional elections could not have been read as a mandate to enact "Contract with America" specifics, since such specifics hadn't been developed by election day and all Republican candidates for the House had

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stuff. If the members knew in September that they would be in the majority on November 8th, there would never never never have been a Contract, period."

[29] Gary C. Jacobson, "The 1994 House Elections in Perspective" (paper prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 6–8 April 1995, 6.

[30] Everett Carll Ladd, "The 1994 Congressional Elections: The Postindustrial Realignment Continues," *Political Science Quarterly* 110 (Spring 1995): 10.

[31] See Robert A. Dahl, "Myth of the Presidential Mandate," *Political Science Quarterly* 105 (Fall 1990): 355.

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not even signed on to the abbreviated document. The results of the 1994 elections were much more a vote of no confidence in the Clinton administration's first two years and no confidence in the Democratic party more generally, because the Democrats had won unified control of the White House and both houses of Congress for the first time since 1976 but could not deliver an end to gridlock and stalemate.

THE "FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IS BROKE" MANUFACTURED REALITY

The budget situation that Republicans characterized with the claim that the "federal government is broke" was bequeathed to them largely by the Reagan administration and the 97th Congress. Despite its conservative, balance-the-budget rhetoric, the Reagan administration through its 1981 tax cuts including the indexing of the tax tables to inflation,[32] its increased defense spending, and the continued rise it allowed in domestic entitlement spending, created unprecedentedly large budget deficits. The large deficits were continued during the Bush administration. Over the twelve years from 1981 to 1992, these deficits averaged $193 billion a year, tripled from $994 billion to $4.4 trillion the size of the national debt inherited from President Jimmy Carter and all his predecessors, and also produced the Washington mentality of being constantly broke. (See Figure 3.)

FIGURE 3



[32] The Republican-controlled Senate in 1981 passed the Reagan tax cut proposal with bipartisan majorities after Democratic majorities failed to get adopted a score of amendments that would have reduced the size of the tax cut and targeted it more to less wealthy taxpayers. In the House, where

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Because of these unprecedented budget deficits and the consequent spiraling of the size of the national debt and the cost of interest on that debt, presidents and Congresses, beginning in 1985 with President Ronald Reagan and the Gramm-Rudman-Hollins Act (BRH I), adopted severe budgetary rules of the game to constrain the growth of federal spending and to reduce the size of the annual deficit. The Budget Reaffirmation Act of 1987 (BRH II), also during the Reagan administration, the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 (BEA) during the Bush administration, and the 1993 Reconciliation Act during the Clinton administration all reinforced the "we're broke" budgetary rules of the game and outlook, essentially by prohibiting any increases in a spending program without compensating decreases in other programs or finding new sources of revenues.

But the going broke of the federal government was no accident, which is why I call it a manufactured reality. President Reagan in his first address to the nation in 1981 was explicit in his desire to starve the federal government of resources. As he put it on national television:

> Over the past decades we've talked of curtailing government spending so that we can then lower the tax burden. Sometimes we've even taken a run at doing that. But there were always those who told us that taxes couldn't be cut until spending was reduced. Well, you know, we can lecture our children about extravagance until we run out of voice and breath. *Or we can cure their extravagance by simply reducing their allowance.*[33]

Reagan's solution was to give large supply-side tax cuts while the federal budget was still in deficit and to carry out a massive expansion of defense spending. Under supply-side theory, a tax cut to those in the highest brackets would stimulate the economy, generate more new jobs, and bring back greater new tax revenues under the lower rates than those lost by the tax cuts. David Stockman, Reagan's first budget director, revealed privately in tape-recorded interviews[34] while the events were taking place that he knew all along it would be impossible to give a large tax cut, have a large increase in defense spending, and still balance the budget by FY 1984—as promised by President Reagan in his election campaign. Rather than a balanced budget in three years, Stockman's Office of Management and Budget (OMB) computers projected a series of federal deficits ranging from $82 billion in 1982 to $116 billion in 1984—numbers which at the time were unprecedented in peacetime. As for the huge tax cuts that were justified by supply-side theory, Stockman told his interviewer:

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the Democrats were in nominal control, the Republicans with some Democratic votes defeated attempts to enact only a limited one-year tax cut calculated to benefit most those earning less than $50,000 a year. On the vote for final passage, enough Democrats switched positions so that the final package of tax cuts was carried by both Republican and Democratic majorities.

[33] Ronald Reagan, Televised Economic Policy Address to the Nation, 5 February 1981. (Emphasis added.)

[34] The interviewer was William Greider, an assistant managing editor of the *Washington Post*, who then wrote a major article based on those interviews, "The Education of David Stockman," *The Atlantic Monthly*, December 1981, 27–53.

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> The hard part of the supply-side tax cut is dropping the top rate from 70 to 50 percent—the rest of it is a secondary matter. . . . The original argument was that the top bracket was too high. . . . Then, the general argument was that, in order to make this palatable as a political matter, you had to bring down all the brackets. But, I mean, Kemp-Roth [the original legislative vehicle for the tax cut] was always a Trojan horse to bring down the top rate.
>
> . . . It's kind of hard to sell "trickle down" . . . so the "supply side" formula was the only way to get a tax policy that was really "trickle down." Supply side is "trickle down" theory. . . .
>
> . . . I've never believed that just cutting taxes alone would cause output and employment to expand.[35]

Gradually, Stockman saw the implicit failure of supply-side theory to bring about a balanced budget not as a problem, but as an opportunity. It provided a chance to have gigantic tax cuts and military increases as President Reagan wanted, yet also could serve to dismantle social welfare programs that had accumulated since the New Deal and the Great Society. Making a virtue of necessity, Stockman became content to let the federal budget deficits rise, thus presumably leaving Congress no alternative but to cut domestic programs. In his memoirs, Stockman alludes to the accusation that he and others in the Reagan administration deliberately created the massive deficit: "In truth, not six of the six hundred players in the game of fiscal governance in the spring and summer of 1981 would have willed this outcome. Yet caught up in the powerful forces unleashed by the dangerous experiment of a few supply siders who had gotten the President's good ear, they let it happen just the same."[36]

The skyrocketing of the deficit did squeeze out much discretionary spending on domestic programs, as can be seen from Table 1 and Figure 4. Some federal discretionary grant programs that provided aid to city governments directly and thus to the poor indirectly—general revenue sharing payments to local governments, Comprehensive Employment and Training Act public service jobs, and urban development action grants—were completely eliminated, or "zeroed out" in budget bureau parlance. Others, like community development block grants, economic assistance grants and loans, and mass transit grants for capital and operating expenses, were cut drastically in terms of constant dollars.[37]

But as can be seen from Table 2 and Figure 5, neither the Reagan, Bush, nor Clinton administrations were, however, able to curb the dramatic growth of entitlement spending on so-called safety net domestic programs for poor people, such as welfare payments, food stamps, Medicaid, child nutrition, and supplemental feeding for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC). All the less could they

[35] Ibid.

[36] David A. Stockman, *The Triumph of Politics: Why the Reagan Revolution Failed* (New York: Harper & Row, 1986), 267–68.

[37] For a full discussion of this part of the cutbacks, see Caraley, "Washington Abandons the Cities," and Demetrios Caraley and Yvette Schlussel, "Congress and Reagan's New Federalism," *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 16 (Winter 1986): 49–79.

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TABLE 1

Annual Federal Outlays for Selected Grants to City and State Governments

	Current dollars (in millions)				*Constant 1994 dollars (in millions)*			
Benefits Primarily to Governments	*1978*	*1994*	*$CH 78-94*	*%CHG*	*1978*	*1994*	*$CH 78-95*	*%CHG*
General revenue sharing	6,823	0	(6,823)	−100	12,272	0	(12,272)	−100
Local public works	3,108	0	(3,108)	−100	5,590	0	(5,590)	−100
Public service jobs & job training	4,251	3,310	(941)	−22	7,646	3,310	(4,336)	−57
Countercyclical assistance	1,329	0	(1,329)	−100	2,390	0	(2,390)	−100
Social services block grant	2,809	2,728	(81)	−3	5,052	2,728	(2,324)	−46
Community development block grants	2,464	3,651	1,187	48	4,432	3,651	(781)	−18
Urban development action grants	225	33	(192)	−85	405	33	(372)	−92
Urban mass transit	1,972	3,267	1,295	66	3,547	3,267	(280)	−8
Economic development assistance	260	204	(56)	−22	468	204	(264)	−56
Federal aid highways	5,807	18,139	12,332	212	10,444	18,139	7,695	74
Totals	29,048	31,332	2,284	8	52,245	31,332	(20,913)	−40
Totals excluding federal aid highways	23,241	13,193	11,391	−43	41,800	13,193	(28,607)	−68

Calculated from *Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 1996*, Historical Tables, Table 12.3.

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FIGURE 4


Changes in Annual Levels of Federal Outlays for Grants to City and State Governments, FY 1978 and 1994
Changes in level of annual outlays in billions of dollars
-20
-10
0
10
20
General revenue sharing
Local public works
Public service jobs & job training
Countercyclical assistance
Social services block grant
Community development block
Urban development action grants
Urban mass transit
Economic development assistance
Federal aid highways
Current dollars
Constant 1994 dollars
Calculated from Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 1996, Historical Tables, Table 12.3

curb entitlement spending for the nonpoor, like Social Security and Medicare. The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act of 1985, the 1987 Reaffirmation Act, the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, and the Reconciliation Act of 1993, while imposing serious deficit-reduction regimes, also gave special protection to these safety net programs by making them exempt from automatic cuts through across-the-board cuts by a process called sequestration. But more important than that, because few sequestrations ever in fact took place, Presidents Reagan, Bush, and Clinton and their Congresses allowed these programs to grow according to the number of persons who became eligible and with the same or increased benefit levels, while at the same time not putting total spending on those programs under any dollar cap.

Presidents and Congresses during this period also made three conscious, major programmatic increases in spending for the poor: First, Medicaid coverage was extended in 1986, 1987, and 1988 during the Reagan administration and in 1990 during the Bush administration to include poor and nearly poor (incomes under 133 percent of the poverty line) pregnant women and their small children under age six, even if they were not on AFDC. This expansion together with

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TABLE 2

Annual Federal Outlays for Selected Benefit Programs for Poor People

	Current dollars (in millions)				*Constant 1994 dollars (in millions)*			
Benefits Primarily to Individuals	*1978*	*1994*	*$CH 78-94*	*%CHG*	*1978*	*1994*	*$CH 78-94*	*%CHG*
Medicaid	10,680	82,034	71,354	668	19,209	82,034	62,825	327
Housing assistance	3,631	22,445	18,814	518	6,531	22,445	15,914	244
Food Stamps	5,200	22,752	17,552	338	9,353	22,752	13,399	143
Earned income tax credit	881	10,950	10,069	1143	1,585	10,950	9,365	591
Welfare payments	6,369	16,508	10,139	159	11,455	16,508	5,053	44
Child nutrition program	2,391	7,044	4,653	195	4,300	7,044	2,744	64
Supplemental feeding (WICS)	371	3,244	2,873	774	667	3,244	2,577	386
Head Start	625	3,326	2,701	432	1,124	3,326	2,202	196
Legal service for poor	157	375	218	139	282	375	93	33
Totals	19,625	88,644	67,019	341	54,505	168,678	114,173	209
Totals excluding Medicaid	15,994	64,199	48,205	301	35,297	86,644	51,347	145

Calculated from *Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 1996*, Historical Tables, Table 11.3.

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FIGURE 5



the rapid rise in medical costs generally, forced a major, 327 percent or 63 billion constant 1994 dollar, expansion of spending between 1980 and 1994 for Medicaid.

Second, the eligibility and maximum benefit level for the Earned Income Tax Credit—a refundable tax credit for persons who work but still earn low incomes—was increased in 1986, 1990, and 1993 during the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations so that federal outlays shot up from $881 million in 1978 to $11 billion in 1994,[38] a 1143 percent increase in current dollars and a 591 percent increase in constant 1994 dollars. The Clinton administration's budget for FY 1996 projected a continued rise in outlays for EITC, to $16.8 billion in 1995 and $20.2 billion in 1996, which of course made EITC a target.

Third, in order to move toward every eligible poor child having at least a half-day Headstart slot, the authorization was increased both in 1990 and 1993. Federal outlays for Headstart went up from 625 million in 1978 to 3.3 billion in 1994, an increase of 432 percent in current, and 196 percent in constant, 1994 dollars.

[38] A maximum credit of $3,560 was available to taxpayers with two children and with earnings under $11,290. The credit was primarily a means of refunding payroll taxes and therefore of removing the disincentive to working.

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FIGURE 6



Although the AFDC welfare program that has been a central target for Republicans as well as some Democrats (President Clinton had promised in his 1992 campaign to "end welfare as we know it"), federal outlays for AFDC showed only modest growth in real dollars from 1978 to 1994—2.2 percent a year. (See Figure 6.) At about $17 billion in FY 1995 federal outlays, the federal cost of welfare was smaller than housing assistance or food stamps and only one fifth the $89 billion of Medicaid. Even the small increase in federal outlays on welfare was the result of increases in caseload from a rise in poverty and from recessions, and not of any increase in the average monthly benefit per family, which actually dropped between 1975 and 1993 by 33 percent in constant dollars.[39]

By the time of President Clinton's 1996 State of the Union message on 23 January, not only the congressional Republicans but also the Democratic president himself—who declared twice in his message that "the era of big government is over"—became committed to actually balancing the budget at a zero dollar deficit within seven years, that is, by FY 2002. The detailed proposed FY 1997 budget President Clinton submitted to Congress in March also was formulated on that premise. While Clinton's tax cut proposal was smaller than that of the Republican majorities and directed more toward middle-income than higher-income families, his plan too would cut revenues in the short run. Furthermore, both the Republican and the Clinton budget-balancing budgets assumed no recessions and low inflation from 1996 to 2002 and would have implemented much of the spending reduction needed for a balanced budget in FY 2001 and 2002. An unprojected recession

[39] *1994 Green Book*, table 10-15, 378.

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or a refusal of interest rates to drop would cause an additional squeeze in revenues and obviously keep the deficit from disappearing.

Of course, the federal government could decide to make itself less broke by expanding its revenues instead of deliberately cutting them, through some combination of raising the top income tax bracket and reducing or ending income tax deductions that favor well-to-do individuals and corporations. Both the 1990 and 1993 deficit reduction packages not only did not decrease taxes but cut the deficit almost equally with spending cuts and tax increases. One big tax expenditure that might be reduced or eliminated is the deduction for interest on home mortgages and real estate taxes on homes, which amounted to $66.1 billion in FY 1995:

	In billions
Interest on home mortgage	51.27
Real estate taxes	14.85

With these deductions, the more expensive a taxpayer's house and its mortgage and real estate taxes, the more these deductions are worth and the more they cost the Treasury in revenues foregone. The FY 1995 tax expenditures of $66.1 billion for interest and real estate tax deductions were in reality larger than the FY 1995 outlays for welfare ($17.1 billion), food stamps ($25.5 billion), child nutrition ($7.5 billion), and WIC ($3.4 billion) combined.

Yet even without touching those deductions, and still giving away the Clinton administration's smaller tax cut but making smaller spending cuts in the safety net than those set by the 104th Republicans, President Clinton's proposed FY 1997 budget showed the deficit as a percent of GDP already down in FY 1996 to an estimated 2 percent—less than one-half of what it had been in 1992 in the Bush administration and one-third what it had been in 1983 in the Reagan administration. (See Figure 7.)

FIGURE 7



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In short, it is a reality that cuts in the rate of spending growth for Medicaid and for non-means-tested Medicare are essential to achieve a balanced budget in the foreseeable future. But it is not an externally imposed reality, simply a policy *choice,* to dissolve the federal safety net as a means of getting to that goal. Furthermore, it is also a policy *choice* to give large tax cuts when the budget is still in deficit. If all other variables were held constant, and using either Republican FY 1996 reconciliations act or Clinton FY 1997 numbers, a budget could probably be balanced before the year 2002 if no tax cut at all were adopted.

Postdevolution Realities

The major justifications for dismantling and devolving the federal safety net have been shown to be fictions. The federal government has proper constitutional authority to fund the programs involved; spending federal money does help many problems; state and local levels of government are not better but worse levels for redistributing income through safety net programs; and devolved block grants to the states are not win-win improvements for everyone but would have devastating effects on the quality of life of most states and locales with concentrations of poor, elderly, sick, or young of any race and ethnicity. As for the "Contract with America," it was in no way a mandate for the specifics of the 1995–1996 Republican proposals, and in any event any contract that may have existed will be moot after new presidential and congressional elections in November 1996.

With respect to the one partial reality about the federal government being broke, it is essential to continue to make progress on reducing the federal deficit. But making the magnitude of cuts proposed in 1995–1996 for the various safety net programs is not necessary for implementing further deficit reduction in a responsible fashion, and there is no equity in the major burden for deficit reduction falling on the poorest part of the population. Neither is it equitable to cut programs for the poor and sick, while providing large tax cuts to those who are better off.

There are, however, other realities that would almost certainly flow from devolving the federal safety net to states through capped block grants: governors would increase their political power, less money would be spent on programs for the poor, there would be massive redistribution of funds between regions and states, and there would be a redistribution of funds away from large city locales. If the devolution package also contained a large tax cut, one additional reality would be the long-term weakening of the federal government as an effective instrument for coping with national problems.

Increased Political Power for Governors

If 1995–1996-type block grant proposals were to be passed, governors would gain in political power, which is of course why so many governors supported the proposals. Under existing law, when the number of beneficiaries expands because of economic recession or the federal government increases eligibility—as, for example, it did in the 1980s by increasing the age of poor children that

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the states were mandated to cover under Medicaid—governors are forced to find the additional matching funds in their budgets for the expanded outlays that would necessarily follow. Governors from states considered rich in per capita income have to provide 50 percent of the new expenditures, while governors from states considered poor need provide as little as 21 percent—this rate applying only to Mississippi.[40] Many governors regarded this legal obligation to come up with more and more matching funds as an almost crushing political bind. Under a system of block grants, governors with their legislatures would gain the option of deciding eligibility and benefit levels and, therefore, total state outlays.

Many governors in states that have experienced strong economic recovery also believe that under block grants they can withdraw some of the state money now obligated as matching funds without reducing benefits and use those funds to plug other holes in their budgets. Under existing law with matching money, any savings would be shared with the federal government at a state's matching rate.

Whether governors are being farsighted enough about their states' and their successors' long-term interest under capped block grants is an open question.[41] Enacting block grants does not eliminate the possibility of recessions, natural disasters, or migrations of large numbers of elderly to particular states. This means that governors would be confronted periodically with the need to fund newly-eligible welfare and Medicaid recipients completely out of state money. To do so, they might have to cut coverage or benefits they themselves prefer and would have to swim or sink on their own. Under existing law, when these needs increase and additional money has to be spent, the federal government—playing its guarantor and spreading-the-risk role—reimburses even the richer states for half of the additional costs and the poorer states for up to 79 percent.

Less Spending on the Poor Generally and No Spending At All on Some Poor

The second certain reality if 1995–1996-type block grant proposals were to be adopted is that there would be less money for the poor. The cut in overall spending

[40] The matching rate in 1994 for Alaska, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Virginia was 50 percent; the highest rate of federal matching was for Mississippi at 78.60 percent. The other states had federal matching at the following rates: Alabama, 70.45; Arizona, 66.40; Arkansas, 73.75; Colorado, 53.10; Florida, 56.28; Georgia, 62.23; Idaho, 70.14; Indiana, 63.03; Iowa, 62.62; Kansas, 58.90; Kentucky, 69.58; Louisiana, 72.65; Maine, 63.30; Michigan, 56.84; Minnesota, 54.27; Mississippi, 78.58; Missouri, 59.86; Montana, 70.81; Nebraska, 60.40; New Mexico, 73.31; North Carolina, 64.71; North Dakota, 68.73; Ohio, 60.69; Oklahoma, 70.05; Oregon, 62.36; Pennsylvania, 54.27; Rhode Island, 55.49; South Carolina, 70.71; South Dakota, 68.06; Tennessee, 66.52; Texas, 63.31; Utah, 73.48; Vermont, 60.82; Washington, 51.97; West Virginia, 74.60; Wisconsin, 59.81; Wyoming, 62.87. *1994 Green Book,* 383–387, tables 10–17 and 14.

[41] Governor Lawton Chiles of Florida called Governors John Engler of Michigan and Tommy Thompson of Wisconsin, who were among the first to lobby for the block grants, "Judas goats," leading the other governors over a cliff. "G.O.P. Bills to Overhaul Welfare Worry City and County Officials," *New York Times,* 18 May 1995.

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on the poor would come, first, from the number of recipients of safety net services and benefits being reduced as eligibility for programs like welfare, Medicaid, and Food Stamps was narrowed through time limits and through essentially ending benefits to families not below the poverty line and, second, from benefit levels being reduced as the federal and state governments capped, reduced the rate of growth, or reduced even in nominal dollars what they were willing to spend on the poor.[42] The vetoed welfare reform act and FY 1996 reconciliation act virtually invited states to cut their own levels of spending by permitting a maintenance of effort of only 75 percent of previous spending without penalty for welfare and a maximum matching of only 40 rather than 50 percent for Medicaid. If a state did not meet its minimum maintenance of effort requirements, it would lose federal funds dollar for dollar. But for a state government intent on reducing welfare benefits, this so-called penalty would not function as a disincentive, because by further reducing its own contribution, a state would be both increasing its "savings" and ratcheting down benefits in the hope that would-be beneficiaries might migrate to other jurisdictions. Though technically not part of devolution, cuts in the earned income tax credit like those incorporated in the vetoed FY 1996 reconciliation act would drive more of the working poor into poverty by

[42] For example, under provisions of the vetoed welfare "reform" act and the vetoed FY 96 Reconciliation Act: On welfare, the de facto federal guarantee of cash benefits under AFDC for all low-income mothers and dependent children would be ended as states would instead receive block grants and be allowed to set criteria for eligibility themselves. Most adult recipients would be required to work after two years, whether or not jobs were actually available so that some would be both without jobs and without welfare benefits. For the most part no one would be able to draw cash assistance for more than five years in the aggregate over the course of a lifetime; present law has no time-limit cutoff. In case of cutoff of a parent, any dependent children they might have would also stop getting benefits. Under the vetoed legislation, states would be allowed at their option to deny any benefits to unwed teenage mothers and their children, and states would actually be prohibited from using funds from the block grants to pay welfare for new children born to welfare recipients unless the states passed formal legislation to opt out of that prohibition, something that could be stopped by inaction in a single house of the state legislature or by a governor's veto. States would be allowed to provide from their own funds only 75 percent of their 1994 level of effort without their block grant being reduced—thus being able to immediately pull out 25 percent of their own contribution. On Medicaid, the automatic coverage of free medical care under Medicaid would be ended for (a) AFDC recipients—or recipients under any successor program, (b) low-income pregnant women with family incomes up to 133 percent of the poverty level and all children from such families up to the age of 13 (slated under existing law to go up to the age of 18 by the year 2002), and (c) the elderly who were poor by having used up their resources and are in long-term care, nursing homes, or receiving home health services. The only groups that would continue to have a federal guarantee would be pregnant women and children under the age of 13 with family incomes up to 100 percent of the poverty level. But even for those groups, states could reduce spending by curtailing the kinds of medical benefits they would provide and for how lengthy a period of time, whereas under existing law some services are mandatory—basically inpatient and outpatient hospital services, physician services, and laboratory and X-ray services—and must be available to all who qualify. The maintenance of effort required from states would drop from a maximum of 50 percent to 40 percent of the amount spent and under an alternative formula available to some states, to less than 40 percent.

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reducing their after-tax incomes or into AFDC by reducing their financial incentives to keep working, or both.[43]

In congressional debates, Republican proponents of block-granting the safety net programs declared it was an insult for their opponents to argue that governors and state legislatures would be less sensitive and responsive to the needs of the poor than is the federal government, and they denied that states would in fact reduce their spending if there was need. But in what would become an open competition for state funds in governors' budgets or in legislative appropriations, claims to increase state funding—or even just not to decrease it—for any cash welfare, Medicaid, Food Stamps, or child nutrition programs that might be devolved would be competing with powerful other demands. The most urgent competing demands would be for state tax cuts, increased school aid with formulas that are skewed toward suburban schools, more highway improvements, and more prisons. And state governments, under legislation that passed the House and Senate, could decide to make eligibility for welfare and Medicaid as strict as they wished and cut off beneficiaries or reduce benefits if the money they were willing to appropriate ran out.

There is no good political reason for governors or state legislatures to give priority to programs that primarily benefit the poor, especially the urban poor. The 1990 census shows that after three decades of suburbanization, in only one state, Arizona, did the combined populations of all central cities of over 50,000 constitute a majority. On the other hand, in 1990 twelve states—California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada, New Jersey, Ohio, Rhode Island, Utah, and Washington—had majorities of their populations in suburban areas, including some small suburban cities. Furthermore, the voting of poor urban voters is much lower relative to their total numbers than is that of suburbanites. In no state does its largest city or combination of largest cities have large political clout in its state government based on its population and voting strength.

With any enactment of capped block grants to the states for welfare, Medicaid, and other safety net programs that might be devolved and with states permitted to reduce their previous level of spending, champions for the poor would have to campaign and lobby in at least fifty different jurisdictions to maintain various elements of the federal safety net—an effort very unlikely to be successful. And state governments, in order to save on the state-generated revenues they would have to produce for these programs, could also follow the lead of New York and simply try to devolve responsibility for some percentage of funding for cash assistance and Medicaid to city and county governments.[44]

[43] The proposal was to save $43 billion over seven years, primarily by eliminating EITC for working poor taxpayers without dependent children and by freezing the current rate of credit whereas existing law provided for it to go up for some categories of eligible taxpayers.

[44] Currently only the following states require matching of the state share by local governments, at the percentage indicated: California, 5 percent; Colorado, 42.7 percent, Indiana,40 percent; Minnesota, 15 percent; Montana, 22.5 percent; New Jersey, 25 percent; New York, 50 percent; North Carolina, 50 percent; North Dakota, 25 percent; and Ohio, 4 percent. *1994 Green Book,* tables 10–19, 387.

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This kind of ratcheting down to give the minimum allowable benefits could become extremely swift, especially in states that are very conservative ideologically or in states or local jurisdictions that are very poor or find themselves budgetarily broke regardless of ideology. Officials of typically generous Los Angeles County imposed a 25 percent reduction early in 1996 in general assistance but claimed that they had no choice. Their budget gap had been caused primarily by California's worst recession in half a century, by a 1992 state law that diverted close to $1 billion in property-tax revenue from the county's general fund to public schools, and by a continuing influx of illegal immigrants. Zev Yaroslavsky, a member of the county's Board of Supervisors, said of the cut, "This is not something we relish but is something we have to do, given what's happening in Washington and Sacramento." The board said the reduction, to $212 from $285 in each beneficiary's monthly check, would save the county $25 million in the county's fiscal year.[45]

Redistribution of Federal Funds from State to State and Region to Region

A third reality of devolution and block-granting is that it would lead to a major redistribution of federal funds from state to state and region to region, causing severe economic and social dislocations for the states losing large amounts of federal funds. This is because under existing law, AFDC and Medicaid are structured as federal matching programs without an overall dollar cap; how much one state receives as matching money has no impact on another state. Under a system of capped block grants, all the states would be locked into a zero-sum game with all the others over allocation formulas and would have incentive to reduce the block grants of other states in order to increase their own.

The Senate floor consideration of the Republican welfare reform bill illustrates the problem: As reported from committee, the bill essentially took each state's 1994 federal matching funds as baselines for calculating future federal block grants. These baselines were in turn the result of the number of eligible persons in each state drawing cash welfare benefits, the benefit level set by the state, and the matching rate required of state dollars to federal dollars—a rate that ranged from 50–50 for rich states like Connecticut, New York, and California, to only 21–79 for the poorest state, Mississippi. This meant that states with generous benefits and numerous AFDC recipients—the most notable being California and New York—would be entitled to the largest block grants. The welfare reform bill would have provided block grants of $3.7 billion for California and $2.3 billion for New York, while Texas—the third most populous state—would receive only $1.1 billion. More importantly, when senators calculated the numbers of dollars per poor child in the state that the welfare block grants would provide, it turned out that Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, Hawaii, and New York would have gotten more than $2,000 per year for each

[45] "Welfare Revamp, Halted in Capital, Proceeds Anyway," New York Times, 10 March 1996.

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poor child, while Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Texas would have received only $300 to $400 per year for each poor child.

During the Senate floor debate, Democratic Senators Bob Graham of Florida and Dale Bumpers of Arkansas offered an amendment to base block grants on the number of poor children in a state relative to those in the entire country. The Republicans voted almost solidly to defeat the amendment, primarily because a debate on the allocation formula could have split their narrow majority.[46] But in the long run, block grants where states like Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, Hawaii, and New York got over $2000 per poor child per year, while states like Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Texas got only $300 to $400 will surely be unsustainable. And the same factors would be even more strongly at work in a Medicaid block grant program, since Medicaid involves five times the number of dollars as welfare.

The reason such disparities are sustainable under existing law is that any state that wants to receive as high per-poor-child payments as California and New York needs only to raise its own benefits, and the increased matching dollars from the federal government would click in automatically. And the poorer the state, the fewer dollars it has to put up of its own funds for each dollar increase in spending for welfare or Medicaid. Because there was no overall dollar cap on these safety net programs, one state getting more federal dollars either in absolute terms or per capita has no negative impact on the matching funds being received by another.

Enacting allocation formulas has always had the potential for causing bitter conflict. But the polarization would be greater now, because the tight budget constraints would not allow states to be "held harmless" at their previous level of funding if the new formula produced less federal aid than did the old formula—a practice that was standard in more plentiful times. The conflicts over allocation formulas would be recurrent ones and would tend to polarize members of Congress.

Redistribution of Funds Away from Large City Locales

A fourth reality is that along with a general contraction of spending on the poor, the transformation of the federal safety net into devolved block grants would lead to a redistribution of funds away from central cities and urban counties.[47] This would occur because under the existing system of entitlements and matching grants, federal money for AFDC, Medicaid, and food stamps flows automatically through state governments to individual recipients, large concentrations of whom live in large cities. These funds not only benefit the recipients receiving the

[46] See CQ Senate Vote 415, *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 16 September 1995, 2839.

[47] The United States Conference of Mayors, The National Association of Counties, and the National League of Cities all declared themselves to be against block granting the safety net. See *New York Times*, "G.O.P. Bills," 18 May 1995.

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benefits but also the economies of those cities, from food stores to the large medical and hospital complexes that are most often found in large central cities. With funds for cash assistance, Medicaid, and food stamps encapsulated into block grants to states, state governments would be able to take whatever federal money was forthcoming and write their own eligibility and benefit provisions and so, if they wished, shift money away from large city locales to locales that had more political clout or were considered to be more worthy. Especially hard hit would be the nation's already beleaguered large cities and in particular the older ones of the East, Middle West, and South, where the existing drift of cities into underserviced, poverty- and homeless-burdened, bankruptcy-skirting ghettos will be accelerated.[48]

A New Trojan Horse?

For the some fifty years preceding the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations, American federal aid policy was based on the premise that only the federal government could afford to fund benefit and service programs for poor people and grant programs for poor cities and states, and that it was right and just for the federal government to do so. This was because unlike that of a particular city or state, the federal government's tax reach is all encompassing so taxpayers cannot move to lower-tax jurisdictions to reduce the amount of their income taken by taxes. From World War II to the 1970s, the federal government had the most productive tax system, able to raise increasingly larger increments of revenue with each increment of economic growth or, because of "bracket creep," with any increment of inflation. Only the federal government is allowed to run a deficit in its annual budget and thus is capable, through borrowing, of spending in any particular year more than it raises in revenues. Only the federal government's expenditures, tax rates, and borrowing are never subject to public referenda. Finally, and most importantly, it was widely felt, at least by Democratic presidents and Democratically-controlled Congresses,[49] that the federal government was

[48] There is a set of formula-generated block grants that could be designed to actually help such cities and send money directly to city governments, one set for cities with "long-term, structural distress" and the other for cities experiencing "cyclical hardship." The grants for "long-term, structural distress" would be based on fiscal need as measured by poverty and unemployment and on the taxable resources available in their jurisdictions. The second block grant for "cyclical hardship" would aim for a countercyclical effect, since despite the absence of any long-term, structural distress, some city governments, even robust ones such as Seattle and San Francisco, experience cyclical hardship when the national and local economies slow down and produce lower revenues at the same time they are faced with more unemployed and poor people needing help. The countercyclical formula grants—in addition to helping hard-pressed city governments cope with difficult economic times—would enable city governments not to add to a recession by laying off city workers and thus increase unemployment further.

[49] For documentation of these sharp differences between parties on federal aid to poor people and poor cities, see Demetrios Caraley, "Congressional Politics and Urban Aid," *Political Science Quarterly* 91 (Spring, 1976): 19-45; Caraley, "Carter, Congress, and the Cities" in Dale Rogers Marshall, ed., *Urban Policy Making* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1979); and Caraley and Schlussel, "Congress and Reagan's New Federalism," 49-79.

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ultimately the guarantor of last resort for keeping services and benefits in all states and localities above some minimal threshold and to help with major problems that could not be or simply were not being successfully addressed by local or state governments. Except for the productivity of the federal tax system, the premises above still hold.

Nevertheless, the Reagan and Bush administrations' and the 104th Congress Republicans' ideological posture has been that they no longer wanted, could not afford, and did not deem it legitimate to have the federal government be the ultimate guarantor of poor people and poor state and local jurisdictions. The 104th Congress Republicans were in their FY 1996 reconciliation act proposals more severe than either the Reagan or Bush administrations. These administrations had actually supported the expansion of Medicaid coverage to the working poor and the broadening of the earned income tax credit, two programs that the 1995–1996 Republican majorities wanted to cut sharply. Both programs were designed to give incentives to working poor families to keep working and not become welfare recipients.

To this writer, the most disturbing reality is that history over the past century has shown the federal government to be the only level of government that can be depended upon to maintain an adequate safety net for the poor, the sick, the disabled, and other groups who have slender political resources and can never become voting majorities. Yet after hearing the federal government attacked with anti-Washington rhetoric for twenty years, public opinion is more distrustful of that level of government than of any other. This means that the forces for dismantling and devolving the federal safety net and for cutting the federal government's revenues so that it will be constantly broke, have formidable staying power and may well eventually succeed. Helping these forces succeed is the absence of political leadership from either party to remind Americans of the transitory nature of much good fortune, the vulnerability to distress of persons and jurisdictions once thought to be permanently well-off, and thus of their self-interest in a strong and nonbroke federal government.

The further dismantling will be done in the name of "returning power to the states," "balancing the budget," and "spurring faster economic growth through large tax cuts"—slogans comprising the latest rhetorical version of a David Stockman-type Trojan horse. Ready to pour out from the new Trojan horse this time will be not only sharp reductions in services and benefits for the poor but also—if large tax cuts remain part of the devolution or balanced budget package—another round of huge deficits.[50] These new deficits will be used to justify more major spending cuts in such already squeezed federal discretionary programs as education, the environment, medical, and other scientific research. The deficits will also place in jeopardy middle-class, payroll-tax supported programs like

[50] For a similar outlook on the prospects for balancing the budget with large tax cuts, see Herbert Stein, "We Can't Afford Voodoo 2," *New York Times*, 7 February 1996. Stein was chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers under Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford.

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social security and Medicare. Indeed, if a combination of severe cutbacks, massive tax cuts, and devolution of power to the states like that proposed by the 104th Congress majorities is eventually enacted, not only will the federal social safety net for the poor be dismantled, but the federal government in general will become so weakened as an effective instrument for governance that we might well see the beginning of the "disestablishment" of the "more perfect Union" that the Constitution of 1789 was determined to create and that the Civil War was fought to preserve.*

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Ten Balances for Weighing UN Reform Proposals

BRUCE RUSSETT

This is a time, following its fiftieth anniversary, for renewed interest in reforming, restructuring, and reinvigorating the United Nations. By some reasonable standards, parts of the UN have worked well much of the time, and others have not. The challenges facing the organization have changed, with new emphasis on civil conflict within rather than between states,[1] population growth, massive voluntary and involuntary migrations, environmental degradation, economic justice, expanded concepts of human rights, and belief in the possibility and the necessity of representative government. The resources the UN commands, and the will of its member states to employ the organization, are inadequate to meet those challenges.

Consequently, several major comprehensive proposals to restructure the UN have been put forth, as well as many partial ones.[2] Even at its creation, the UN was, for all the realism attached to its new institutions of collective security, also in substantial degree a liberal internationalist project in the sense derived from the vision of Immanuel Kant's essay, *Zum Ewigen Frieden (On Perpetual*

[1] Donald C. F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes, eds., *Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping* (New York: St. Martin's, 1995); Lori Fisler Damrosch, ed., *Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993).

[2] Major ones include Erskine Childers with Brian Urquhart, *Renewing the United Nations System* (Uppsala, Sweden: Dag Hammarskjold Foundation, 1994); South Commission, *Reforming the United Nations: A View from the South* (Geneva: South Centre, 1995); Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighborhood* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); Independent Working Group on the Future of the United Nations, *The United Nations in Its Second Half-Century* (New York: Ford Foundation, 1995).

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Peace). That vision, for which we last year marked the 200th anniversary, saw peace as built on a solid tripod of free political institutions, networks of economic interdependence, and international law and institutions.[3] The vision was reflected, for example, in the Bretton Woods financial institutions, the United Nations Development Programme, the Commission on Human Rights and the Center for Human Rights, and the International Court of Justice.

The vision was also, in current terms, one of "human security";[4] that is, the security of states and of their peoples from mortal danger, a vision attentive to a broad range of human rights—political, social, and economic. In this vision, the element of international law and organization is quintessentially represented by the United Nations. The UN in turn can do more than just directly support a regime for peace and security from violence; it can indirectly undergird peace by promoting and helping to manage economic interdependence, and by supporting and protecting the political rights of representative government. With sympathy if not full acceptance of this vision, therefore, it is appropriate to judge reform proposals with these Kantian or liberal internationalist criteria in mind: criteria that inform the contemporary discourse on the United Nations even more than they did for the organization's founding. These criteria are subversive of autarchic and authoritarian definitions of state sovereignty, in the interest of popular sovereignty in control of states. They, therefore, provide the basis for supporting and actively promoting the production of representative governments in the global system. Sovereign liberal nation-states would serve as components of liberal global institutions that would have enough teeth to defend themselves against illiberal challengers.

To evaluate proposals one must decide how well they should and do strike various balances—or, perhaps, how well any proposal synthesizes various opposites, or Hegelian dialectics. Some degree of balance is needed not merely because everyone will bring different values and perspectives to the task, but because of the complexity of the social phenomena at issue. Rarely can any balance be successfully tipped all the way in one direction. In the spirit of stimulating discussion, I propose ten balances for consideration. The number 10 is fortuitous rather than intentional. However, any effort to design global institutions is a bit like playing God, so perhaps the number is not totally coincidental. Sometimes I will illustrate the effort to strike a balance with reference to the report I know best,

[3] Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); John Oneal, Frances Oneal, Zeev Maoz, and Bruce Russett, "The Liberal Peace: Interdependence, Democracy, and International Conflict, 1950–1985," *Journal of Peace Research* 33 (February 1996): 11–28.

[4] This term is used explicitly by the Commission on Global Governance and the Independent Working Group (see fn. 1); also United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 1994* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).

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namely that of the Independent Working Group on the United Nations.[5] But in doing so, I do not intend to offer a full explication, let alone defense, of the particular balances achieved in that report. The purpose is rather to offer a set of criteria for evaluation, leaving it to every reader to make her own or his own judgment on where a balance should be struck, and where it was struck in any individual proposal. These balances are interrelated, often closely. None operates apart from others.

1. The balance between the interests and perspectives of states, and those of broad-based nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and other nonstate actors

While typically multinational in execution, writing of such reports is unavoidably an elite enterprise. The majority of participants usually come from public sector backgrounds (for example, service in elective, appointive, or administrative office) and therefore usually give large consideration to the interests of the state. Even those whose personal backgrounds are predominantly from civil society or NGOs are usually highly privileged members of their societies. Nonetheless, they must try and at least partially succeed in transcending their elite and statist perspectives, reflecting wider and somewhat less top-down views. This is not just for the sake of wider appreciation in the subsequent public dialogue, but because state elites simply do not have all the answers. While speaking the realities of power, the participants must also speak a wider version of "truth" to power.

2. The balance between the preservation and the erosion of state sovereignty

Ever since the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, which marked the end of the Thirty Years' War, state juridical sovereignty has been the fundamental legal and ideological principle (and also myth) undergirding the world system. The United Nations is an organization comprising sovereign states; it is neither a world government nor an assembly of peoples. Elites understandably want to retain the sovereignty of the states they control, as do most of their citizens. No reform proposal that fails to preserve and in some ways even to strengthen state sovereignty can hope for a favorable reception from those who have the power to enact the proposal.

[5] I served, with Paul Kennedy, as co-director of the Secretariat of the Working Group. For that reason I avoid commenting at all on the particulars of other reports. A Kantian vision certainly underlay my contributions, and whereas I believe Kennedy and most—perhaps all—of the members of the Working Group implicitly shared that vision in some degree, neither they nor the Ford Foundation, which funded the effort, are responsible for any of the remarks in this article. Nor would I pretend that all of the balances proposed here were ever considered overtly or consciously; they are, however, relevant both to post hoc evaluation and to any effort to synthesize recommendations from the various studies and reports.

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The reform must be acceptable to the vast majority of governments, as consistent with their sovereignty.

Yet, at the same time, states' practical sovereignty has in many areas been eroded in the modern world.[6] Some of these erosions have happened consciously and voluntarily—most strikingly in the case of the European Union, in other instances by a variety of treaty commitments binding states to common legal norms and procedures. Some others have been intended but involuntary, as when extreme repression or humanitarian distress becomes the basis for international intervention in what would normally be the domestic affairs of a state (for example, Iraq, Haiti). Still others have been both involuntary and unintended, as when states lose to international banks and currency speculators much of their ability to control their national budgets and foreign exchange rates, or their ability to manage the effect of transnational flows of pollution or the erosion of resources in the global commons. Humanitarian disasters and massive refugee flows from civil conflict may defy the practical ability of a state to insulate itself and its policies from events in its neighbors. Indeed, the collapse of civil authority in a country such as Somalia may mean that there is no government capable of exercising the practical rights of sovereignty to which the country may still nominally be entitled.

In these and other instances, the role of an international organization may well come down to that of helping to strengthen or even rebuild civil authority, and hence enabling the government to exercise certain of its sovereign rights (to manage its economy, to limit the effects of pollution, to restore a system of public order and justice), which it could not otherwise exert. International organizations must therefore strike some balance between replacing and building the sovereignty of their member states. This is true even when the proponents of a particular reform consciously wish to diminish state sovereignty in certain areas. No other course will be acceptable.

The delicate nature of this balance is illustrated by the problem of "collapsed states," or, as it is called more tactfully in the Report of the Independent Working Group, of "coordination of efforts to rebuild weakened societies under stress."[7] In such cases the UN or other legally sanctioned external actors must try to rebuild the administrative, political, judicial, and economic structure of the state so it can again exercise its legal sovereign rights—but in a form that respects human rights broadly and that involves some supervision based both on an international consensus and some agreement between the international organization and those

[6] See Hedley Bullard and Adam Watson, eds., *The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Historical Analysis* (London: Routledge, 1994); Mark Zacher, "The Decaying Pillars of the Westphalian System" in Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James Rosenau, eds., *Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1992); D. J. Elkins, *Beyond Sovereignty: Territory and Political Economy in the Twenty-First Century* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995); Michael Barnett, "The New UN Politics of Peace," *Global Governance* 1 (January 1995): 79–98.

[7] Independent Working-Group, *United Nations*, 53.

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local authorities that do function. It implies some mixture of at least temporary voluntary and involuntary surrender of formal sovereignty for the sake of regaining essential elements of real sovereignty later.[8]

The mechanism proposed by the Independent Working Group for coordinating the rebuilding of a "state under stress" is a new Social Council, working in collaboration with a new Economic Council. Both would be new principal organs of the UN, replacing the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC); the membership of each would be chosen with regard to accepted international principles of representation.) But the Social Council would be empowered to act only "with the consent of the local government if it retains authority,"[9] or, if not, as authorized by the Security Council and some political groups within the country concerned. Obviously this is a very difficult balance: the UN must not be seen as a neocolonial usurper of state sovereignty, but as ultimately restoring it. And if weak states are to permit it to assume certain conservancy functions, it must have at its disposal—from the international community—the very substantial human and material resources needed truly to restore effective and humane government.

3. *The balance between practicality and vision*

Here the balance is between what should be done and what can be done. What will states more or less readily accept, and what can they successfully be persuaded to accept, by other states or by their own constituents and civil society? How much should they be subjected to higher aspirations, even if those aspirations are not readily or plausibly achievable in the midterm future? "Visionaries" are by definition "impractical," yet some of both qualities are necessary to make any reform worth pursuing.

A relevant illustration here is the Independent Working Group's treatment of financing the UN. The report makes all the right more-or-less practical noises about the need for greater efficiency in the UN's use of existing resources, the need for states to pay their legally mandated assessments in full and on time, and the need for revision of the assessment formula to mitigate existing perceived inequities. Yet it admits that the requirements of enforcement, peacebuilding, development, human rights, preservation of the commons, and so forth are likely vastly to exceed what member states will be willing to pay as assessments.

Thus the report also creatively calls for "additional sources of funding that are not dependent on the political and budgetary constraints under which most governments operate,"[10] to take the form of "some sort of levy on the utilization of the global commons." It recognizes that it will be very hard to decide what

[8] Steven Ratner, *The New UN Peacekeeping: Building Peace in Lands of Conflict after the Cold War* (New York: St. Martin's, 1995); I. William Zartman, ed. *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995).

[9] Independent Working Group, *United Nations*, 38.

[10] Ibid., 48.

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form that tax might take.[11] Any global tax will face enormous resistance, from those on whom it is levied, on political grounds, and from problems of administrative difficulty. In the current environment of domestic politics in many countries, instituting any form of tax seems unthinkable.

It is not just a matter of cost. A reasonable case can be made for tight fiscal control over any organization. The need always for the UN to persuade member governments to pay their dues provides a powerful restraint on the UN; imposition of some type of global tax could dissolve states' existing fiscal control over the UN. In proposing such a tax, therefore, the Working Group puts an important and even necessary idea on the agenda for discussion, but also pushes the envelope of practicality. Serious attention to maintaining some adequate power of the purse on behalf of those who in one way or another will pay most of the bills is essential. A solution, possibly keyed to functions of the proposed Economic Council, need not be beyond reach.

4. The balance between power (or effectiveness) and legitimacy (or justice)

This balance is closely related to the previous one. Nothing can happen without the capability or power to do it and the willingness to exert that power. In the global arena, major UN activities must have the approval, and usually the active participation and support, of the most powerful states in the system. Although the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund owe their existence to the needs of economic justice, they cannot violate the wishes of the states that provide their principal funding. The Security Council cannot, given the veto, embark on an operation against the wishes of a Permanent Member. Nor should it do so without assurances of financial and military commitment from the major powers whose active participation in some form will be necessary. Power talks and acts. And power will not act in circumstances wherein the major states in the United Nations do not deem the action to be worthwhile in terms of the way they define their national interest (broad or narrow, immediate or long-term). No action in the absence of adequate power will be effective.

On the other hand, power cannot long be exercised in raw form, divorced from concepts of equity and legitimacy. Despite all the Security Council's necessity to represent power, and to maintain the procedures and small size required for timely and judicious action, its legitimacy will be questioned to the degree it is seen as no more than a concert of great powers—especially of rich industrial ones. In the long run, its composition must change and it probably must be expanded. It must reflect the financial power of the states essential to the organization's fiscal health and to its peacekeeping operations in particular. (Japan and

[11] For some possibilities, see the special issue, "The UN at Fifty: Policy and Financing Alternatives," *Futures: The Journal of Forecasting, Planning, and Policy* 27 (March 1995); and Dragoljub Najman and Hans d'Orville, *Towards a New Multilateralism: Funding Global Priorities* (Paris/New York: Independent Commission on Population and Quality of Life, 1995).

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Germany are now the world's second and largest contributors to the UN's budget.) But if it adds those states as permanent members, it is hard to see how, without also adding some major less developed countries, it can retain legitimacy in the eyes of the great majority of UN member states. In turn, however, the more numerous and diverse the permanent members wielding veto power, the more difficult it will become to act promptly and effectively when the world community wants action.[12] An ineffective Security Council will not retain legitimacy either. Hence the need, however great the resistance of powerful states to relinquishing any of their privileges, to think about some restriction of the scope of the veto, such as limiting it to the realm of military action that might threaten a great power's vital interest—as wished by most of the UN's American and British founders.[13]

5. The balance between particularity and universality

Here is the dilemma between on one hand respect for national and subnational cultural values, including different priorities and conceptions of human rights, and on the other the proclamation and widespread acceptance of the principle that there are universal human rights and substantial (if often vague, contested, and incomplete) agreement as to what those rights comprise. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and its subsequent conventions, protocols, and agreements have been widely ratified, and embodied in the documents emanating from major UN conferences. Despite the protests of Asian authoritarians, religious fundamentalists, and rich country postmodernists, there *is* a real degree of consensus.

Nonetheless, the need to respect cultural and political diversity, to balance individual rights with conceptions of group rights, within states as well as between them, lies at the core of intrastate and interstate peace. Devising principles, procedures, and institutions to do so requires a never-ending and ever-contestable balancing act. States need some protection from the threat of disintegration. But minority rights need protection from the potential tyranny of the majority—even sometimes from a democratically-chosen majority. For any proposed increment in the powers and purposes of international institutions, this balance is crucially related to the sovereignty balance.

6. The balance between civil and political rights on one end, and economic rights on the other

This balance is closely related to the preceding one. A widespread claim is that especially for poor countries, satisfaction of economic rights (basic material

[12] Bruce Russett, Barry O'Neill, and James Sutterlin, "Breaking the Security Council Restructuring Logjam," *Global Governance* 2 (January–April 1996): 65–80.

[13] Robert C. Hilderbrand, *Dumbarton Oaks: The Origins of the United Nations and the Search for Postwar Security* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990).

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needs) must come first; civil and political rights are luxury goods to be obtained only later—if ever. This view was common in Marxist regimes and remains powerful in rapidly developing capitalist systems operating in strong states. Of course, there must be some room for the determination and application of priorities; all good things do not go together in lockstep. Most rich countries are democratically governed, and many poor ones are ruled by authoritarian regimes. Yet there are numerous exceptions in both groups. Qatar, Singapore, and the United Arab Emirates have higher per capita incomes than do Canada and France. India has experienced decades of substantially democratic rule while ranking among the lowest income countries, as have other states. But systematic empirical evidence of the necessity of sharp trade-offs of economic against political and civil rights simply does not exist. The notion that political opposition must be repressed in the interest of development is, as a generalization, a lie. An excellent review of the scientific literature on political and economic development summarizes the situation well:

> There is no evidence that, on average, a democracy with civil liberties is costly in terms of economic development. If anything it may be the other way around, that a democracy with civil liberties promotes economic development. . . . But establishing democratic institutions is not the "deus ex machina" that resolves all the problems of development. A sound and stable political-economic development is essential.[14]

Representative government can facilitate balanced and equitable economic development in the following ways: an equitable distribution of income and political stability are important contributors to successful growth.[15] By providing stable, legitimate governance and a restrained rule of law, representative government strengthens the property rights necessary to encourage long-term investment.[16] By providing a base of widespread access to the political system, it discourages the engorgement of inefficient state monopolies and prevents secret environmental abuses of the kind that have emerged from the communist era in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. It offers some check on corruption by officials operating behind opaque barriers of state security and without any inquiry by free public media. (Zairean President Mobutu Sese Seko exemplifies the kleptocracy of a leadership whose interest in economic development extends

[14] Alberto Allesina and Roberto Perotti, "The Political Economy of Growth: A Critical Survey of the Recent Literature," *World Bank Economic Review* 8 (September 1994): 354–55.

[15] Ibid., 351–74; also Ross Burkhart and Michael Lewis-Beck, "Comparative Democracy: The Economic Development Thesis," *American Political Science Review* 88 (December 1994): 903–910; Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, "Political Regimes and Economic Growth," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 7 (Summer 1993): 51–70; John F. Helliwell, "Empirical Linkages between Democracy and Economic Growth," *British Journal of Political Science* 24 (April 1994): 175–98; Robert Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).

[16] Mancur Olson, "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development," *American Political Science Review* 87 (September 1993): 567–76.

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only to enriching itself.) Mass famines occur only in political systems where information can be suppressed and protest repressed.[17]

In particular instances there will always be an element of contradiction between some kinds of rights and others. But they are not inevitably in any kind of severe dialectic. The elements of complementarity on the whole outweigh those of contradiction. Those times when they do come into conflict and are not sufficiently mutually reinforcing may be precisely the times for international organizations to use their influence to preserve a balance, for example standing up for the principles of representative governments as well as the necessity for achieving decent material living conditions.

7. The balance between enforcement and neutrality

The idea of an international organization empowered to enforce the protection of basic human rights rightly causes fear, not only among those judged guilty in a particular instance but among weak states everywhere. But it also represents the hope of many vulnerable individuals and oppressed peoples. This tension cannot be avoided in any discussion of human rights and is, of course, integrally related to the sovereignty balance. In the area of the UN's traditional operations for peace and security, peacekeeping (where the UN forces were on the ground with the consent of the parties, were authorized only to shoot in self-defense, and were not supposed to take sides or otherwise become a party to the conflict) the balance was overwhelmingly on the side of neutrality. Yet sometimes neutrality effectively would mean taking the side of the strong against the weak, without regard to judgments about justice. The UN has also operated (more rarely to be sure, but with Korea and Iraq the prime exhibits) as an agent of collective security, coercing a named aggressor and trying to enforce a settlement that manifestly favored one side.

"Peace enforcement," as it emerged in Boutros Boutros-Ghali's *An Agenda for Peace*, represents a precarious effort to balance enforcement and impartiality, using force as "a provisional measure" when deemed necessary to avert large-scale humanitarian disaster.[18] The need arises in the context of increasingly common civil wars and breakdowns of order, and requires an immensely difficult balancing act. Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia all illustrate in different ways the hazards. Perhaps most of the time the UN will lack the consensus, the will, and even the capability to engage in peace enforcement. Writing—and if necessary adjusting—the mandate for every such activity offers a formidable challenge. But sometimes the international community, acting through its designated institutions, will decide it to be necessary. The Independent Working Group, for example, calls for establishing a small UN Rapid Reaction Force, available for urgent deployment by the Security Council to prevent certain dangerous political conditions from

[17] Amartya Sen, *Poverty and Famine* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981).

[18] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace* (New York: United Nations, 1992), 26.

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deteriorating into chaos and disaster. The force would be capable not only of a peacekeeping mission, but (limited however by its size), able to "provide security for UN personnel; hold an airport . . .; establish one or more safe areas for the civilian population; limit escalation and assist in ending the violence. . . ."[19] These are in large degree peace enforcement tasks, not those of traditional peacekeeping. They are also distinct from collective security enforcement by heavily-armed units, which the UN dare undertake only when its key members are confident they are prepared to stay the course.

8. *The balance between specificity and plasticity of the Charter*

The UN Charter has proved to be a reasonably flexible instrument. For instance, it has been possible to stretch the charter for purposes of maintaining "international peace and security" to modify in de facto fashion the Article 2 (7) prohibition of intervention "in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state"[20] and to invent the institution of peacekeeping despite the absence of any explicit charter authorization for it. Nevertheless, it is extremely difficult to amend the charter formally, since amendments require ratification by two-thirds of the member states, including approval by all five permanent members of the Security Council. Over its fifty-year history, the only amendments to make it have been for one enlargement of the nonpermanent membership of the Security Council, and two stages of enlargement of ECOSOC. The problem remains how to write—or now, when and how as necessary to modify—a foundational document that will preserve the foundation while underpinning a structure that can expand, contract, and change its form and function in response to new and unforeseen power realities and challenges.

9. *The balance between coordination and uniformity of purpose, and diversity*

A common criticism of the UN has been of the uncoordinated nature of its various units and specialized agencies. Indeed, they not infrequently pursue conflicting goals, whether as part of a peacebuilding effort in El Salvador or in delivering humanitarian relief in Africa.[21] At best, the result is the waste of very limited resources; at worst it is outright failure. It seems intolerable to have different organs working at bureaucratic cross-purposes.

[19] Independent Working Group, *United Nations*, 22.

[20] Article 39 becomes the escape clause to permit intervention: "The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken . . . to restore international peace and security."

[21] See Alvaro de Soto and Graciana del Castillo, "Obstacles to Peacebuilding," *Foreign Policy* 94 (Spring 1994): 69–83; also Eva Bertram, "Reinventing Government: The Promise and Perils of Peacebuilding," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 39 (September 1995): 387–418.

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Yet some diversity of goal and doctrine has its value. In the arena of economic development the UN and the members of the economic profession who advise or comment on its policies have yet to come up with a coherent, unified theory of economic development. It is not much more attractive to imagine all economic development assistance to be administered on the model of the World Bank than on the model of the UN Development Programme. Nor can we ever expect to see complete agreement on concept or practice between the rich states from which development funds must come and the poor ones which constitute the locus and object of development projects. The Independent Working Group's proposal for a new Economic Council contains a built-in and unavoidable tension. It would be charged "to integrate the work of all UN agencies and international institutions, programs and offices engaged in economic issues, . . . promote the harmonization of the fiscal, monetary and trade policies of Member States and encourage international cooperation on issues of technology and resources, indebtedness, and the functioning of commodity markets."[22] Yet it also encourages different development approaches. Some increased integration and harmonization is surely desirable. Very much is surely not desirable nor, in a world of sovereign states, possible. How and where the balance will be struck lies in the realm of a continuing political process that will always also reflect the competing claims of the balance of effectiveness and legitimacy (justice).

10. The balance of interests

Governance of and by the UN is, like all instances of governance, a political process in which numerous interests exert claims and can resist claims. The UN's constitutional structure guarantees a plethora of actors with de facto if not de jure veto power. Hence any reform proposal will have to have something to please most everyone, as well as in the best satirical tradition, something to offend most everyone. The trick is to get the balance right, not just in any single reform proposal (expand the Security Council, create a new Economic Council and a new Social Council, institute some new mode of financing the organization), but in a package of proposals. No single reform recommendation can be considered in isolation. Nor will any large acceptable package be put together without long negotiation and intense public debate around the world. The task of reforming and renewing the United Nations is at heart a political task, as arduous as it is essential.

[22] Independent Working Group, *United Nations*, 52.

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Second Coming: The Strategies of the New Christian Right

MARK J. ROZELL
CLYDE WILCOX

Since the election of a Republican majority in Congress in 1994, the Christian Right movement has attained an unprecedented degree of legitimacy and influence in American politics. GOP lawmakers eagerly seek to be pictured with Christian Coalition executive director Ralph Reed, Jr., who unveiled the "Contract with the American Family." Popular media portrayals, including a *Time* magazine cover story, refer to a Christian Right strategy of "taking over" American politics as "working."

These developments are remarkable when we consider the once declining stature of the Christian Right and the predictions of its demise as recently as the aftermath of the 1992 elections. Yet the success of the Christian Right was neither a sudden occurrence nor an accident of the GOP takeover of Congress. It was the result of a calculated, sophisticated strategy to build a disorganized social movement into a formidable party faction with a grassroots oriented network of activists. This article examines the factors that have contributed to the recent successes of the Christian Right.

The Christian Right of the 1970s and 1980s

The Christian Right of the late 1970s and 1980s was a social movement characterized by disorganization, decentralization, and a lack of fully developed institutional structures—in short, a typical social movement. The leaders used extreme and confrontational rhetoric to mobilize their constituents, who in turn acted as

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typical political amateurs by insisting on pure political positions as a prerequisite for support. By the end of the decade, Reverend Jerry Falwell had disbanded the one-time leading Christian Right organization, his Moral Majority; Reverend Pat Robertson's presidential campaign had failed; and many predicted the imminent demise of the Christian Right in America.

There were three primary reasons for the failure of the first wave of the New Christian Right. First, the social movement organizations made no real effort to build at the grassroots and had few active local chapters. Jeffrey Hadden et al. reported that their study revealed no evidence of a functioning grassroots structure and argued that "the Moral Majority was primarily an organization for grabbing media attention, built and supported by direct-mail technology."[1] Second, religious prejudices made for narrow coalitions, with Moral Majority leaders especially intolerant of Catholics, Pentecostals, and mainline Protestants.[2] Finally, the movement made little attempt to market its message to a broader audience, serving up the same heated rhetoric to the press and public that it used to motivate its activists.

In the 1990s, the Christian Right built far more effective organizational structures, far larger and more inclusive coalitions, and began to adopt more pragmatic strategies. Some activists claimed that the movement had matured and that it could now be considered part of the conservative mainstream. Critics charged that the Christian Right was adopting a moderate face to win elections, but that the fundamental agenda remained unchanged.

Matthew Moen argues that the new organizations of the Christian Right differed from those that came before in several key ways. First, the organizations of the 1990s abandoned the language of moral crusade in favor of appeals based on the "rights talk" of liberalism. Second, the groups emphasized politics over moral reform and attempted to build political coalitions. In this way, Moen argues, they became more secular. Finally, the new organizations were far more

[1] Jeffrey K. Hadden, Anson Shupe, James Hawdon, and Kenneth Martin, "Why Jerry Falwell Killed the Moral Majority" in Marshall W. Browne and Ray B. Browne, eds., *The God Pumpers: Religion in the Electronic Age* (Bowling Green, OH: Bowling Green Popular Press, 1987).

[2] Although the coalition of national leaders who helped to form the Moral Majority included Paul Weyrich (a Catholic) and Howard Phillips (who is Jewish), and although Falwell made repeated rhetorical appeals to those outside of his Baptist Bible Fellowship denomination, researchers found that the Moral Majority attracted few Catholics or even mainline Protestants. Robert Liebman found that most state Moral Majority chairs were pastors in the Baptist Bible Fellowship, and surveys of state chapters found them dominated by that denomination and other independent Baptist churches. See Robert Liebman, "Mobilizing the Moral Majority" in R. Liebman and R. Wuthnow, eds., *The New Christian Right* (New York: Aldine, 1989); Sharon Georgianna, *The Moral Majority and Fundamentalism: Plausibility and Dissonance* (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellon Press, 1989); Clyde Wilcox, *God's Warriors: The Christian Right in 20th Century America* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1992). In Indiana, for example, almost 75 percent of the membership came from small Baptist denominations, and although the chapter was one of the largest in the nation, Georgianna found no Catholics in her survey.

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sophisticated than those that went before, primarily because of the influx of a new cadre of skilled leaders.[3]

At the core of the transformation was political learning. Activists who remembered the defeats of the 1980s appeared to have learned from their mistakes and counseled different strategies. The more doctrinaire activists left politics in disgust, and those that remained became more pragmatic as they learned the rules of the game.[4] Moreover, the newly formed organizations avoided the mistakes of the Moral Majority and other first generation Christian Right groups.

In what follows we describe and analyze the transformation of the Christian Right from a generally ineffectual social movement to an influential interest group striving for the political mainstream. That transformation has resulted from such strategies as mainstreaming issue appeals, broadening the coalition, and compromising when necessary. To understand these new strategies we interviewed numerous Christian Right leaders, prominent Republican consultants, and grassroots activists.

Because the Christian Right has shifted its focus of activities to the grassroots, we focus predominantly on state and local level leaders and activists in Virginia, which was the home of Falwell's Moral Majority and is the home of the most influential Christian Right organization—Robertson's Christian Coalition.

Our findings lend some credibility to Moen's thesis that "the Christian Right has gradually reconciled and adjusted itself to the secular norms and practices of American politics."[5] The evidence that follows shows that the Christian Right indeed has moved from the expansionist phase to one of institutionalization.[6] Nonetheless, this transformation poses different problems for the Christian Right as it seeks to both broaden its appeal and keep its activist core politically mobilized, and to the Republican party, which must integrate these social conservatives into a coalition that includes more libertarian elements.

The Christian Right in the 1990s

The Christian Right organizations active in Virginia in the 1990s have focused on building grassroots organizations that emphasize politics, not religious affiliation. Although the Baptists of the Moral Majority seemed to impose a strict denominational definition for who would go to heaven, the Christian Right groups of the 1990s argued that they could defer such judgments to God and work together with other Christians and even occasional conservative Jews and Muslims to

[3] Matthew Moen, *The Transformation of the Christian Right* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1992).

[4] Steve Bruce, "The Inevitable Failure of the New Christian Right," *Sociology of Religion* 55 (Fall 1994): 229–242; Duane Oldfield, "The Christian Right and State Republican Parties" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 1989).

[5] Matthew Moen, "From Revolution to Evolution: The Changing Nature of the Christian Right," *Sociology of Religion* 55 (Fall 1994): 345.

[6] Ibid., 348–353.

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elect candidates they could all support. We will profile several of these organizations and then describe and analyze their strategies.

The Christian Coalition of Virginia

The Christian Coalition, headquartered in Chesapeake, Virginia, is headed by Reverend Pat Robertson and directed by Ralph Reed. The group claims a membership of 350,000 with 750 local chapters. It has lobbyists in several states and in Washington, DC and an annual budget of $8–10 million. Founded in 1989, the organization now has fifty independently incorporated state organizations. The national organization also is a Virginia corporation. Reed compared the arrangement to that of the AFL-CIO: there is a national union, fifty separate state ones, and numerous local affiliates.[7] Yet the national organization has more influence on the Virginia chapter than in other states. Reed noted:

> We do have more say in the Virginia organization than in other state organizations. I live here, Pat [Robertson] lives here. . . . We're closer to the situation here, we understand it better. For example, I don't understand the state organization in Ohio as much as I understand the one in Virginia."[8]

The organization's motto is "Think like Jesus . . . Fight like David . . . Lead like Moses . . . Run like Lincoln." In its early days, candidates backed by the Coalition did not quite follow Lincoln's lead, running instead as stealth candidates who did not divulge their connections with the Christian Coalition nor their positions on many key issues until after the election. This tack drew considerable criticism, not only from Democrats and GOP centrists, but also from other Christian Right organizations; the Coalition no longer officially encourages stealth campaigns.[9]

The Virginia state organization has its own board of directors and staff. There are forty separate county chapters, and congressional district coordinators. Reed claims that 75,000 Virginians belong to the state chapter.[10] Spokesman Mike Russell claims that there are 45,000 Virginians who have made donations to the organization.[11] Either number represents sizable strength.

The Coalition has focused its efforts on local school board elections, city councils, and the state legislature. According to the group's *Leadership Manual*:

> For issues that concern pro-family Catholics and Evangelicals—abortion, drugs, education—the future lies at the state and local level. A decade from now, the

[7] Author interview with Ralph Reed, Washington, DC, 29 September 1994.

[8] Ibid.

[9] For a detailed discussion of stealth candidacies and their justification, see Hubert Morken, "The San Diego Model," (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, 1993.)

[10] Reed interview.

[11] Tyler Whitley, "Religious Right Called Important to Va. GOP," *Richmond Times-Dispatch*, 10 September 1994.

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organizations that mobilize voters and activists in the counties and precincts of America will control the political agenda.[12]

The training manual addresses various skills that Christian activists can employ to gain political influence and hold power. These include instructions on precinct organizing, building alliances, working with the news media, organizing local committees, influencing public officials, recruiting candidates, using effective rhetoric, and setting up phone bank operations.

The Christian Coalition produces and distributes voter guides in each election year. The group also produces and distributes congressional scorecards that purport to answer the question: "How did *your* Congressman and Senators vote on issues critical to the family?"[13] The Christian Coalition also sponsors conferences, get-out-the-vote drives, and conservative Christian voter registration.

The Christian Coalition has made a major effort to avoid the pitfalls of religious particularism that destroyed the Moral Majority. Its state and local chapters are generally not headed by clergy, and the group has spent a good deal of effort training its leaders and members on how to work together in politics. The group's national lobbying office in Washington boasts an ecumenical staff, including a Greek Orthodox and a Jew, and Reed himself is an Episcopalian. The Prince William chapter in Virginia is headed by a Catholic, something that would have been unthinkable in the Moral Majority.

Reed claims that the organization's membership reflects a diverse religious coalition, with approximately 25 percent belonging to mainline Protestant denominations; 10–15 percent associated with Pentecostal churches, half Baptists; and 5–10 percent belonging to other churches.

The Family Foundation

The Family Foundation communicates directly with approximately 40,000 voters in 22,000 homes. Yet its importance lies not primarily in its membership, but in the ability of its leader, Walt Barbee, to build networks of sympathetic organizations and individuals. Materials produced by the Family Foundation are distributed by many other state and especially local organizations throughout Virginia.

The Family Foundation is one of thirty-five state affiliated, family-policy councils associated with the national group, Focus on the Family. The thirty-five family-policy councils cooperate in an informal network. For example, the well funded Michigan Family Forum produces research upon which other family-policy councils often rely. Unlike the Christian Coalition, the Focus on the Family

[12] William L. Fisher, Ralph Reed, Jr., and Richard L. Weinhold, *Christian Coalition Leadership Manual* (Chesapeake, VA: Christian Coalition, 1990), 2.

[13] *Christian Coalition Congressional Scorecard*, 1994 election edition. For Virginia's senators, in 1994 John Warner voted 71 percent of the time for the Christian Coalition position, placing him in the top third of all senators; and Charles Robb voted a mere 7 percent of the time for the group's position.

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does not build its own state organizations, but instead seeks to establish ties with already existing groups in a state.

Although the Family Foundation was formally formed in 1987, its origins are in a 1982 county-level organization. In 1982 Barbee formed the Prince William County Concerned Citizen Council to counter what he and others considered the antifamily decisions of local policy makers. The group started small, with about twenty members.

The initiative that encouraged that mobilization was a proposed sex education program for public schools. The Concerned Citizen Council held six public forums on the proposal, and Barbee sent out a mailing about an upcoming school board meeting on the topic to his members and several hundred others whom his group had identified as sympathetic to the pro-family agenda. Barbee said that this initial effort far exceeded his own expectations, for large numbers of conservative Christian activists packed the meeting, and the school board voted against the proposal.[14]

This initial success showed the potential influence that Christian Right activists could have on public policy if they were mobilized into political action. By 1987 the Concerned Citizens Council had grown substantially and claimed several thousand members throughout the state. For five years, Barbee reached out to citizens who shared his concerns on primarily educational and social issues, and his network grew rapidly. Much of what he did—maintaining a mailing list, sending a monthly newsletter—was self-financed. Nonetheless,

> We realized that there were a number of other small groups in Virginia trying to do the same thing. We realized that there needed to be an umbrella group. . . . These groups were underfunded, short-staffed and just not very focused or effective. So a decision had to be made strategically that there had to be some organization in order to be effective. . . . There was a real vacuum at the state level. . . . Until we came on the scene, there was no one who was there during the General Assembly session representing the family on issues that impact the family.[15]

The policy areas emphasized by the Family Foundation extend far beyond social issues such as abortion and sex education. Among those that Barbee identifies as "family-impact issues" are education; economic, social, welfare reform; and right-to-work, among others. "If it impacts the family in terms of its pocketbook, its future, or its culture, it is a family-impact issue and we're interested in it." Barbee estimates that the group now devotes about 70 percent of its activity to education issues. "More people will come together on educational issues than anything else—more even than abortion."[16]

In addition to expanding its membership, scope, and policy agenda, the group's activities have grown significantly. Along with the Concerned Women of America, it produces and distributes voter guides in state races. In 1994 they

[14] Author interview with Walter Barbee, Springfield, VA, 16 September 1994.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid.

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claimed to have distributed about one million guides on the congressional races in Virginia. Each candidate received from the groups an issues survey that asked for responses to questions on taxpayer funded abortions, the Freedom of Choice Act, the value-added tax, Goals 2000, school prayer, among others. Researchers documented candidate positions for those who refused to reply.[17]

The Family Foundation maintains six Family Hotlines. The telephone alert system helps members "stay informed on federal and state family impact legislation before it happens."[18] The hotlines operate seven days per week, twenty-four hours per day, and are usually updated each week. During state legislative sessions there are updates three or four times each week. The six hotlines provide local phone number access for over one-half of the Virginia population.[19]

The group also maintains a unique FAX Alert network. Barbee issues action alerts by FAX to targeted activists about once a week on breaking news of concern to members. Each of the activists spreads the word by then issuing FAX messages to as many as two dozen more members or by activating local "phone trees." In a relatively brief period, a large number of highly motivated member-activists can be moved to contact public officials on some policy issue.[20]

The Family Foundation also advertises that it is "the only multi-issue, pro-family organization which provides a full-time, on-site representative during each session of the Virginia General Assembly."[21] That has been the case since 1991. The legislative liaison person gathers information of General Assembly activity, advises legislators on the Family Foundation members' views on issues, and provides the legislators with data and analysis on policy issues.

The Family Foundation has an affiliate lobbying organization, the Virginia Family Council, which issues a *Report Card for Virginia Legislators.* The report card identifies "legislators' voting patterns on a broad range of key family impact issues." The first such report card, issued in 1993, gave a failing grade to eighty of Virginia's 140 legislators.[22] The scorecards give high grades primarily to Republicans, but some Democrats do post credible scores.

The Family Foundation also holds occasional conferences and workshops for members. It provides a monthly state news insert for Virginia subscribers to the national Focus on the Family publication the *Citizen.* It sponsors as well the Virginia Storm church voter registration initiative.[23] The group also allows candidates for public office to rent its mailing list, with the agreement that no solicitations will be made. The candidates can only introduce themselves and

[17] *Citizenship '94 Voter's Guides.* The documentation is based on past voting records and public statements. Critics maintained that the survey questions are biased and the documentation often inaccurate or incomplete.

[18] Family Foundation letter to members, 25 September 1993, 4. Copy obtained by author.

[19] Barbee interview.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Family Foundation letter, 5. (Emphasis in original.)

[22] Ibid., 2–3. (Emphasis in original.)

[23] Ibid., 2, 5.

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their views on issues to the members. Barbee is building Community Impact Committees, which are small teams of activists usually based at local churches who will repackage information.[24]

Other Groups

Several other groups, most prominently the Concerned Women for America (CWA), are also active at the grassroots. CWA was formed in the early 1980s, and its Virginia chapter was formed in 1991. Today the CWA claims to have 16,000 members in Virginia. There are forty active chapters throughout the state and seventy liaisons to churches and community groups. One activity of the liaisons is to distribute issue Action Alerts to church members.

The CWA of Virginia has a state legislative liaison who keeps members apprised of action on various issues of concern to the group. The state legislative liaison prepares position papers on such issues and declares Action Alerts to the regional offices and liaisons.

According to Beth LaRock, a Loudon County School Board member and state coordinator of CWA, the group can get the word out quickly to about 15,000 members when an issue of concern arises in the General Assembly.[25] The state office has a hotline recording that members can call for updates on legislative and gubernatorial initiatives.

One of the more influential of the smaller groups is the Old Dominion Association of Church Schools, comprised mostly of about sixty independent Baptist-operated schools. The head of the association, Reverend Jack Knapp, lobbies at the state capitol. "Many of the groups that we work with are tied to the Family Foundation, either directly or unofficially. We work with the Eagle Forum, Concerned Women for America, Virginians for Life, home educators."[26]

Knapp also is the executive director of the Virginia Assembly of Independent Baptists, founded in 1977 and now comprised of about 450 churches. He maintains that the pastors and members put aside their religious differences to promote common political objectives. He also represents the Assembly as a lobbyist at the state capitol. During Assembly gatherings, Knapp prohibits different groups from displaying their own literature or other goods in order to keep the members focusing on common objectives. The assembly promotes common political goals while avoiding religious doctrinal differences, yet it is devoid of participation by either Pentecostals or charismatics.[27]

Home-schooling parents in Virginia are loosely organized under two groups—Michael P. Farris's Home School Legal Defense Association (HSLDA) and the

[24] Barbee interview.

[25] Author interview with Beth LaRock (by telephone), 22 December 1994.

[26] Author interview with Jack Knapp, Richmond, VA, 9 December 1993.

[27] Ed Briggs, "After 16 Years, Fundamentalists Still Together," *Richmond Times-Dispatch*, 18 September 1993.

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Home Schooling Education Association (HEAV). There are approximately 5,000 home-schooling families in Virginia. In 1993, Farris captured the GOP lieutenant governor nomination with the support of thousands of home-schooling parents who filed as convention delegates. GOP regulars were stunned by this event, but as the former Family Foundation director, Anne Kincaid, pointed out:

> All this networking was pre-political. That's why it was so easy to turn all of these things into a political movement. These were all networks of people working together toward the same goals. . . . Each group has its own newsletter. They have telephone trees. When I wanted to put the heat on legislators to defeat the mandatory schooling bill . . . the way we [tried] that was to activate these phone trees around the state. We got thousands of calls in to the legislators. The homeschoolers learned that they could have a real impact on the process.[28]

New Strategies

These organizations have sought to use more sophisticated political strategies than those of the first incarnation of the New Christian Right. The amateur tactics of the first wave of Christian Right activism have given way to greater professionalism. As these groups have built grassroots organizations, they have used a variety of techniques to train their members in political action. State and local seminars, often stretching over a weekend, include workshops on building coalitions, mainstreaming the message, and how and when to compromise on issues. A variety of new communications strategies, including the Internet, provide up-to-date information for activists.

Mainstreaming the Message

Christian social conservatives have worked to win nomination for their own candidates and have also helped to support other candidates backed by the Republican party. When the Christian Right succeeds in nominating one of its own to run in the general election, there has been a growing attention to how to mainstream the message.

This strategy consists of two elements. First and foremost, eschew religious language in public forums and instead use secular arguments to support the same position. When Kincaid first was active in anti-abortion advocacy, she used heated rhetoric. Her approach was ineffectual and resulted in many dismissing her as a fringe personality. She reflected on what she learned from her setbacks.

> I can remember using rhetoric that I don't use anymore, that sounded inflammatory. "Onward Christian soldiers" scared people. So you don't talk that way. Some still talk about witchcraft and the feminist movement. Yes, the Bible says that "rebellion against men is of witchcraft." It's all Biblical tenets, but the layman doesn't understand that. So it makes you sound like you've lost your marbles. . . . The point is that

[28] Author interview with Anne Kincaid, Richmond VA, 17 November 1993.

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> you have to know your audience. That's not deception. . . . Unless you're talking to a Christian audience, you don't put all the rhetoric out there that others won't respond to. I learned this lesson the hard way.[29]

Today Kincaid is the governor's director of constituent services and considered by many as one of the most savvy political figures in the state. Kincaid runs a seminar session for conservative Christian activists on how to "adopt an editor" and work effectively with the news media. She teaches the importance of using a strictly nonconfrontational approach to the media, even when it appears to be futile that an editor or reporter will be anything other than hostile to the cause of conservative Christians.

For Christian Right leaders, the strategy is to know the audience and then use the appropriate rhetoric. When many criticized Farris in 1993 for talking like a traditional conservative most of the time and then using Biblical appeals before Christian Right audiences, he protested, "everybody doesn't speak Bible-ease. You have to be able to communicate in ways that everybody can understand."[30] He added:

> Evangelical Christians need to find ways to communicate effectively with different people. They can't just interact among themselves. Many are learning that as they interact in the Republican party, not everyone understands or accepts the lingo that evangelicals use when talking to each other. . . . I've got to understand the other person, if I want to be persuasive. Understanding that person means respecting that other person. I've got to get around other peoples' mental road blocks. That means respecting where that person is coming from. That's the way that evangelical Christians can be more effective. . . . It's a growing up thing. That is, being able to disagree with others but still be respectful of their values.[31]

Kincaid advises avoiding overt Biblical appeals.

> Now I'm proud to be a Christian and known as a Christian activist, but, right now you will not see the word "Christian" in any of the Family Foundation literature because, in the current climate, that kind of appeal is not received. We've been trying to tell people not to wear the neon targets on their backs. We feel that we are a persecuted group. In today's climate, you cannot get away with taking pot-shots at [liberal] groups, but you can take pot-shots at Christians all you want.[32]

Others agree that rhetorical tone is crucial to success. In a memorandum to supporters, Reed wrote that "phrases like 'religious war' and 'take over' play to a stereotype of evangelicals as intolerant." He urged followers to avoid such rhetoric. "We must adopt strategies of persuasion, not domination."[33] Reed's rhetorical moderation stands in sharp contrast with the language he used early in his work with the Christian Coalition. He is best known for saying, "I do

[29] Ibid.

[30] Mike Allen, "An 'Unscary Mike' Offered to Voters," *Richmond Times-Dispatch*, 29 August 1993.

[31] Author interview with Michael Farris, Purcellville, VA, 12 August 1994.

[32] Kincaid interview.

[33] Taylor, "Christian Coalition Revamping Image," *Richmond Times-Dispatch*, 7 December 1992.

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guerrilla warfare. I paint my face and travel at night. You don't know it's over until you're in a body bag. You don't know until election night."[34] In 1992, Reed campaigned against a proposed Equal Rights Amendment to the Iowa state Constitution. He linked the proposal to witchcraft and lesbianism.[35] After a spate of negative publicity, Reed changed his approach—not because his views had changed, but rather he had learned how to be more politically effective.

The second tactic that Christian Right groups have used to help their candidates appeal to the mainstream is to emphasize taxes, crime, and other concerns likely to appeal to a majority of voters. Christian Right leaders believe that the key to their long-term political success rests with being accepted as not much different from the traditional conservatives who focus on crime and the economy. When Christian Coalition Executive Director Ralph Reed speaks publicly about his organization's goals, he emphasizes economic issues and downplays social ones. As GOP moderate Bobbie Kilberg stated, "they know that in order to be successful they have to masquerade as just regular conservatives who are interested in tax rates."[36]

Conservative Christian leaders insist that the issue of tax rates is germane to the decline of the family. The Virginia Family Council publishes a legislative report card to inform activists whether their legislators are family-friendly. The category of taxes leads the list of "criteria for determining 'family-friendly' votes." According to the report card: "Excessive taxes are the major reason why most moms who would like to stay home and raise their young children cannot afford to do so. Clearly any bills and votes which increase the tax burden on families are not family-friendly." The report card also lists government debt and wasteful public spending as family issues.[37]

The mainstreaming technique works best in low-profile races, where media attention is sparse and opposition candidates lack the financial resources to draw voter attention to the Christian Right connections of candidates. Many Democratic candidates for state legislative seats attested to the effectiveness of this strategy. We interviewed Democratic House of Delegates candidates who lost elections in 1993 to Republican candidates strongly associated with the Christian Right. Some of the Democrats argued that their opponents won the Republican nomination by running as religious conservatives winning a plurality of votes in a multi-candidate field with the strong support of conservative Christian activists. In the general election, however, they emphasized traditional Republican economic issues.

[34] Quoted in Jan Vertefeuille, "Religious Right Sets Sights on Virginia GOP," *Lynchburg News & Daily Advance*, 23 March 1993.

[35] Taylor, "Christian Coalition Revamping Image."

[36] Author interview with Bobbie Kilberg, McLean, VA, 15 February 1994.

[37] Virginia Family Council, *Report Card for Virginia Legislators* (1993), 2; *The Christian Coalition Congressional Scorecard* (1994) rates legislators according to their votes on "family" issues, including the president's economic stimulus program and his budget plan, government debt, social security tax increases, and term limits.

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Several of the Democrats said that their GOP opponents dissembled on abortion and other issues identified with the Christian Right. Their opponents ran on anti-abortion platforms in the GOP contests, and then in the general election claimed that abortion wasn't an important issue because the Supreme Court had settled the controversy in favor of abortion rights. The Democratic candidates said that the Christian Right candidates prevailed by hiding their real agendas.

Yet in some high-profile races, this tactic has failed. During the 1993 campaign, Farris tried in vain to position himself as a traditional conservative. He emphasized such issues as reducing government debt, lowering taxes, streamlining government programs, and transportation and economic development. Because Farris had a controversial record of earlier activities, his Democratic opponent succeeded in branding him as a Christian Right extremist.

The mainstreaming tactic also failed in the highly publicized Virginia Beach school board elections of 1994. Virginia Beach – home of the Christian Coalition, Robertson's Christian Broadcasting Network, and his Regent University – held its first school board elections in May 1994. With the backing of Robertson and the Christian Coalition, a slate of five candidates who called themselves the "Kids First" team ran a campaign emphasizing school safety, education standards, and budgetary policies. The team spent little effort discussing opposition to sex education, the need to teach creationism, and other of their controversial views. The Christian Coalition went all out for the team by distributing over 100,000 voter guides.

The campaign was widely watched as an indicator of whether Christian Right groups could prevail in low-turnout races by mobilizing their enthusiastic followers. All five candidates lost, due in part to a well organized effort by the Virginia Beach Education Association to advertise the more controversial views of the Kids First candidates. With good countermobilization and substantial publicity, the Kids First team failed to "come in under the radar screen."[38]

In 1995, Fairfax County held its first-ever school board elections with disappointing results for the Christian Right. Socially conservative candidates downplayed their controversial views and connections to the Christian Right, but again teachers' organizations as well as the local media publicized the candidates' positions on teaching creationism and sex education. The state legislative elections, in which voters rejected Governor George Allen's plea for a GOP majority, also turned in part on the social issues with Democrats warning of the implications of GOP candidates' support for abortion restrictions, charter schools, and the elimination of Family Life (sex) Education.

Yet Democrats who have successfully linked Christian Right candidates with Falwell and Robertson in past campaigns now worry that these new efforts to mainstream the message will make Christian Right candidates more formidable. They acknowledge the difficulty of characterizing conservative Christian leaders

[38] See Bill Geroux, "Virginia Beach Vote Holy War of Sorts," *Richmond Times-Dispatch*, 1 May 1994.

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as extremists when those leaders employ mainstream rhetoric and successfully manage their interactions with the news media.

The abortion issue provides the perfect example of how conservative Christian leaders and candidates have changed their rhetoric. The Christian Coalition State Legislative Policy and Campaign Institute booklet features an article entitled "How to Win With Life." That article emphasizes the need for conservative Christian candidates to "run smarter" than their pro-choice opponents by offering "mainstream" appeals on the abortion issue. "To make the issue of abortion an issue that works in his favor, the pro-life candidate must make his opponent out to be the 'radical' and 'extremist.'" The way to accomplish that end, accordingly, is to focus on the "sub-issues" of parental notification and consent, waiting periods, taxpayer funding, and third trimester abortions.[39] Consequently, pro-choice candidates who take unpopular positions on these sub-issues can either be put on the defensive or be forced to drop the abortion issue altogether. "Focusing on the sub-issues, pro-life candidates can convince a comfortable majority of voters that their view is indeed the 'mainstream' position and that their opponents are the ones who are out of the mainstream."[40]

This strategy does not envision any change in principle on the abortion issue. It merely envisions that "the [pro-life] stand is communicated in a reasonable manner" in order to be politically effective.[41] Yet Christian Right activists have in the past been reluctant to take any but the most straightforward and extreme positions on abortion. GOP Delegate Robert Marshall, the executive director of the American Life League, is the author of a pamphlet that advises conservative Christian activists on how to effectively handle questions from the public about their pro-life candidates' views. In sections entitled "How to Work the System for the Babies While Keeping Your Soul for the Lord" and "Continue Prudently," Marshall cites Biblical passages to defend a strategy of presenting to the public only that information that will aid the pro-life cause. Among the advice that he offers are the following:

- Be hesitant to go beyond what is requested. Don't answer questions that are not asked.
- And when you do talk, you are under no obligation to exhaust your information on a topic.
- And even the Lord did not always answer questions directly.
- Also, it is morally permissible to answer a question with a question.[42]

Of course, these tactics are not new to politics, nor are they unique to the Christian Right. All candidates seek to frame their positions in the best possible

[39] Christian Coalition, "How to Win With Life," *State Legislative Policy and Campaign Institute* (Chesapeake, VA: The Christian Coalition, 1993), 110.

[40] Ibid., 111.

[41] Ibid., 112.

[42] Robert G. Marshall, *Pro-Life Precinct Power* (Stafford, VA: American Life League, 1990), 25.

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light. Surveys have consistently shown that the public is ambivalent about abortion and favors a variety of procedural restrictions but opposes an outright ban of abortions during the first trimester. Thus both liberals and conservatives have attempted to cast their arguments in the most attractive light.[43] Yet these tactics are new to the Christian Right and are designed to help candidates with strong ties to the movement make their arguments more persuasively to prospective voters.

Of course, even when Christian conservatives mainstream their message, they appear extreme to many Americans; and even the most moderate elements of the movement occasionally use language that makes secular conservatives wince. Although the new rhetoric of the movement is far more moderate than that of the Christian Right of the 1980s, it is nonetheless often seen as extreme by other political actors.

Broadening the Coalition

As Christian Right candidates and groups have broadened their agenda, they have become better able to build coalitions. This breadth begins with increased cooperation among conservative Christians, even across what were once vast theological chasms. Farris's new political organization, the Madison Project, supported a Mormon candidate for Congress, something unthinkable for the Moral Majority. One fundamentalist home-schooler said that although he would never contribute to the Christian Coalition, because he disagreed with Robertson's theology, he would be happy to support Christian Coalition candidates for office.[44]

The coalitions involve secular conservative groups as well. Christian Right candidates have learned that by staking positions on these broader issues, they can win the support of a variety of conservative interest groups. A list of participants at a Mike Farris fundraiser included representatives of the Association for Concerned Taxpayers, Accuracy in Academia, the Gun Owners of America, the American Conservative Union, and the Heritage Foundation. GOP consultant Bruce Hildebrand noted that the Christian Right has become enormously effective at networking with other conservative groups to share membership lists, cosponsor fundraisers, and organize to promote like-minded political candidates.

> There is a lot of talk about the Christian Right not being good at forming coalitions. Quite the contrary. Look at Walt Barbee's operation. He is the master of the lists. He has the lists of numerous organizations that work together very effectively.
>
> Barbee's group, the Gun Owners, English First, other organizations—they're all in Springfield [VA]. That's where the "pony express" starts. They can have literature produced—to attack [a candidate], to address some subject, whatever—and it would go out in the volunteers' cars, after being printed up, all over the state. It would

[43] Elizabeth Adell Cook, Ted G. Jelen, and Clyde Wilcox, *Between Two Absolutes: Public Opinion and the Politics of Abortion*, (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992).

[44] Anonymous interview.

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> show up as a campaign expenditure on Saturday, drivers would be out all night long . . . and it would be at the churches on Sunday morning. Barbee's operation is where they merge the lists. He has become the guru of the lists. He's got the software and the hardware. And they are quick.[45]

The Christian Coalition's State Legislative Policy and Campaign Institute booklet contains a section on the importance of coalition building to political success. "Assuming the candidate is an across-the-board conservative, there is a whole range of groups likely to be supportive of him. . . . The key to coalition building is to recognize that, among this range of groups, there is both commonality and diversity."[46] There are numerous groups listed as among those likely to form coalitions with one another: pro-business organizations, anti-tax organizations, educational reform organizations, conservative youth groups, pro-life organizations, pro-family organizations, veterans' groups, right-to-work groups, gun owners groups, home educators, and anti-pornography groups.[47]

These coalitions do more than come together to support candidates. As activists interact within campaigns, they share information and strategies, and learn from each other. Activists in some of these other organizations may become involved in local Christian Right groups and activity. Reed expects that the Christian Right will ultimately coordinate a loose web of interconnected local groups that will cooperate on many but not all issues.[48] Such local groups are continually forming and becoming integrated into the blossoming communications networks.

Compromising on Issues

The most difficult transition for Christian Right activists has been to compromise on key issues. For those who tie their positions on political issues to inerrant Scriptures, compromise may literally be seen as making a deal with the devil. Many of the activists in the Moral Majority in Indiana in the 1980s indicated that their political activity was designed to help defend America against the forces of Satan.[49] Such a view makes it difficult to sit across a table and negotiate a solution with someone who opposes your position.

Yet the American political system is designed to force compromise, and purists usually lose. In Virginia gubernatorial elections in the 1980s, Republican candidates who took uncompromising pro-life positions lost to pro-choice Democrats. In each case, Christian Right and pro-life activists threatened to withhold

[45] Author interview with Bruce Hildebrand, McLean, VA, 15 February 1994.

[46] Christian Coalition, *State Legislative Policy and Campaign Institute*, 55.

[47] Ibid., 56.

[48] Ralph Reed, "What do Christian Conservatives Really Want?" (paper presented at Colloquium on the Religious New Right and the 1992 Campaign, Ethics and Public Policy Center, Washington, DC, 1993).

[49] Clyde Wilcox, Ted G. Jelen, and Sharon Linzey, "Reluctant Warriors: Premillenialism and Politics in the Moral Majority," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 30 (March 1991): 245–258.

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support if the GOP candidate moderated his abortion position in the general election. Moreover, the *Webster* decision, which allowed states to impose certain restrictions on abortion, mobilized pro-choice voters and made it even more difficult for a strict pro-life candidate to win.[50]

As a consequence, Christian Right leaders have begun to advocate compromise on abortion and other issues. Pat Robertson has signaled that it is necessary to focus on the politically feasible.

> I would urge people, as a matter or private choice, not to choose abortion, because I think it is wrong. It's something else, though, in the political arena to go out on a quixotic crusade when you know you'll be beaten continuously. So I say let's do what is possible. What is possible is parental consent.[51]

Reed says that what Christian conservatives really want is merely to reverse *Roe v. Wade* and leave abortion to the states, a move that would leave abortion rights intact in many states by legislation or by state court action. Reed suggests that this would allow more conservative states to impose restrictions immediately, thereby reducing the number of abortions. Over the long run, he believes, abortions would be restricted in most states.[52]

In 1993, Christian social conservatives showed a willingness to compromise on abortion by backing former Congressman George Allen for governor, despite his unwillingness to take a strict pro-life position. Allen referred to his position as one of "reasonable moderation": he favored parental notification and opposed any abortion funding by government, but favored abortion rights in the first trimester, and afterward in cases of rape, incest, threat to the life of the mother. Allen was undecided about other abortions during the second trimester. Further scientific study would have to be done, he said, before he could clarify his position on second trimester abortions.

Had Allen run for the governorship in the 1980s, pro-life and Christian Right leaders would have threatened to withhold their support unless he staked a more pro-life position. Yet after a string of GOP defeats, and after the *Webster* decision made pro-life positions even less viable in statewide elections, the Christian Right was ready to be pragmatic. They strongly backed Allen in a three-way contest for the GOP nomination. One of Allen's campaign managers was Michael Thomas, a former executive director of the Virginia Society for Human Life. Thomas said that by the 1990s it had become clear that Christian conservative leaders had to stop making uncompromising demands on GOP candidates. He likened the change

[50] For a general discussion, see Cook et al., *Between Two Absolutes*. For a discussion of the 1989 Virginia lieutenant governors race, see Elizabeth Adell Cook, Frederick Hartwig, and Clyde Wilcox, "The Abortion Issue Down Ticket: The Virginia Lieutenant Governor's Race of 1989," *Women & Politics* 12 (No. 4, 1993): 5–18. For a discussion of the 1989 gubernatorial election in Virginia and the 1990 elections in other states, see Cook, Jelen, and Wilcox, "Issue Voting in Gubernatorial Elections: Abortion and Post-Webster Politics," *Journal of Politics* 56 (February 1994): 187–199.

[51] Transcript of ABC *Nightline*, "God and the Grassroots," 4 November 1993.

[52] Reed interview.

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in strategy to that of civil rights leaders telling African American congregants that a moderate Democratic nominee is "with us," but he has to sound like a moderate outside of the church in order to win.[53]

GOP consultant Ed DeBolt identified the major change in the tactics of Christian Right leaders from the 1980s: they had become politically savvy and pragmatic. Not only did this change accrue to the benefit of Allen in the nomination contest, but it also helped him win the general election campaign.

> Unlike in [earlier campaigns] where the Religious Right made demands—they made demands that "you follow our positions completely or we'll take a walk"—this time they got pragmatic enough that they understood the need to be more flexible, to work with people, to get what they can. Because of this, they are more dangerous to their enemies than ever before.[54]

Christian Right leaders happily agreed with that assessment. They said that they had learned some hard lessons from the GOP losses in the 1980s. They now realize that it is better to compromise, even on abortion, in order to win and get half-a-loaf, than it is to stand 100 percent on principle and lose. Both Kincaid and Thomas even referred to this strategy as one of "incrementalism." They admitted that it can be difficult at times to convince the activists to accept only incremental change, especially on abortion.[55] Kincaid teaches the pro-life activists that "this is a generational commitment. We're not going to see change overnight. We didn't lose ground overnight. It took decades and it will take decades to get it back."[56]

Christian Right activists point to their willingness to support Allen despite his support of legal abortion in the first trimester as evidence of their growing pragmatism and willingness to make realistic political compromises. Of course, in 1993 they had little choice. Allen's two opponents were pro-choice, and if Christian conservatives wanted a horse in the race, Allen was the only colt in the barn. In the 1994 GOP Senate contest, James Miller staked an extreme pro-life position in an attempt to win some Christian Right support away from Oliver North, and that position would have probably cost him the election against an unsullied Democratic opponent.

Yet the support of Allen was but one of a series of actions by the Christian Right in the early 1990s on behalf of moderately pro-choice candidates such as Kay Bailey Hutchison in Texas and Paul Coverdell in Georgia. In the latter case, Christian Right support may have provided the narrow margin of victory in the runoff election.

Assessing the Impact of Christian Right Mobilization

Christian Right leaders and groups can build organizational structures and plan new strategies, but ultimately their success depends on the willingness of conser-

[53] Author interview with Michael Thomas, Richmond, VA, 19 August 1994.
[54] Author interview with Ed DeBolt, McLean, VA, 15 February 1994.
[55] Author interview with Anne Kincaid (by telephone), 12 September 1994; Thomas interview.
[56] Kincaid interview, 1994.

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vative Christians to become involved in politics. The politicization of religious belief is not an easy process for Pentecostal, neo-evangelicals, and especially fundamentalists, for their doctrine teaches them that politics involves compromise with the sinful world, and that it is better to remain apart from that world and wait for the final days.

Kincaid discussed the frustrations of convincing people to "get out of the pews" and get involved in politics. Many Christians do not accept it as a duty to get involved in endeavors "of this world."[57] Marshall implored conservative Christians to overcome any such "apprehensions" and get involved in politics. He argued that political activity can work to serve Godly ends.[58] The Christian Coalition manual makes a similar appeal: "Christians are in the 'foreign service' of their King; they are foreign ambassadors."[59] Public policy can reflect either "the moral values of the God who created us" or "the denigrated moral values" of society. It is therefore up to Christians to move public policy toward God's will on earth.[60]

The efforts to get conservative Christians active in politics have worked remarkably well. The new activists were persuaded that the moral decay in America was sufficiently advanced that their involvement was needed to stem the tide and that it was their Christian and patriotic duty to become involved. One activist defended conservative Christians against the charge of being "holier-than-thou people" who want to impose their narrow agenda on others. "It's more like, you see somebody dying and you want . . . to help that person. We see that there are many sicknesses in our society, some of which the government has contributed to. We are trying to help out anyway we can. We feel that it's an abrogation of duty not to."[61] Walt Barbee explained:

> I got involved as just an ordinary citizen who became concerned about the direction of public policy. I want to have an impact on the kind of future that my children will have. . . . The involvement of many conservative Christians is really defensive. Many want to protect their rights and liberties; they want to be left alone to do what they do in their lives. Instead, they see moral relativism, homosexual lifestyles and other things they consider offensive shoved down their throats in the public square.[62]

A number of activists said that they saw political action as a Christian duty. According to one, "we expect our commitment to political activity to be long-term. . . . Our voices will be heard and we will be sure of that by working for other candidates who stand up for what we believe."[63] Another stated that, "to me it was a patriotic duty to enlist once I understood what was happening to our

[57] Ibid.
[58] Marshall, *Pro-Life Precinct Power*, 1–4.
[59] Fisher, Reed, and Weinhold, *Christian Coalition Manual*, 8.
[60] Ibid., 11.
[61] Anonymous interview.
[62] Roland Gunn interview with Walt Barbee, Springfield, VA, 28 November 1993.
[63] Anonymous interview.

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society. . . . [Conservative Christians] decided that, if God had given us a country with tremendous potential and gifts, and even the potential to be a blessing to the entire world, then we would be crummy stewards if we didn't do anything to preserve it."[64] Marshall offered the following call to action. "What? Personal religious motivation as a part of public affairs? Yes! But isn't that unconstitutional, and doesn't it violate the principle of separation of church and state? No! . . . Search the written Constitution. The phrase 'separation of church and state' is nowhere found."[65]

Many Democratic opponents of the Christian Right attested to the effectiveness of conservative Christian grassroots organizing. They pointed to the effectiveness of networking strategies and the use of phone trees and other techniques to get the word out. For example, Kevin Mack, the executive director of the Virginia Democratic Caucus in 1993, observed that the two parties had broken down at the grassroots level, largely due to a heavy emphasis by both on mass media. Consequently, the Christian Coalition developed "the same kind of program that the parties used to do" at the grassroots level.

> Ralph Reed and the Christian Coalition have not done anything sinister. They've taken tactics used by Democrats and Republicans for years, mastered them, put them to work, and now even Democratic professionals like myself get the Christian Coalition training manuals, read them and appropriate things that are good, and now we go back to our people and try to teach them the same things.

Mack and his staff put together their own training manuals—the "Doorstep Campaign" and the "Ten More Campaign"—modeled after the Christian Coalition training manual. "We tried to do many of the things that they did," he explained. Referring to the successful grassroots politics of the Christian Coalition, the Virginia Democratic Caucus 1993 *Field Director's Manual* stated that "concerned Democrats can fight fire with fire by using the same well-tested tactics."[66]

Mack argued that Democrats had no right to complain about the tactics of the Christian Coalition. In his view, the Democrats needed to beat their opponents by doing what the Christian Coalition does so well: organize people at the grassroots level, give them the tools to participate, train them, put them to work for the cause. The trouble is, he added, it is often difficult to find a cause that makes grassroots activists so fervent as does religion.[67]

Networking and phone trees predated even the Moral Majority. Some long-term Christian activists emphasized that their efforts were not initially orchestrated by any formal organizations or, as one put it, "gurus telling us what to do."[68] People began networking informally in the 1970s largely, most said, in response to widespread "social pathologies." Groups of like-minded conservative

[64] Anonymous interview.
[65] Marshall, *Pro-Life Precinct Power*, 2.
[66] Virginia Democratic Caucus, *Field Director's Manual*, Richmond, VA, 6 May 1993.
[67] Author interview with Kevin Mack (by telephone), 4 January 1994.
[68] Anonymous interview.

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Christians organized local telephone trees and photocopied their own literature to distribute in Richmond to state legislators. According to one, "we felt that we were just regular people. We weren't professional lobbyists; we weren't getting paid for it." This activist said that the people in these informal networks became emboldened when legislative proposals that they worked against were defeated in the General Assembly.[69] Such networks are even more evident today. Conservative women homemakers network through phone trees out of their homes; home schoolers developed networks through community organizations, newsletters, and even computer bulletin boards. Most home-schooling families own personal computers, and many rely on electronic bulletin boards to keep informed of legislation and campaigns that affect their interests. They hold conferences on the major computer networks such as America-on-Line, Prodigy, and Compuserve. Different groups communicate through various networks; two of the largest are called FIDO and RHYME. There are other networks on the Internet.[70]

Communicating with activists through such techniques has enabled a network of Christian activists to effectively mobilize for political action. But none of these techniques would work without a message that mobilizes the grassroots into action. Although conservative Christian leaders emphasize the importance of appealing politically to the mainstream, these leaders communicate in a different language when talking to each other or to activists. To mobilize the grassroots activists requires pushing their hot buttons. And that means using language that others might consider inflammatory and making issue appeals that many consider extremist.

Ann Stone, chair of Republicans for Choice, noted that "when Robertson and Reed began saying that they cared mostly about economics and traditional Republican issues, they looked back and saw no one following. Then they would throw in, 'oh yeah, no abortions and gays are bad,' and the troops would follow again." Stone said that the difficulty for Christian Right leaders is that they recognize the need to mainstream, but they can't motivate their people without appeals based on key social issues such as abortion and homosexuality.[71] Stone's observation also points up a problem for the new Christian Right strategy: the leaders want to enter the political mainstream, yet the activists are not easily mobilized by their approach.

Critics of the Christian Right eagerly pointed to the discrepancies between the rhetoric used within the movement and the moderate face put on for the general public. They complained of what they perceived as deceitful tactics. Yet Kevin Mack's point about the sophisticated organizational efforts of the Christian Right is equally germane here: it is hardly sinister that the leadership of any group would use emotional rhetoric to motivate its own activists and mainstream rhetoric to appeal to a wider public. In that sense, what conservative Christian

[69] Anonymous interview.
[70] Anonymous interviews.
[71] Author interview with Ann Stone, Alexandria, VA, 24 June 1994.

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leaders are doing is not substantively different from what labor union, feminist, or environmental leaders often do.

In most cases, Christian Right candidates in Virginia today do stake public stands on the social issues, but they emphasize other issues with greater appeal to the mass electorate. In the Fairfax County school board races, for example, Christian conservative candidates stressed taxes and spending in their public debates, but also took public stands to weaken sex education programs dramatically in the schools and to teach creationism. Despite their best efforts to center the campaign on taxes, the creationism issue dominated the campaign.

This points to two potential problems with the mainstreaming strategy. In those cases in the past where Christian Right candidates ran as true stealth candidates and sought to hide their views on controversial matters from public scrutiny, they were justly criticized for deceiving voters; and when they attempted to implement their hidden agenda they were generally turned out of office in the next election. When these candidates do take public positions on these issues, however, no matter how much they try to center their campaign on economics, it is likely that their opponents will focus their attacks on their positions on controversial social issues. Moreover, many critics charge that the emphasis on economic issues is itself deceptive and that once in office Christian Right candidates would focus primarily on the social agenda, not the economic issues on which they had campaigned.

Moreover, the mainstreaming tactics also runs the risk of losing the enthusiasm of movement activists. Newly mobilized activists may find it difficult to get excited about a candidate who stresses tax cuts and less government spending instead of abortion and pornography. And they may find it even more difficult to accept that they should work on behalf of a socially moderate Republican. Compromise is less appealing to these activists than to movement elites: our survey of GOP convention delegates shows that more than a third of Christian Right supporters believe that there is one Christian view on most political issues, and that nearly a third believe that compromise has no place in American politics. The new strategies are quite appealing to party centrists, who want the Christian Right to be a supportive constituency to their candidates, but less attractive to Christian Right activists.

Moreover, Christian Right elites have not been consistent in their use of these new strategies. The "mature" endorsement of Allen contrasts sharply to Robertson's and Reed's endorsements of Oliver North when polls showed that the Iran-contra figure would lose the general election. Christian Right delegates supplied North with his convention nomination. And even when the elites do not endorse an extreme candidate, movement activists may supply the victory margin. Christian Right activists were the primary force behind the 1993 nomination of Farris, whose views were considerably more extreme than those of Allen.

The Christian Right in the Republican Party in the 1990s

By the 1990s, the successes of conservative Christian grassroots activism in Virginia were so complete that many party centrists were complaining of the

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takeover of the Republican party. In 1993, conservative Christians dominated the GOP convention and controlled the nominations for all three statewide offices. In 1994 these activists ensured the U.S. Senate nomination of Iran-contra figure Oliver North. Across the state, conservative Christians wrestled control of local and county party organizations away from long-term party leaders.

These local and statewide firefights within the GOP reflect the current battle for the future direction of the party. Many party moderates and economic conservatives resent the success that conservative Christians have had in winning control of GOP organizations at the local and state levels. These long-time Republicans believe that conservative Christians look upon the GOP as a vehicle for promoting a Christian Right agenda. Loyalty to the GOP, not to a faction within the party, should come first, many complain.

In fact, Christian Right leaders and activists told us that they don't want to make the same mistake that African Americans allegedly have made by becoming so strongly aligned with the Democratic party. Kincaid recalled Lee Atwater's argument that the GOP didn't have to align itself so strongly with the Christian Right, because conservative Christians had no other option than to work within the party. "His 'big-tent' theory failed to recognize that there is a back door to that tent. We can run out just as quickly as they invited us in."[72] Farris explained, "if the Republican party were to abandon its principles, then my faithfulness to the party will be seriously reexamined. As long as the Republican party sticks to its principles, I stick with the Republican party."[73]

These statements make it clear that although activists in the Christian Right function as a party faction, for many their partisanship is instrumental. They work within the Republican party because it is closer to them on key issues, and they seek to move it even closer to their ideal positions. Yet many activists retain a far stronger loyalty to the social movement and to the interest groups that are forming from that movement. Should the party move sharply to the center on social issues, their loyalty to the party might be withdrawn.

Kincaid states, "the Christian Right today . . . is in the Republican Party." Kincaid, Farris, and other conservative Christian leaders insisted that they can work effectively within the GOP framework over the long-term, as long as the party moderates and economic conservatives accept the Christian Right and recognize what that group can do for the party: deliver a solid core of activists who will bolster the party's electoral fortunes and put needed pressure on public officials. Kincaid said, "if George Allen wants to get his parole package through a hostile Democratic legislature, he needs me and what I can do for him: to get tens of thousands of phone calls by Christian activists to these legislators. We're not just around for elections."[74]

[72] Kincaid interview, 1993.
[73] Farris interview.
[74] Kincaid interview, 1993.

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Stone maintains that the conservative Christians have gained the upper hand in the state GOP because "they've spent eighteen years building their organizations and identifying and mobilizing their people. The other side didn't, because the other side was the establishment and didn't see it coming."[75] Hildebrand compared the conservative Christian network in Virginia to a sophisticated political machine similar to when he opposed labor union-endorsed candidates in the 1970s.

Rather than the union halls, the conservative Christian "machine" operates out of churches and private residences. By altering its strategies, the Christian Right of the 1990s has emerged as a more effective political force in the process. With refined organizational skills and a recognition of the needs to focus on grassroots activism and to fashion an appealing, broad-based message on a host of issues, Christian Right organizations are having an unprecedented impact on both GOP politics and the policy process.

Conclusion

Of course, the new organizational muscle of the Christian Right does not mean that it will succeed in achieving its agenda in Virginia or elsewhere. Michael Farris lost in 1993, despite a Republican landslide in the offices immediately above and below his on the ballot, suggesting that many Virginians made a conscious effort to vote against him. Oliver North lost in 1994 despite outspending Charles Robb by a wide margin, in the midst of a nationwide Republican landslide.[76] In 1995 Republican hopes that they would capture control of the state legislature failed, as voters appeared to react negatively to the promises that Governor Allen had made to pursue policies that had the support of the Christian Right.

Steve Bruce has written that the Christian Right must inevitably fail, because it seeks to impose a sectarian morality that is unpopular with voters who value individual liberties and rights.[77] It does seem likely to us that even a more pragmatic, organized Christian Right faces real limits to its policy agenda. Parental notification on abortion is possible in Virginia, because a majority of citizens support it in some form; but banning abortions is not, for a majority of citizens oppose that policy. Similarly, Christian Right policies for dealing with the rights of women, gays, and lesbians, are unpopular and unlikely to be implemented.

Although the Christian Right has achieved considerable influence in state Republican parties, its policy successes have been far more modest than recent social movements, such as those that sought civil rights for racial minorities and

[75] Stone interview.

[76] Polls showed that the Iran-contra scandal was central to voters in evaluating North but that a sizable minority of voters also objected to North's ties with the Christian Right.

[77] Steve Bruce, "The Inevitable Failure of the New Christian Right," *Sociology of Religion* 55 (Fall 1994): 229–242.

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women.[78] While black mobilization for equality fundamentally transformed the nation, the Christian Right mobilization has thus far affected policy at the margins. The reason for this discrepancy may lie in the important differences between the agendas of the two movements. The civil rights movement, the feminist movement, and the gay rights movement all asked in their earliest days that Americans treat other Americans fairly: allow them to hold the same jobs for the same pay, attend the same schools, and generally end discrimination. The Christian Right makes a different claim, arguing that their moral code is superior to that of other Americans and that all Americans should live by their code. More recently, the Christian Right has begun framing its agenda in "rights talk," and claiming that conservative Christians suffer discrimination in America. Whether this kind of claim will help it achieve more of its agenda remains to be seen.

[78] For a discussion of the Christian Right in state Republican parties across the nation, see Mark J. Rozell and Clyde Wilcox, eds., *God at the Grass Roots: The Christian Right in the 1994 Elections* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1995).

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Technocrats and Mexico's Political Elite

JUAN D. LINDAU

Mexican political recruitment has changed profoundly during the last two decades. Technocrats, typically identified in Mexico as individuals with foreign graduate degrees in economics who have spent their careers in the financial sector of the government, have occupied an ever larger share of top posts in the regime.[1] Concomitantly, traditional politicians with electoral/partisan backgrounds have become less powerful.[2] This process has been especially notable during the de la Madrid (1982–88), Salinas (1988–94), and Zedillo (1994–2000) administrations, whose senior positions have been staffed largely by individuals fitting the technocratic stereotype.[3]

Both scholars and pundits argue that this change in the composition of the political elite has transformed the regime's ruling style. These assertions are based on the assumption that Mexican politicians and technocrats have fundamentally different approaches to governing. This assumption is disputed in this article. While these behavioral distinctions may exist in democratic polities, certain intrinsic characteristics of nondemocratic regimes like Mexico's blur these differences. This lack of a behavioral distinction between technocrats and politicians is reflected in the fact that most of the changes usually linked to technocratization have either not occurred in Mexico or are better explained by other factors.

Conventionally, technocrats are associated with authoritarianism and a dislike for the messiness of politics reflected in a desire to simplify the political arena,

[1] Merilee Grindle, "Power, Expertise and the 'Tecnico': Suggestions from a Mexican Case Study," *Journal of Politics* 39 (May 1977): 399–426.

[2] Roderic Ai Camp, "The Cabinet and the 'Tecnico' in Mexico and the United States," *Journal of Comparative Administration* 3 (August 1971): 189, 190.

[3] Peter Smith, *Labyrinths of Power* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979); Roderic Ai Camp, "The Political Technocrat in Mexico and the Survival of the Political System," *Latin American Research Review* 20 (No. 1, 1985): 97–117; and "Relaciones familiares en la politica mexicana" *Foro Internacional* 26 (enero-marzo 1986): 463–483.

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often through the exclusion and repression of different political actors.[4] They are also described as less flexible, pragmatic, and willing to compromise than politicians and more prone to commit political mistakes and miscalculations.[5] Moreover, technocrats supposedly place more of an emphasis on planning; elevate economic over political criteria; are less nationalistic than politicians; and use sober, detailed, and technical language in their public pronouncements.[6]

In Mexico, however, the last decades have not witnessed a clear increase in authoritarianism. Flexibility, pragmatism, and the willingness to compromise have not decreased. While political mistakes and miscalculations have arguably increased, it would be erroneous to link these problems to technocrats qua technocrats. Despite widespread conceptions to the contrary, recent technocratic administrations have not been more "economistic" than their political predecessors. They have also not used different public language or been less nationalistic. The one exception to this general pattern is planning, which has increased markedly during the last fifteen years.

Technocratization has not had more of an impact on the regime's ruling style for two primary reasons. Like many nondemocratic governments, Mexico has historically lacked the two most essential elements that cause politicians and technocrats to act differently from one another—a clearly legitimate and competitive electoral sphere and a bureaucracy staffed by a professional civil service, which is relatively insulated from the political arena. Absent these factors, many of the assertions about quintessentially technocratic and political behavior begin to crumble.

These findings have broad comparative implications. It has been common for scholars of other nondemocratic regimes, such as the former Soviet Union, to argue that technocrats—also described as managers or experts—had predilections that were clearly distinct from those of the politicians—"reds"—who came out of the party.[7] Mexico's experience, however, suggests that this distinction between technocrats and politicians has to be used very cautiously in nondemocratic settings. While it is possible to show that each of these groups exists in these regimes, it is by no means clear that their approach to governing is fundamentally different.

[4] Jean Meynaud, *Technocracy* (London: Faber and Faber, 1968), 59, 211; Guillermo O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1979), 76–85; and Thomas Baylis, *The Technical Intelligentsia and the East German Elite* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), 269.

[5] Meynaud, *Technocracy*, 59, 208.

[6] Ibid., 201, 209; Fred A. Kramer, "Policy Analysis as Ideology," *Public Administration Review* 35 (September/October 1975): 509; Guy Benveniste, *Bureaucracy and National Planning: A Sociological Case Study of Mexico* (New York: Praeger, 1970), 20; Camp, "The Political Technocrat and the Survival of the Political System," 110; and "El dulce encanto de la tecnocracia," *Proceso*, 10 September 1984, 36.

[7] Jeremy Azrael, *Managerial Power and Soviet Politics* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966), 3, 4; and Baylis, *The Technical Intelligentsia and the East German Elite*, 270.

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TECHNOCRATS AND AUTHORITARIANISM

The most powerful evidence that Mexican technocrats have authoritarian proclivities would be a hardening toward opposition during the last three administrations. According to the conventional view, technocrats should have been more prone to use force and repression against opposition than politicians were. In order to determine the accuracy of this view, it is possible to compare how earlier political and more recent technocratic administrations in Mexico handled opposition from a variety of sources.

Over the years, the Mexican government has faced opposition from several sources. The most consistent opposition has included agitation by labor and peasant organizations, electoral challenges, and high-level dissent within the regime. Important student movements have also arisen during the period when traditional politicians were in power and more recently when technocrats controlled the political system. Additionally, guerrilla movements have existed during earlier political administrations and during supposedly quintessentially technocratic administrations.

Another way of gauging the proclivity to use repression is to examine changes in the number of political prisoners, the frequency of political "disappearances," and the use of torture. Yet another indication of this same tendency is the willingness to tolerate criticism and refrain from the use of censorship.

Labor and Peasant Opposition

Repression in Mexico has been used occasionally to deal with strikes. The government has retained the right to determine whether strikes are illegal or not and to settle labor disputes by decree when conciliation has failed. Labor violence has been relatively infrequent, however, because of the government's control over the labor movement.

There is no indication that the de la Madrid, Salinas, and Zedillo administrations responded with more repression to labor unrest than their predecessors. This does not mean that they have been necessarily more benign, since none faced the kind of challenge from the labor movement that might have led them to use massive force. However, technocrats, like their forerunners, employed the Mexican army in special cases to repress recalcitrant unions. An example is the Salinas government's handling of labor protests after it closed the Cananea mine in 1989. None of these administrations, though, came close to approaching the levels of violence and repression against labor that were reached when the government savagely suppressed the railway workers union in 1958.

Rural movements of all types, if they resisted cooptation, have faced repression. Land disputes have created much of this violence over the last forty years. The large number of landless peasants, the slowness of the land reform bureaucracy, and the intransigence of large landlords helped to make these disputes quite common. During the late 1950s and early 1960s, for example, numerous

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land invasions occurred in northern Mexico.[8] In all these instances, the army was brought in to expel the squatters.[9] During this same period the government also repressed peasant agitation in the state of Morelos by killing Ruben Jaramillo, a peasant leader, after he refused to be coopted.[10]

This pattern continued throughout the 1970s. In June 1973, for example, Secretary of Defense General Hermengildo Cuenca Diaz declared that the army had expelled thirty groups of invaders in one year in seven states.[11] Moreover, from January 1972 to July 1973 newspapers in Mexico City published reports of seventy invasions by landless peasants.[12] During the balance of the 1970s land invasions continued to occur every year. In most instances the army was sent in to intimidate and expel the invaders. Local peasant leaders were also killed every year, either by the army or by gunmen working for landlords.[13] These practices persisted through the 1980s and into the 1990s.[14] They have been especially widespread in two southwestern states, Oaxaca and Chiapas. This violence has been Amnesty International's single greatest concern about Mexico. It has continued to cite this problem in each of its *Annual Reports*. For example, its 1987 report on Mexico affirmed that:

> There were renewed reports of arbitrary detentions and killings of members of peasant and Indian organizations, often in the context of land disputes. Many killings were attributed to civilian gunmen linked to private landowners, but appeared to be carried out with the acquiescence of authorities.[15]

Amnesty International's 1990 report echoed these findings, stating that: "Reports of killings, mostly in the context of land disputes, were received from the states of Michoacan, Puebla, Oaxaca, Veracruz, Hidalgo, Chiapas and Chihuahua."[16] More recent reports by Amnesty International have continued to cite the same problem. This unfortunately corresponds to a long-standing pattern.

During the Salinas administration, most human rights violations continued to occur in rural areas. In the first two years of the administration, killings, torture, and unlawful detentions accompanied the drug war pursued by the government. The federal judicial police committed these acts against peasants in drug-producing areas of the country, prompting much international criticism of Mexico's human rights record, notably a report in 1990 by Americas Watch.[17] In

[8] Rosa Elena Montes de Oca, "The State and the Peasants" in Jose Luis Reyna and Richard S. Weinert, eds., *Authoritarianism in Mexico* (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1977), 55.

[9] Ibid., 55.

[10] Ibid., 54.

[11] Ibid., 58.

[12] Ibid., 58.

[13] Alan Riding, *Distant Neighbors* (New York: Vintage Books, 1984), 272.

[14] *Amnesty International Annual Report, 1990* (London: Amnesty International Press, 1990), 163.

[15] *Amnesty International Annual Report, 1988* (London: Amnesty International Press, 1988), 123.

[16] *Amnesty International Annual Report, 1990*, 163.

[17] *Human Rights in Mexico: A Policy of Impunity*, An Americas Watch Report (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1990).

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response to these criticisms the government established a National Commission on Human Rights and ultimately removed the head of the antidrug campaign, Javier Coello Trejo, from his post.

The judicial police and the army have continued to use force against peasants during the Zedillo administration. This violence is both random and directed, since the security forces, especially the police, are not entirely subject to central government control. State police forces also prey on peasants. The most dramatic example of this sort of behavior was the killing of a group of peasants in the state of Guerrero by state judicial police during early 1995. The greater isolation and powerlessness of rural inhabitants still makes them much more likely to experience the depredations of the police than urban dwellers. The critical point is that the rise to power of technocrats has not produced a worsening of the treatment of rural inhabitants. Instead, certain long established, highly regrettable policies have persisted. In this regard, at least, technocrats cannot be distinguished from their predecessors.

Conditions in rural Mexico have occasionally contributed to the outbreak of rural guerrilla movements. In the late 1960s a guerrilla movement led by Lucio Cabanas fought the Mexican Army in the state of Guerrerro. During roughly the same period a small guerrilla movement led by Genaro Vazquez was active in the state of Oaxaca. Both guerrilla movements were savagely repressed by the government, and their leaders, Lucio Cabanas and Genaro Vazquez, were ultimately killed by the Mexican army.

During the Salinas administration, a guerrilla movement called the Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional (Zapatista Army of National Liberation, or EZLN) arose in the state of Chiapas. In early January 1994 the Zapatistas seized several cities throughout the state. The government responded with massive military force, killing, "disappearing," and jailing hundreds of peasants. It also cordoned off guerrilla areas with over 40,000 troops. After this initial response, however, the government sought to negotiate and began a long round of peace talks with the EZLN. Although the Zedillo administration arrested a number of members and sympathizers of the EZLN during 1995, it also continued the talks initiated by its predecessor. By mid-1996 the threat of violence had substantially, although not completely, receded in Chiapas; and the EZLN had signed a peace agreement with the government.

In this area the technocrats in the Salinas and Zedillo administrations clearly did not act with greater brutality than their predecessors. The initial brutality employed by the government was followed almost immediately by negotiation, a strategy that was not used in the 1960s and early 1970s. Although the government's willingness to negotiate with the EZLN was the product of many factors, including a changed international and domestic context, it nonetheless reveals that technocrats in Mexico do not have intrinsically more authoritarian proclivities than earlier politicians.

In sum, rural Mexico has long witnessed sporadic violence and repression, which continued during the de la Madrid, Salinas, and Zedillo administrations.

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But there is no evidence that these technocratic administrations were more violent than their predecessors. Instead, what can be discerned is the continued, and highly unfortunate use of certain long established measures against labor and peasant opposition.

Electoral Opposition

From its establishment in 1929 until the late 1980s and early 1990s, the state-sponsored ruling party – the Institutional Revolutionary party (PRI) – completely dominated Mexican electoral politics. The majority of elections during this period were weakly contested. In several instances, which have become much more frequent during the last ten years, a strong showing by the opposition led the government to bolster the ruling party's showing through the use of a variety of dubious electoral techniques. Not surprisingly, this prompted strong reactions from supporters of opposition candidates. In order to determine whether and how the government's methods of dealing with electoral protests have changed, it is possible to examine a number of elections from 1940 to the present. The presidential election to succeed Lazaro Cardenas in 1940 was sharply fought between the government's candidate and inevitable winner, General Manuel Avila Camacho, and his opponent, General Juan Andreu Almazan. The election to succeed Miguel Aleman in 1952 was also contested, pitting the government's candidate, Adolfo Ruiz Cortines, against General Manuel Henriquez Guzman. During the de la Madrid administration, the closest elections occurred in the city of Juchitan in the southern state of Oaxaca, in several northern states during municipal and gubernatorial elections in 1985 and 1986, and in the presidential elections of 1988. Finally, during the Salinas administration (1988-1994) the most disputed elections occurred in the north and in the states of Guanajuato, Michoacan, Guerrero, Yucatan, and Tabasco. The presidential elections in 1994 were also closely contested. During the first years of the Zedillo administration, gubernatorial elections in a number of states were also very competitive.

In the 1940 election to succeed Cardenas, pre-election day violence by supporters of both camps killed two people and wounded many more.[18] On election day thirty people died, and 157 were wounded in Mexico City, while 17 people died in other parts of the country.[19] The government's declaration that its candidate had won by an overwhelming margin (2,476,641 votes to 15,101) led to a number of demonstrations and ultimately to a series of isolated revolts by the defeated supporters of Almazan. The government swiftly and overwhelmingly repressed all protests against the results of the election by Almazan's supporters, both peaceful and violent.

[18] Luis Medina, "Del Cardenismo al Avilacamachismo," *Historia de la Revolucion Mexicana*, no. 18, Periodo 1940–1952 (Mexico DF: El Colegio de Mexico, 1978), 117.

[19] Ibid., 121.

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Similarly, substantial conflict marked the presidential elections in 1952. In this case most of the violence occurred after the election following the announcement of electoral results. The supporters of General Henriquez denounced the election as a fraud, disputing the government's claim of an overwhelming victory by the official candidate, Adolfo Ruiz Cortines. In protest, the *henriquistas* staged a demonstration in downtown Mexico City. The government greeted the demonstrators with riot police who killed several people and wounded dozens more, while carrying out over 500 arrests.[20]

Subsequently, the *henriquista* movement, which had concentrated its efforts on the election and had not elaborated much of a postelection strategy, began to fall apart.[21] Its death knell was sounded in January 1954 when a group of *henriquistas* tried to capture the barracks in Ciudad Delicias, Chihuahua. The attack failed, and a subsequent demonstration in Mexico City provided the excuse the government needed to annihilate the movement by cancelling its electoral registration.

In both instances the government used an iron hand to quell whatever opposition arose after the election. Both the de la Madrid and Salinas administrations, in contrast, used a broader variety of measures to deal with this sort of opposition. Although they used repression in some cases, they were also quite restrained and circumspect in a number of other instances. For its part, the Zedillo administration, at least so far, has had little choice, given the context that it has faced, but to concede opposition victories in gubernatorial elections. It has consequently largely avoided postelectoral protests.

During the de la Madrid administration the greatest amount of repression was used against a leftist group called the Coalition of Workers, Peasants and Students of the Isthmus (COCEI) in the city of Juchitan, Oaxaca. This violence reached a peak in the latter portion of 1983 following several highly disputed municipal elections. The government responded to protests organized by COCEI by detaining over 300 *coceistas*.[22] It also arrested and held three of COCEI's most important leaders, allegedly for having committed criminal acts.[23] These individuals were not released until 1985.[24] Indeed, virtually from the outset, the government used intimidation and force against COCEI while also pouring funds into Juchitan designed to strengthen support for the PRI. On the other hand, the de la Madrid administration used little repression against the rightist National Action Party (PAN) in the northern part of the country.

State and municapal elections in a number of northern states including Sonora, Nuevo Leon, and Chihuahua, were very hotly contested in 1985 and 1986 where

[20] Olga Pellicer de Brody, "La Oposicion en Mexico: El Caso del Henriquismo" in *Las Crisis en el Sistema Politico Mexicano, 1928–1977* (Mexico DF: El Colegio de Mexico, 1977), 40.

[21] Ibid., 42–43.

[22] *Amnesty International Annual Report, 1984* (London: Amnesty International Press, 1984), 177.

[23] *Amnesty International Annual Report, 1986* (London: Amnesty International Press, 1986), 177.

[24] Ibid., 177.

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the PAN mounted its strongest challenge to the government. Despite the depth of support for the PAN, the government declared PRI victories in every one of these contests. This triggered widespread protests, including massive demonstrations and vigils, traffic stoppages, hunger strikes, sit-ins on bridges linking Mexico to the United States, and a protest in Washington during a state visit by President de la Madrid. The government, for its part, responded with restraint. While the military's visible presence in the region was increased, most of the demonstrations were allowed to proceed unchecked, although in certain instances some arrests were carried out. Interestingly, even the opposition was taken aback by the government's reaction. The PAN's defeated candidate for the governorship of Chihuahua in 1986, Francisco Barrios, declared in an interview: "There has not been much physical repression and that surprised us very much."[25]

The same pattern of relative restraint was also evident during the presidential elections in 1988. This is not to say that the elections were absolutely free of violence. The strongest opposition faced by the government's candidate, Carlos Salinas de Gortari, came from an electoral front made up of PRI dissidents and a number of parties on the left. This front, which presented the government with the most formidable electoral challenge it has ever faced, was led by Cuauhtemoc Cardenas, a former member of the PRI and the son of Lazaro Cardenas. During the campaign a couple of Cuauhtemoc Cardenas's supporters and one of his top aides were murdered. However, force was not used to quell demonstrations in support of Cardenas or the PAN's candidate, Manuel Clouthier. Demonstrations after the election, occasioned by the widespread belief that fraud had occurred, also met little repression. This differs sharply from the situation during the 1940s and 1950s. Indeed, when one compares the way the de la Madrid administration handled the *cardenistas* with the way the government dealt with a similar force, the *henriquistas* in the 1950s, one sees a diminution in the use of force.

The Salinas administration also used a variegated approach to deal with electoral opposition. Perhaps most notably, against the protests of many PRI cadres in the state of Baja California Norte, it allowed the PAN's candidate, Ernesto Ruffo, to win the election for governor in 1989 (marking the first time that an opposition candidate had won a governorship). In 1991, the Salinas administration also overturned the gubernatorial elections in the states of Guanajuato and San Luis Potosi, which had given highly questionable victories to the PRI's candidates. In subsequent elections in several states, including Chihuahua and Guanajuato, the government recognized PAN victories. However, the administration did not recognize the PAN's victories in the southern state of Yucatan. This revealed its willingness to concede states in the north where PAN power was overwhelming, while attempting to hold on to southern Mexico. The refusal to recognize the PAN's showing in Yucatan led to virtual political paralysis in the state forcing Salinas to appoint several interim governors. It also led to widespread protests, which were handled with relatively little repression, once again revealing

[25] Mexico's Rusty PAN, *Newsweek*, 8 September 1986, 37.

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the government's fear of further alienating the PAN's often middle-class constituents.

The restraint used in dealings with the PAN was a product of several factors. The PAN's emergence into an ever more formidable political force, combined with the growing ideological convergence between the PRI and the PAN led to a tacit partnership, where PAN victories were increasingly recognized by the government while the PAN only demanded gradual political change.

In contrast, the Salinas administration was much less guarded in its handling of protests and victories by the left. Cuauhtemoc Cardenas's party, the PRD (Party of the Democratic Revolution) accused the government of using fraud and repression in many elections. These complaints were especially common in the states of Michoacan, Guerrero, and Tabasco, which are all *cardenista* strongholds. In several state and municipal elections, both the PRI and the PRD claimed victory. These disputes were accompanied by violence and repression, and a number of people were killed. At the same time, the government was much more loathe to concede PRD victories. Indeed, the government's response to these situations replicates a number of the measures used by the de la Madrid administration against the COCEI in Juchitan. The Zedillo administration has also conformed to this pattern, treating the PAN with much more restraint than the PRD. Most dramatically, perhaps, it did little to overturn PAN gubernatorial victories in 1995 in the states of Jalisco and Guanajuato, but turned a deaf ear to PRD claims of victory in the state of Tabasco.

In sum, the technocrats in the de la Madrid, Salinas, and Zedillo administrations did not handle electoral opposition with a heavier hand than the politicians in the 1940s and 1950s. None of these administrations used indiscriminate violence or the same means to deal with each situation. Moreover, recent elections show that these technocratic administrations have, if anything, been somewhat less prone to use repression against electoral protests than their political predecessors. Given the amount of international attention these last several elections have received and Mexico's changed domestic environment (including a larger but more moderate opposition), it would probably be a mistake to overestimate the importance of this fact. Instead of being genuinely less apt to use repression, the government may have been restrained by the desire not to project a worse image to the world. For this reason, it would be wrong to assume that the government is necessarily less apt to use force against electoral opposition under different circumstances in the future. Nonetheless, the point remains that the technocrats in these administrations, regardless of the reason, did not show a greater penchant to use force than their political predecessors.

Moreover, the variety of measures used to deal with this opposition indicate that they have been just as pragmatic and flexible as traditional politicians. Indeed, a highly political calculus, designed to quiet and not inflame opposition, appears to have guided most of their actions. A willingness to engage in negotiation and compromise has also continued to be evident. In this regard, they have also behaved in an extremely political fashion.

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High-Level Dissent

Yet another category of opposition has been high-level dissent within the regime. Open intra-elite conflict has been relatively infrequent over the last thirty years. In the 1960s, perhaps the most significant case of high-level dissent within the government involved Carlos A. Madrazo, the president of the PRI during the Diaz Ordaz administration (1964-1970). His attempts to reform the PRI by introducing local nominating primaries were defeated by powerful groups inside the regime, and Madrazo was fired by President Diaz Ordaz. Madrazo then sought to create a national front organization to oppose the PRI. Many in Mexico believe that his death a year later in a commercial airplane accident was caused by the government.

In the more contemporary period, the most important schism within the political elite occurred in the late 1980s, when Cuauhtemoc Cardenas formed the *Corriente Democratica* or Democratic Current in the PRI, splitting away from the ruling party in 1987 in order to contest the 1988 presidential elections. Rather than expel Cardenas directly from the party, the de la Madrid administration sought to edge him out by restricting the membership rights of participants in the *Corriente Democratica*. Moreover, the government did not directly repress him. Although a prominent aide to Cardenas was murdered, quite possibly at the government's behest, no other major attempts were made to suppress the electoral front that he formed. There are probably two primary reasons for this circumspection: the extent of support for Cardenas and a pragmatic calculation that his elimination would create a martyr, increasing opposition. Regardless of the reasons, the technocrats in the de la Madrid administration did not show themselves more prone to use repression than the politicians in the Diaz Ordaz administration.

Student Movements

Students have also occasionally challenged the regime. The most notable student movement occurred in 1968, when thousands of students took to the streets of Mexico City pressing a variety of political demands. They did not threaten the regime's hold on power, but were met with savage force by the government. This repression was the most dramatic case in the modern era when the government used vastly excessive and disproportionate force—especially in terms of its negative political repercussions for the regime. In response to largely peaceful, although enormous demonstrations, the regime for the first time in the history of the university violated university autonomy by sending the army onto the campus of the National University. More crucially, the army massacred hundreds of students during a demonstration at the Plaza of Tlatelolco in Mexico City, which profoundly and lastingly tarnished the regime. For a government that has generally been characterized by much more proportional uses of force, the unneccessarily heavy hand used against the students represents a fundamental error in political judgment. This event occurred, moreover, during an administra-

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tion—the Diaz Ordaz presidency—that was still controlled by politicians and not technocrats.

Indeed, the way the Diaz Ordaz administration dealt with the student movement in 1968 contrasts sharply with the way the government has handled more recent student unrest. An example of the government's greater restraint was its response to widespread student unrest in early 1987. During the first few months of 1987, students at the National University staged numerous large demonstrations in Mexico City to protest a series of proposed reforms that sought to raise academic standards and increase tuition. The government reacted with a great deal of restraint, opting to use negotiation instead of force. The students also behaved quite moderately. The situation was resolved when the proposed reforms were withdrawn. While the students' demands were less political than they had been in 1968 and were consequently less threatening to the regime, the fact remains that the de la Madrid administration, which was in power at the time, acted in a conciliatory fashion.

Political Prisoners, the "Disappeared," and Torture

The late 1960s and early 1970s were years of fairly widespread guerrilla activity in Mexico. This period was also the high point in the government's use of clandestine terror and force. The regime also responded to the guerrillas by "disappearing" a number of people. According to the National Committee for the Defense of Political Prisoners, the Pursued, Disappeared and Political Exiles (CNPDPPDEP), roughly 500 people disappeared after being arrested during the 1970s.[26] The government has always objected to these figures, claiming that they were grossly inflated and that the majority of those who had supposedly disappeared had either been released or had been killed resisting arrest or in clashes with other guerrilla groups.[27] Amnesty International, however, has been very skeptical of the government's claims, and in the 1990s was still pressing the government to resolve the cases of a number of people who had disappeared in the 1970s.[28] Despite these unresolved cases, disappearances declined significantly after the late 1960s and early 1970s. For example, in its 1988 *Annual Report*, Amnesty International only reported one new *desaparecido*.[29] Its 1990 Report did not mention any new "disappearances."[30] However, some disappearances once again occurred in conjunction with the government's repression of the EZLN in early 1994. According to Amnesty International: "At least 20 people 'disappeared' in the context of the armed conflict in Chiapas."[31] The reemergence of

[26] *Amnesty International Annual Report, 1982* (London: Amnesty International Press, 1982), 152.
[27] See, *Amnesty International Annual Reports, 1980–1985.*
[28] *Amnesty International Annual Report, 1990*, 162.
[29] *Amnesty International Annual Report, 1988*, 124.
[30] *Amnesty International Annual Report, 1990*, 163.
[31] *Amnesty International Report 1995*, 212.

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this practice in 1994 reveals the regime's continuing willingness to use this grotesque form of repression, although the practice has become less common since the early 1970s.

The number of political prisoners also appears to have declined over the years. During the 1968 student movement, the government jailed hundreds of students. Although many were released as a result of federal amnesties during the 1970s, their numbers still kept the total count of political prisoners high. In 1976, for example, Amnesty International estimated that there were 192 political prisoners in Mexico.[32] For a number of years after that, Amnesty International was unable to calculate the total number of political prisoners. In part, this was because the Mexican government always denied that there were any political prisoners in the country. It was also because many people ostensibly arrested on criminal charges were in reality detained for their political activities. As Amnesty International noted in its 1982 *Annual Report*:

> The Mexican authorities did not admit to holding political prisoners. However, Amnesty International was concerned that the arrest and imprisonment of many people convicted on criminal charges were politically motivated and stemmed from their activities in trade union or peasant groups.[33]

In its 1988 *Annual Report*, however, Amnesty International finally did provide a calculation of the number of political prisoners in Mexico. It estimated that, in 1987, at least twenty-three "prisoners of conscience," who had been arrested between 1982 and 1986, remained in jail.[34] This clearly represented a substantial decline from the nearly 200 political prisoners in 1976. Unfortunately, this reduction was not permanent. In early 1994 a substantial rise in the number of political prisoners occurred following the repression of the EZLN. According to Amnesty International: "Hundreds of people, including scores of prisoners of conscience were arrested . . . during the uprising in Chiapas."[35] However, the government, in marked contrast to its behavior during the 1970s, released many of these prisoners shortly thereafter under the pressure of public opinion. As Amnesty International noted: "Following public outcry, 38 of the prisoners were released in February and the rest in the following months."[36] In sum, despite the rise in the number of political prisoners during the Chiapas uprising, the technocrats in the last three administrations have not shown more of a penchant to jail their opponents than their political predecessors.

Yet another index of repression is the use of torture. It is unquestionably true, as successive Amnesty International Reports have documented, that torture continues to be common in Mexico.[37] In particular, torture was often used to

[32] *Amnesty International Annual Report, 1977.*
[33] *Amnesty International Annual Report, 1982*, 152.
[34] *Amnesty International Annual Report, 1988*, 123.
[35] *Amnesty International Report, 1995*, 210.
[36] Ibid., 210.
[37] *Amnesty International Annual Reports, 1980–1995.*

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extract from prisoners the *primera declaracion* (the initial statement or confession made to police about a crime). However, while torture remained ubiquitous during the de la Madrid, Salinas, and Zedillo administrations, the government finally began to take some tentative, although largely symbolic steps against the practice. In 1986, for example, the de la Madrid administration passed legislation banning the use of torture and prescribed sentences of up to eight years for torturers.[38] In June 1987, it also ratified the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture.[39] These measures were never seriously enforced, however, and torture continued to be frequent.

Although the Salinas administration also tacitly condoned the practice by not prosecuting torturers with much vigor, in 1991, in another response to criticisms of its human rights record, it partially reformed Mexico's legal code to reduce the evidenciary value of the *primera declaracion*, although confessions could still be admitted. Unfortunately, the continuing use of confessions ensures the persistence of torture. As a consequence, torture has continued to be a commonplace occurrence and was widely used by the Mexican army against the Zapatista rebels in the state of Chiapas. Amnesty International reported that hundreds of people were tortured during the uprising by the army and other security forces.[40] It also observed that: ". . . the frequent use of torture by law enforcement agents, particularly the state judicial police, continued to be reported . . . [M]ethods included beatings; near asphyxiation with plastic bags; forcing peppered water into the nose; electric shocks and burning."[41] There is also no indication that the Zedillo administration has effectively reduced the security forces' propensity to use torture.

In sum, repression continues to be used in a number of areas. Land disputes are often settled by force, and peasant leaders are still killed. Torture, while not officially sanctioned, has remained frequent. The number of political prisoners and the "disappeared" has by and large declined. It would be a mistake to assume, however, that this represents a clear departure from the past. The government's initial, extraordinarily violent response to the *Zapatista* uprising clearly indicates its continuing willingness to use these methods against certain types of opposition.

Critically, however, a greater technocratic qua technocratic propensity to use force cannot be discerned. Moreover, it is even less possible to identify a clearly technocratic bias in this area because of differences between the de la Madrid, Salinas, and Zedillo administrations. Human rights violations, especially in rural areas, were much more common in the Salinas administration than they were during either the de la Madrid government or the Zedillo administration. The Salinas government was also "harder" than either its predecessor or successor and was much quicker to use the Mexican army, particularly against labor.

[38] *Amnesty International Annual Report, 1986*, 178.
[39] *Amnesty International Annual Report, 1988*, 124.
[40] *Amnesty International Report, 1995*, 211.
[41] Ibid., 211.

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In both these areas, although it unquestionably was more repressive than its technocratic peers, it did not exceed the norms established by earlier political administrations. For all these reasons, it is not possible to argue that technocrats have shown a systematically greater tendency to use force than traditional politicians.

TECHNOCRATS AND CENSORSHIP

Authoritarian proclivities are also manifested by an increasing use of censorship. There is no evidence, however, that the last three technocratic administrations have been more censorious than their predecessors. Moreover, the de la Madrid and Salinas administrations also differed from each other, since the former was more willing to tolerate criticism than the latter. The Zedillo administration, beset by endless criticism, given the economic crisis which Mexico endured after the devaluation in December 1994, has responded much like the de la Madrid government. Consequently, in this area it is not possible to find a distinctly technocratic tendency or to establish a difference between technocrats and politicians.

Through the 1960s, the government quashed virtually all criticism in the printed press by threatening to use its monopoly over the supply of newsprint to close any news organ. Since the mid-1970s, however, the government moved away from this practice and began allowing newspapers and news magazines to publish more critical stories. The point of departure occurred after the Echeverria administration's censorship of Mexico's largest daily newspaper, *Excelsior*, in 1976. In the years after 1968, *Excelsior* had increasingly shown its editorial independence from the government. In response, the Echeverria administration, shortly before leaving office, engineered the ouster of the director general of *Excelsior*, Julio Scherer Garcia, along with much of the newspaper's editorial staff.[42]

The group that left *Excelsior* formed a news agency called CISA and began to publish a weekly magazine called *Proceso*. The creation of *Proceso* marked a watershed in the relationship between the government and the print media. From the outset, *Proceso* was highly, even vitriolically critical of the government. In the years since its establishment, other news organs, such as *Unomasuno*, *La Jornada*, and *Nexos*, have at different points been critical of the regime. Though *Proceso* began its existence using prohibitively expensive newsprint which was not supplied by PIPSA (Producer and Importer of Paper S.A.), the government monopoly, it subsequently received its newsprint from the government, as have the other publications mentioned above.[43]

[42] Peter Smith, "Leadership and Change, Intellectuals and Technocrats in Mexico" in Roderic Ai Camp, ed., *Mexico's Political Stability: The Next Five Years* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1986), 105.

[43] "De *Excelsior* a *Proceso*: lucha por la voz publica," *Proceso*, 6 November 1976, 12–15.

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On one occasion during the Lopez Portillo administration (1976-1982) the government did attempt to muzzle *Proceso*. Beginning in April 1982, the government launched an advertising boycott against the magazine. The federal government, the PRI, and the state governments all halted their advertising in *Proceso*.[44] The General Coordinator of Social Communication of the Presidency – the president's press secretary – Francisco Galindo Ochoa, charged that *Proceso* lacked respect and was ill intentioned, subjective, injurious, and negative.[45] Moreover, he asserted that: "no medium of information can be supported with advertising if it does not demonstrate respect for those who integrate the government."[46]

The withdrawal of government advertising clearly represents a milder form of censorship than the practice of withholding newsprint or the tactics used against *Excelsior* by the Echeverria administration. This can be illustrated by the fact that even though *Proceso* was forced to close its news agency, CISA, because of the loss of revenue, it was able to continue publishing the magazine.[47] Moreover, its highly critical coverage of the government continued. Indeed, despite the suspension of government advertising, the regime went to great lengths to assure that PIPSA would continue providing newsprint.[48]

President de la Madrid did not make any obvious attempt to censor *Proceso* or the other news organs cited above, despite the fact that these publications were, if anything, even more critical of his administration. On the other hand, the de la Madrid administration did continue other, long-standing forms of chilling press criticism. As in the past, journalists were routinely paid to print favorable stories. At the same time, those who were critical of the regime faced an array of possible threats to their physical well-being. Occasionally, journalists were beaten by thugs, kidnapped, and even killed under mysterious circumstances. During the de la Madrid administration, the most celebrated example of these practices was the murder of Manuel Buendia, one of Mexico's most prominent journalists. Though the government denied responsibility for the incidents, it is widely believed that they were carried out at its behest.

Like its predecessors, the de la Madrid administration viewed television as a much more influential medium of information and opinion formation than the printed press. Television, consequently, continued to be sanitized and used as a vehicle for government propaganda. Nonetheless, especially if one considers its tolerance of *Proceso* and other news organs, the de la Madrid administration was, if anything, more and not less tolerant of criticism than its more political forerunners.

President Salinas, in contrast, was much less willing to accept criticism. During his first year in office, for example, in an action somewhat reminiscent

[44] "Por irrespetuoso 'con los hombres del gobierno'," Galindo Ochoa castiga a *Proceso*, *Proceso*, 31 May 1982, 18-19.

[45] Ibid., 18.

[46] Ibid., 18.

[47] "*Proceso* ante el boicot publicitario," *Proceso*, 31 May 1982, 6, 7.

[48] "Por irrespetuoso 'con los hombres del gobierno,'" *Proceso*, 19.

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of the measures taken against *Excelsior*, the administration engineered the ouster of the publisher of *Unomasuno* and largely muzzled the newspaper. Journalists continued to be "encouraged" to print favorable stories, while intimidation was used against critics of the regime, most notably Jorge Castañeda. In addition, during the Zapatista uprising, a number of journalists covering the conflict in Chiapas received death threats.[49] More generally, and intangibly, the regime adopted a triumphalist tone that brooked no disagreement. The government's triumphalism filled the press and the airwaves, overwhelming dissident voices. This atmosphere, combined with fears of reprisal, was an enormously powerful control mechansm because it promoted self-censorship.

However, the Salinas administration also permitted *Proceso* and *La Jornada*, in particular, to continue their critical coverage of the regime. It did subject critical organs to tax audits, an effective way of cowing opponents. The general climate also meant that both were far less probing of the Salinas government than they were of the de la Madrid administration. Nonetheless, despite being less tolerant of criticism than the de la Madrid government, the Salinas administration clearly did not engage in more censorship or press manipulation than earlier political governments.

The discrediting of the Salinas administration, which culminated with the devaluation in 1994 and the jailing of the former president's brother on a variety of charges including murder, unleashed a torrent of criticism against the government that continued throughout the Zedillo administration. The Zedillo administration, weakened by the situation and facing the continuing expansion of opposition, had little choice but to tolerate this criticism.

More fundamentally, despite the climate created by the Salinas administration, a secular trend away from censorship has been underway since the early 1970s. The last fifteen years have not witnessed a dramatic acceleration or diminution of this trend. Most importantly, perhaps, freedom of the printed press has grown slightly. Through continual pressure, especially before the 1994 presidential elections, the opposition has gained more access to television, although television news continues to be especially sanitized. Because these changes have been relatively modest, it would be a mistake to infer that the current elite is more liberal in this regard than its predecessors, especially given the proclivities of the Salinas administration. In this area too, continuity prevails over discontinuity. Undoubtedly, technocrats have not been more or less tolerant of criticism than politicians. This represents yet another refutation of the argument that they are intrinsically more authoritarian than politicians.

Nationalism and Technocrats

Technocrats, because of their foreign training, are frequently accused of being less nationalistic than politicians. These assertions are based on the fallacious

[49] *Amnesty International Report, 1995*, 210.

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belief that recent economic changes enacted by the de la Madrid, Salinas, and Zedillo administrations—particularly privatization and reduced protectionism, which culminated in the implementation of the North American Trade Agreement in 1994—are not only quintessentially technocratic but also clearly antinationalistic. These policies, however, reflect ideological biases and not technocratic qua technocratic predilections. Moreover, they are not even clearly antinationalistic. Nonetheless, it is common for scholars and journalists in Mexico to attribute these economic changes to the rise to power of technocrats.

Though the Mexican Revolution lacked an explicit system of thought that could be called an ideology, it did contain a number of underlying themes. Central among them was nationalism. Mexican history has been marked by repeated foreign military interventions and a long exposure to predatory foreign economic interests. As a result, antiforeign sentiments have run deep. Much of this nationalistic feeling has been directed toward the United States because of the two countries geographical proximity and bilateral history. For all these reasons, policies that emphasized Mexican sovereignty and its independence from the United States have been widely supported.

Mexican economic nationalism showed itself in a number of ways. Beginning in the 1930s, Mexico expropriated and nationalized industries in various sectors of the economy. The government also placed sharp controls and restrictions on foreign investment. In addition, the government pursued a range of policies designed to protect the domestic market. High protectionist barriers received support from organized labor and from much of the private sector, which benefited from restricted competition. For all of these reasons, but especially within the context of Mexican politics, the accusation that technocrats are less nationalistic than politicians has been an extremely serious charge.

Beginning with the de la Madrid administration, the Mexican government cautiously began to abandon traditional economic nationalism. The Salinas administration quickened and expanded these policy changes. Most notably, perhaps, in 1985 Mexico decided to join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), thus signalling its commitment to open the economy to foreign competition. The Salinas administration, in turn, loosened the laws governing foreign investment, accelerated the dismantling of protectionist barriers, and, in the most dramatic move of all, negotiated the North American Free Trade Agreement with the United States and Canada. The Zedillo administration has continued these policies, which promote ever greater integration between the Mexican and U.S. economies. The question is whether these changes have resulted from the ascension of technocrats or are better explained by other factors.

The economic crisis that beset Mexico for most of the 1980s exposed serious flaws in Mexico's industrial plant, particularly its lack of competitiveness. Mexico also faced, and continues to face, an imperative need to gain greater access to foreign markets. The drop in oil prices that occurred during the de la Madrid administration also highlighted the weakness of Mexico's nonoil exports and the consequences of excessive reliance on a single commodity. These factors serve

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as far more plausible explanations for Mexico's decision to join GATT than the rise to power of technocrats. The same thing is true of attempts to lure foreign investment. The massive capital flight and enormous internal and external debt payments that accompanied the economic crisis dried up other sources of capital. The attempts to lure foreign investment are hardly surprising under the circumstances.

Despite these caveats, the de la Madrid, Salinas, and Zedillo administrations' departure from economic nationalism has helped to lend credence to the view that technocrats are less nationalistic than politicians. In addition, all three of these administrations exhibited much more compliant behavior toward the United States than any of their immediate predecessors. All of them were less critical of U.S. foreign policy in Latin America and the Caribbean than their predecessors, and were much more cooperative in a number of bilateral areas of the relationship. This has lent additional support to this perception about quintessentially technocratic behavior.

However, there is a central problem with this view of technocrats. Economic policies that are often called antinationalistic in Mexico—such as the abandonment of protectionism and the opening to foreign investment—do not reflect an antinationalistic bias per se but a different diagnosis of which measures are most likely to solve the country's economic problems. Indeed, assessments of whether a particular policy is antinationalist or not depend on the ideology of the beholder, sharply limiting the analytical utility and cogency of this particular assertion about technocrats. Measures seen as antinationalist by those who are on the left are likely to be seen as nationalist by those who are on the right. This is because both groups have such different views of which policies are apt to strengthen the country's economy.

Insensitivity to Political Costs and the Willingness to Elevate Economic over Political Criteria

Technocrats are also frequently accused of insensitivity to the political consequences and costs of their actions and of elevating economic over political criteria.[50] While the last three administrations have committed their share of political mistakes, these mistakes did not result from the elevation of economic over political criteria. Moreover, it does not appear that impolitic actions were undertaken blindly.

It is undoubtedly true that the de la Madrid administration was not very adept politically. At critical junctures it projected an image of weakness and indecisiveness, which tended to exacerbate dissatisfaction with the regime. Notable mistakes include its complete paralysis after the 1985 earthquake, which devasted Mexico City. The government's inept and chaotic response to the disaster fanned contempt for the regime in Mexico. Another significant political mistake

[50] Meynaud, *Technocracy*, 201, 208.

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was the way the de la Madrid administration handled the vote count after the 1988 presidential elections. Long delays and conflicting pronouncements further delegitimized the results of the election by giving additional credence to the view that widespread fraud had occurred. By so doing, they helped to erode the thin and rather dubious mandate received by President-elect Salinas.

In contrast, the Salinas administration during its first few years in office was among the most politically adept governments in recent memory. Its performance at the end of the administration, on the other hand, was marked by a host of political mistakes. Somewhat counteracting the mishandling of the vote count in the wake of the 1988 elections, the Salinas team exhibited considerable political adroitness by helping to propagate and manage the public discussion about so-called dinosaurs and modernizers in the PRI. The dubiousness of the election and the opposition's strong showing put the newly elected administration under considerable pressure to announce that it intended to open up and democratize the political system. It made this announcement, but also encouraged the view that it was likely to be hampered in these efforts by traditional politicians in the PRI, who were labelled "dinosaurs." This characterization was picked up and given extensive coverage by the domestic and international press. This imagery established the reformist, liberalizing intentions of the Salinas team; insured that it would receive credit for any changes; and gave it a convenient scapegoat for the failure to carry out reform. Finally, in an especially ironic twist, this characterization turned the traditional argument about technocrats on its head by depicting the technocrats around Salinas as pluralistic democrats, while characterizing old line *politicos* as authoritarian hardliners.

After assuming office, the Salinas administration also exhibited considerable political skill by moving swiftly and decisively against several individuals whose prosecution had an important symbolic resonance. Most notably, perhaps, the regime jailed Joaquin Hernandez Galicia "La Quina" and Salvador Barragan Camacho, the leaders of the oil workers union. This action served a dual purpose. By prosecuting the leaders of the oil workers union who had supported the opposition during the election, the regime put internal opponents—both real and potential—on notice. Even more critically, the ouster of individuals seen as virtual untouchables because of the oil union's enormous political and economic power, dispelled the image that Salinas was weak and indecisive. Thus, it helped to establish the credentials of the president as a strong leader and not a weak and indecisive bureaucrat. This perception was complemented by the government's jailing and prosecution of Eduardo Legorreta Chauvet, one of the most prominent businessmen in Mexico.

In contrast, the last year of the Salinas administration was marked by a string of major political miscalculations. The savagery of the government's military response to the Zapatista uprising was enormously unpopular. Unprecedented violence during 1994 also plagued the regime. The ruling party's candidate for president in the 1994 presidential elections, Luis Donaldo Colosio, and the secretary general of the PRI, Jose Francisco Ruiz Massieu, were both assassinated

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in separate incidents during the year. The government's failure to resolve the killings, conjoined to repeated rumors of its complicity in the assassinations, fanned a climate of instability and uncertainty and helped to further weaken the regime.

For its part, the Zedillo administration also committed its share of mistakes. Perhaps most significantly, the administration completely mishandled a devaluation of the currency in December 1994, causing the virtual collapse of the peso and plunging the country into yet another profound economic crisis. Although the government handled the resulting economic crisis with reasonable skill given its shortage of options, it had great difficulty reconstituting any popularity.

The problems marking the end of the Salinas administration and the beginning of Zedillo's government, however, although undeniably serious, were not much more extensive than those that plagued the more political Echeverria (1970–1976) and Lopez Portillo (1976–1982) administrations. The last years of both of these administrations were marked by political uncertainty and economic crises. Indeed, since the mid-1970s, acute transitional problems have marked the transfer of power from one administration to another. Both politicians and technocrats have seemed unable to prevent this from happening.

The devaluation shortly after the Salinas administration ended in December 1994 most powerfully reveals that the last several technocratic administrations have also not been more prone than previous political administrations to elevate economic over political considerations. The depth and severity of this devaluation was at least in part a consequence of the government's decision to artificially support the currency and preserve an atmosphere of prosperity through the 1994 elections, although a host of macroeconomic indicators were signaling the need for changes in economic policy, especially an acceleration of the slippage of the peso against the dollar. Although the government used a number of economic arguments to justify its refusal to change course, it is clear that the elections led it to elevate political over economic criteria.

Roughly a decade earlier, Miguel de la Madrid behaved in much the same way. In the midst of a profound economic crisis, and much to the dismay of international financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund, the Mexican government, for exclusively political reasons, abandoned austerity and pump primed the economy in the six months before the 1985 mid-term elections, substantially undermining the administration's attempt to reduce inflation.

Technocrats have also shown their sensitivity to political criteria by behaving with economic circumspection. For example, the de la Madrid administration, despite the manifest necessity for economic reform, given the depth and severity of the crisis which it inherited, enacted change only very slowly, cautiously, and ambivalently, precisely because of its concern over the political consequences of these actions. By the end of his administration, only the first tentative steps had been taken to open up the economy and to reduce the size of government deficits. For its part, the Salinas government, while pursuing reform more aggressively did so in part out of the conviction that only profound change offered hope

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for the economy and the regime. Like its predecessors it also sought to give a veneer of popular consent to its actions, carrying out extensive consultations in the traditional corporatist style of the regime.

The Zedillo administration inhabited the realm of necessity after coming to power. The overwhelming need to resolve the country's immediate economic problems gave it little policy space. Given this context, it is unfair to judge the regime as being economistic, since it has had little choice in this matter. If anything, its behavior, both stylistically and substantively, is reminiscent of the de la Madrid administration.

Fiscal prudence has also not distinguished technocrats from politicians. While the de la Madrid, Salinas and Zedillo administrations all pursued balanced budgets, a goal successfully reached by the Salinas government, a number of earlier administrations, including the Ruiz Cortines (1952-1958) and Diaz Ordaz administrations were also notable for their fiscal prudence. In sum, in these areas as well, Mexico's leaders during the last two administrations have not behaved in a manner that is clearly distinct from their political predecessors.

Public Pronouncements

The rise to power of technocrats should also have produced a change in the government's public pronouncements, because technocrats supposedly have a specific and specialized, rather than a general view of matters.[51] Consequently, their ascendance is presumably marked by a decline in general, evocative rhetoric and the increased use of detailed and sober language. Traditionally, the regime's public pronouncements sought to identify the government with the Mexican revolution. They contained a great deal of revolutionary rhetoric and largely confined themselves to expressing principles, goals and accomplishments. By the same token, they rarely described specific programs in much detail. This was particularly true of the president's annual State of the Union Message.

In a decided break with the past, the State of the Union addresses delivered by de la Madrid contained very sober and detailed language. A typical example is the following quote drawn from one of his State of the Union addresses:

> Since the beginning of my government I announced an economic and social strategy which would combine the battle against the crisis with the profound reordering of the economy. This is why the *Plan Nacional de Desarollo* [National Development Plan] was centered on two courses of action: the reordering of the economy to confront the crisis and a policy of structural changes to propitiate basic transformations in the productive and distributive apparatus. . . . These changes seek to reconstruct firm bases for sustained and efficient economic development.[52]

[51] Geoffrey Kingdon Fry, *Statesmen in Disguise* (London: Macmillan, 1969), 236.

[52] Miguel de la Madrid, "Segundo Informe de Gobierno," *Comercio Exterior* 34 (September 1984): 810.

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He then went on to cite a host of statistics that detailed the accomplishments of specific programs. The rhetorical style of de la Madrid prompted a great deal of commentary in Mexico. Enrique Semo, for example, wrote that:

> The sparseness of rhetorical resources, the sobriety of the adjectives, underlie an ever more transparent emphasis on the technical diagnosis of situations, of administrative solutions and efficiency. . . . In his discourse he refers each time less to the traditional ideals of the revolution and more to the choice of the right measures to respond to the inexorable action of the laws of the crisis.[53]

Salinas, on the other hand, despite a quintessentially technocratic background, had a rhetorical style that was much more political. The speeches during his campaign for the presidency and after he assumed office typically contained general, politically evocative language. For example, one of his State of the Union addresses concluded by saying:

> Together, in a short time we have done much. Together we will do more. . . . Our accomplishments have been realized in a new common estate. . . . It is a patrimony of democracy and justice [for] Mexicans. . . . It is also the patrimony of an unbreakable will: the decision which was forged and accomplished by Independence; the firmness forged by a liberal Revolution; the passion crystalized by a Revolution of lasting social commitments. It is the will of us, the Mexicans, the will of Mexico. We have a direction which we must conquer.[54]

This same tone and style marked Salinas's other State of the Union addresses.

President Zedillo, in contrast, has had a rhetorical style that is reminiscent of de la Madrid's. This evidence about technocrats is at best mixed. While de la Madrid and Zedillo conformed to type, President Salinas did not. These rhetorical differences further reveal the substantial dissimilarities between the three presidents. Even critics of Salinas acknowledge that he often behaved in a very political fashion. In contrast, even supporters of de la Madrid and Zedillo have not argued that political skill and charisma were their strong points.

The differences between the three men highlight a fundamental problem with the behavioral arguments that typically accompany the technocrat/politician typology. By definition, these arguments are premised on the assumption that behavior is inexorably molded by training and career path. If this were true, the differences between the three presidents should not have been so great. All followed similar, technocratic paths to power and received graduate degrees from Ivy League universities—de la Madrid an M.A. in Public Administration and Salinas a Ph.D. in Political Economy from Harvard and Zedillo a Ph.D. in Economics from Yale. They spent virtually all their careers in the financial sector of the government. Moreover, all three lacked electoral experience prior to being selected as the PRI's candidate for the presidency. These commonalities, however, clearly did not determine political skill or style. It may well be that many traits

[53] "El dulce encanto de la tecnocracia," *Proceso*, 36.

[54] Carlos Salinas de Gortari, *Primer Informe de Gobierno*, 1 November 1989, xxxii.

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typically described as quintessentially political or technocratic, including political skill and rhetorical style, may be individual and temperamental, and not just the result of training and career path.

PLANNING

It is also widely thought that planning is a technocratic trait. Harking back to concerns found as early as John Stuart Mill and Max Weber, those who decry the growth of planning view the rise of technically trained personnel with foreboding. Friedrich Hayek, for example, argued that because parliaments were not suited to act quickly on legislation: "the conviction grows that if efficient planning is to be done the direction must be 'taken out of politics' and placed in the hands of experts."[55] Consequently, "[t]he delegation of particular technical tasks to separate bodies, while a regular feature, is yet only the first in the process whereby a democracy which embarks on planning progressively relinquishes its powers."[56] Planning is thought to be the hallmark of a technocratic style for two primary reasons: the formulation of plans elevates economists, the quintessential technocrats, to power; even more importantly, planning rests on a faith in rational manipulation, which is typically thought to lie at the heart of a technocratic vision of the world.[57]

In Mexico, planning has increased steadily over the years, reaching a peak in the last two administrations. Several tentative attempts at planning occurred during the late 1940s and 1950s. A National Investment Commission was established in 1948, only to be abolished a year later. In 1953, an Investment Committee was created in the Finance Ministry and included representatives of the Bank of Mexico and Nacional Financiera (the government development bank). A year later, it was removed from the Finance Ministry, renamed the Investment Commission, and placed under the direct control of the president. Headed by Raul Salinas Lozano, the commission served as the president's technical staff during the next four years. In 1958, when Adolfo Lopez Mateos took over the presidency, the commission was abolished and a Secretariat of the Presidency was established with one department that did the work of the commission.

The Finance Ministry, through its control of the budget, carried out a great deal of informal policy coordination during the 1960s. Planning, per se, in contrast, continued to be relatively weak. The Secretariat of the Presidency, though it was created to oversee planning, was not able to consolidate its control over the process because of resistance within and outside the government.[58] It would

[55] Friedrich Hayek, *The Road to Serfdom* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944), 62.

[56] Ibid., 66, 67.

[57] Meynaud, *Technocracy*, 201; Benveniste, *Bureaucracy and Naitonal Planning*, 20.

[58] John Bailey, "Presidency, Bureaucracy and Administrative Reform in Mexico: The Secretariat of Programming and the Budget," *Inter American Economic Affairs* 34 (Summer 1980): 36, 37.

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be wrong to suggest, however, that formal attempts at coordination were not made. For example, a Sub-Commission for Investment Finance, consisting of personnel from the Ministries of Presidency and Finance—and later National Patrimony—was created in 1967 to oversee investment, a role it carried out until 1976.[59]

In sum, until the early 1970s, despite these efforts, relatively little planning was done. Budgeting under the control of the Ministry of Finance was the main planning process.[60] National economic plans, which were elaborated in Mexico for the first time during the 1960s, either were not widely circulated or were kept secret. Gustavo Diaz Ordaz, for example, during his campaign for the presidency, affirmed the need for planning. His regime, however, never made public a national plan.[61]

With the rise to power of Echeverria in 1970 and the resignation of Antonio Ortiz Mena after twelve years as secretary of finance, the Ministry of Finance began to lose its predominant role. As a result, policy making became even less coordinated. It was against this background that the Secretaria de Programacion y Presupuesto—SPP—(Secretariat of Planning and the Budget) was created by the Lopez Portillo administration. The establishment of this ministry marked the culmination of a long attempt to create a centralized planning agency. Although the SPP was subsequently abolished during the Salinas government and its functions reabsorbed into the Secretariat of the Treasury (Hacienda), planning has continued.

Indeed, over the last fifteen years a plethora of plans has emanated from the government. Shortly after assuming office, the de la Madrid regime announced a National Development Plan (Plan Nacional de Desarollo), which set out a global strategy for the following six years. Numerous other plans were also formulated by the administration to deal with a variety of economic problems. Notable among these was the Plan for the Immediate Reordering of the Economy (PIRE), which was supposed to resolve the economic crisis. The penchant to engage in planning is clearly technocratic, as commentators have been quick to observe. As an *Excelsior* editorial acerbically commented:

> . . . making plans without possibility of application is an old bureaucratic exercise, a technocratic one, better said . . . the economists and the technocrats . . . love to talk about plans and make plans as a way of involving public opinion in projects which supposedly are going to resolve everything or almost everything.[62]

Defenses of planning are much more scarce. A rare editorial in *Excelsior* observed that:

> Planning the economy of a country signifies harmoniously and efficiently rationalizing its economic and social development. [This] implies optimizing its human and

[59] Ibid., 37.
[60] Ibid., 35.
[61] Benveniste, *Bureaucracy and National Planning*, 85, 86.
[62] "Nacio un nuevo plan," *Excelsior*, 5 February 1983, 6.

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material resources and its productive activity in order to increase the welfare of all groups in the population.[63]

Planning was continued by the Salinas administration. Like the de la Madrid regime, it issued a National Development Plan (Plan Nacional de Desarollo 1989–1994). The Zedillo administration has also pursued these same practices, devoting a substantial portion of the first half of 1995 to the formulation of a National Development Plan. In this one area, at least, Mexican technocrats have conformed to stereotype.

Conclusions

The first reason for the lack of a greater behavioral distinction between politicians and technocrats in Mexico has been the semicompetitive nature of electoral politics. Although this situation is gradually changing, Mexican elections still differ substantially from those in truly democratic polities. As a result of the ruling party's historical dominance, the overwhelming majority of elections, especially until the mid-1980s, were essentially pro-forma affairs. In practical terms, this meant the electoral-partisan experience was less important for high-level members of the political elite. As Peter Smith wrote: "It is important to understand . . . that Mexican deputies are not elected in any real sense of the term; they are appointed."[64]

Being noticed and promoted, in turn, had to do with the capacity to maneuver among different small groups in the party and the government. For many years, in part because of the political demobilization that accompanied the institutionalization of the party, most meaningful political activity occurred between groups both within and outside the government. As a consequence, interpersonal, bureaucratic skills were more important for an aspiring politician than the ability to appeal to mass publics in an election.

The largely pro-forma nature of elections also meant that from the standpoint of the candidate, the crucial political activity occurred before his selection as the party's candidate, and after the election, once he took office. Roderic Ai Camp, notes that: "the election itself, until recently, has had little to do with how decision makers achieve their positions."[65]

As a result, elections, until the late 1980s, had more the look and feel of ritualistic pageants than of close contests. Although campaigns helped expose candidates to local conditions, the absence of any serious chance of losing limited the necessity to be responsive. For this reason, electoral campaigns and elections in Mexico were not the political learning experiences that they have been in more democratic polities. It is precisely these aspects of electoral experience, however,

[63] "Politecnicos a participar," *Excelsior*, 9 February 1983, 6.
[64] Smith, *Labyrinths of Power*, 218.
[65] Camp, "The Political Technocrat in Mexico," 97.

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that are most often said to mark the politician and cause him to act differently from the technocrat.

The behavioral distinction between politicians and technocrats has been further blurred by the absence of a professional civil service, clearly distinct from electoral politics. Political criteria have permeated the bureaucracy, playing a critical role in determining who advances to high office. As Merilee Grindle has written: ". . . at all levels of the public administration but particularly at high ones political criteria are considered in recruitment."[66] Indeed, in order to achieve a top position in the bureaucracy, one must possess considerable political skills. Thus, while "pure" technocrats may exist at the middle and lower reaches of the system, few if any of them are found at the top. To quote Merilee Grindle again, the *tecnicos* found in cabinet positions: "have specialized knowledge, but, in addition, they also demonstrate important political skills which enable them to rise to positions of influence and to maintain themselves there."[67]

Broadly then, the most common sort of politics that has existed in Mexico has been bargaining, negotiation, and compromise among groups within and outside the government. The most relevant political skill for both technocrats and politicians has been the ability to manage and manipulate these interests. In this regard, much of politics in Mexico has closely approximated the political behavior of bureaucrats in Western Europe described by Joel Aberbach, Robert Putnam, and Bert Rockman. To quote them, the "political game" of bureaucrats:

> differs dramatically from the one played by parliamentary politicians. While the close involvement of interest groups with the administration of the state requires political skills on the part of administrators, these are the skills of mediation and bargaining—the ability to broker conflicting interests in specific terms. . . . The politics of bureaucrats is a politics that juggles carefully the interests of key groups; it does not typically advance broad claims upon government.[68]

In Mexico, because of the authoritarian nature of the political system, almost no one in the political elite and certainly not most politicians have been involved in "advancing broad social claims upon government" since the 1930s. The only portion of the political elite, which at least had to deal with larger groups (although more for purposes of control than advancement), were those associated with the sectors of the ruling party and individuals in certain ministries such as Gobernacion (Government) and Trabajo (Labor). However, this has always represented a fairly small and quite static proportion of the political elite. Most of those in the government, regardless of their location in the political system, have been primarily concerned with the mediation and conciliation of specific powerful interests—what they call the "politics of bureaucrats." Although the clienteles

[66] Merilee Grindle, *Bureaucrats, Politicians and Peasants in Mexico* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 47.

[67] Grindle, "Power, Expertise and the 'Tecnico'," 419.

[68] Joel Aberbach, Robert Putnam, Bert Rockman, *Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), 172.

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and groups which need to be conciliated may shift, depending upon the specific ministry or agency, the type of political behavior does not. Moreover, both politicians and technocrats have had to maneuver among different groups in the government. Possessing this type of political skill has been virtually indispensable to success in Mexican politics. For this reason, successful technocrats have had to possess skills and behave in ways that are much like those of traditional Mexican politicians. To quote Merilee Grindle: "The operating techniques of the politician may be indispensable to the technical specialist if he is to be a successful administrator, the ability of the official to use the knowledge or expertise he commands therefore frequently depends upon his political abilities."[69]

Finally, behavioral differences between technocrats and politicians have been attenuated by another characteristic of the political system. As an institutionalized, authoritarian regime, the Mexican government always enjoyed enormous policy latitude when compared to more democratic and less highly centralized systems. This is not to say that the government had carte blanche or that it could ignore the preferences of different political groups. Nonetheless, because of the amount of power concentrated at the top of the system, Mexico's leaders were less constrained by politics than the political elites of more democratic systems. Consequently, neither Mexican politicians nor technocrats had to worry about the "inefficiency" of politics in the same way as leaders of more democratic polities. This unquestionably reduced the distinctiveness and saliency of what is in many ways the most quintessentially technocratic trait.

In sum, differences in the extent to which politicians and technocrats are popularly accountable, as well as differences in the way they respond to broad societal forces are only really significant in situations where real electoral contests exist. The behavioral distinction between politicians and technocrats is further blurred in environments that lack a professional civil service and where the bureaucracy itself has become the primary forum for contending interests. All of these variables strongly militate against the persistent tendency in both the popular press and the scholarly literature to divide the Mexican political elite into technocrats and politicians who act differently from one another. Only the real democratization of the polity, a process that is still very much in its infancy, and the creation of a civil service will give this distinction analytical merit.

Technocrats have clearly risen to power in Mexico but have not had most of the impacts imputed to them. This, of course, has a number of suggestive implications for the study of the relationship between technocrats and politicians in regimes lacking real electoral competition and a professional, politically insulated civil service. It was common for scholars of the former Soviet Union to argue that technocrats were apt to be more pragmatic than the doctrinal "reds" in the party and were consequently more likely to push these systems in a liberalizing direction. In this context, it is worth asking whether liberalizers like Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin conform to this dichotomy between reds and experts.

[69] Grindle, "Power, Expertise and the 'Tecnico'," 419.

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Both have origins that are more red than expert, having emerged from the party and not the central planning apparatus. In a further paradoxical twist it appears that among those who resisted reforms most vigorously are many "experts" and bureaucrats in the central planning apparatus with a large vested interest in preserving the status quo. In sum, while it is possible to show that each of these groups exists in institutionalized nondemocratic regimes, it is far more difficult to establish that they are clearly and systematically distinct from one another.

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Sino-Indian Rapprochement and the Sino-Pakistan Entente

JOHN W. GARVER

The several years preceeding Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's December 1988 visit to China saw significant improvements in Indian-Chinese relations. Following his visit, Sino-Indian relations became more cordial than at any time since the mid-1950s. China's close relation with Pakistan has been very important to Beijing. It is a long standing friendship that has been, as the Chinese and Pakistanis like to say, "tested by adversity," which has come in the form of regime change and upheavals in both countries, fundamental realignments in the international system, and war. Pakistan played a major role in China's strategy for coping with India and, following the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, with the Soviet Union.[1] By the time of the Deng Xiaoping-Mikhail Gorbachev summit meeting of May 1989, however, Sino-Soviet relations were increasingly cordial. Gorbachev acceded to Beijing's three demands—withdrawal from Afghanistan, ceasing support for Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia, and drawing down the Soviet military presence on China's northern borders. This redefined Sino-Soviet relations, reducing the utility of Pakistan to Beijing in the countering of Soviet encirclement. Moscow's withdrawal from Afghanistan was of special relevance here. Then following the Western sanctions in response to the 1989 Tiananmen Massacre, Beijing sought to renew its lapsed membership in the Third World, beginning with China's large southern neighbor, India. Since its formation in 1964 the Sino-Pakistan entente has been a significant source of contention in

[1] Works on the Sino-Pakistan relation include: Anwar Hussain Syed, *China and Pakistan: Diplomacy of an Entente Cordiale* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1974); J. P. Jain, *China, Pakistan, and Bangladesh* (New Delhi: Radiant, 1974); Yaacov Vertzberger, *The Enduring Entente: Sino-Pakistani Relations, 1960-1980* (New York: Praeger, 1982).

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Sino-Indian relations. Logically, the dilution of the Sino-Pakistan link could provide an important impetus to the improvement of Sino-Indian relations. The questions thus arises: What effect did Sino-Indian rapprochement have on Sino-Pakistan relations? Did improved Sino-Indian relations lead to a weakening of the Sino-Pakistan entente? The thesis of this article is that it did not. While Beijing modified its pro-Pakistan position on the sensitive Kashmir question, and while Beijing's traditional amity with Pakistan has been offset by new elements of cooperation in Sino-Indian relations, the underlying strategic rationale and component of the Sino-Pakistan entente cordiale remains unchanged.

There have been other instances in which China's rapprochement with one power had a deep adverse effect on close ties with a country that had previously played an important role in Chinese foreign policy. The best known example of this was the deterioration of Sino-Vietnamese relation following China's rapprochement with the United States in the early 1970s. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam had played an extremely important role in China's foreign policy throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Yet when China's leaders concluded that the main danger to China came from Soviet social imperialism rather than from U.S. imperialism, Sino-Vietnamese relations rapidly deteriorated. Beijing was quite cognizant of the problem and made serious efforts to properly subordinate the secondary contradiction (between Vietnam and the United States) to the primary contradiction (between Soviet social imperialism and the people of the world), but with little success. By 1979, China was aligned with Thailand, China's enemy during the First and Second Indochina Wars, against Vietnam.

Another example of China's trading partners is Beijing's rapprochement with Yugoslavia after Mao's death and the consequent breakdown of the Sino-Albanian entente. The emergence of the Sino-Pakistan entente simultaneously with the collapse of Sino-Indian relations in 1962-1964 also partly fits this pattern, although in this case the deterioration of China's relations with its initial partner (India) was the cause not the consequence of its movement toward the second partner (Pakistan). There is a somewhat closer fit with the pattern if the system is enlarged to four actors; the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations speeded the process of China's switching partners on the subcontinent. While previous history does not constitute evidence regarding current international relationships, it is suggestive. Thus, we come back to the question of what impact Sino-Indian rapprochement has had on the Sino-Pakistan entente.

The Pace of Sino-Indian Rapprochement

The accelerated improvement in Sino-Indian relations during the late 1980s traces approximately to mid-1987, when a part of the Indian political elite began rethinking India's China policy. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi personally studied Indian-Chinese relations and concluded that adjustments in India's approach were in order. First, Gandhi concluded that the problems existing in Sino-Indian relations could not be solved at the diplomatic level—that is, through the vice-

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ministerial level talks which had begun in December 1981 and which had taken place seven times as of mid-1987. Major progress towards normal relations required an upgrading of the level of bilateral talks. This conclusion led to New Delhi's acceptance of Beijing's long-standing invitation for the Indian prime minister to visit China and to a series of ministerial level interactions over the next two years. Second, Gandhi decided to drop the previous Indian policy of insisting that the normalization of Sino-Indian relations would depend on the solution of the border/territorial issue. Instead, Gandhi decided to further expand and upgrade bilateral ties in order to create a friendly, cooperative atmosphere that would be conducive to the ultimate resolution of the boundary issue. The exact meaning of "normalized" relations was ambiguous, but, parallel to Sino-Soviet relations, it included and was symbolized by a meeting of the heads of the two countries.[2]

Rajiv Gandhi's December 1988 visit to China was judged a success by both sides. As the first visit by an Indian prime minister to China since Jawaharlal Nehru's 1954 visit, Gandhi's visit helped balance the score in terms of summit visits. China's premier had visited India four times in 1954, 1956, 1957, and 1960. A series of agreements were signed, a joint working group on the border was set up, and an annual exchange of foreign ministers was agreed to. Gandhi also formally notified China's leaders of the new thrust of India's China policy and indicated a willingness to increase consultation and cooperation with China on a range of international issues, such as the creation of a New International Economic Order, disarmament, and pollution. New Delhi's willingness to cooperate with China on such global issues (which we may perhaps call macrodiplomatic cooperation) represented acceptance of a Chinese proposal that had been on the table since the early 1980s.[3] The idea behind macrodiplomatic cooperation is that, as large developing countries with long histories, China and India share many important characteristics and common interests. Moreover, by cooperating on these issues, the two countries will create an atmosphere conducive to better bilateral relations. This strategy traces back to Zhou Enlai's very successful diplomacy toward India in the early 1950s, when the two countries cooperated on such issues of the day as the Korean War, decolonization, and disarmament. An example of renewed Sino-Indian macrodiplomatic cooperation came in June 1990 at the London international conference on depletion of the ozone layer,

[2] Regarding the 1987 adjustments in Indian Chinese policy, see *Far Eastern Economic Review* (hereafter *FEER*), 9 April 1987, 39-40; 7 May 1987, 33–34. Also see Sujit Dutta, "Sino-Indian Relations: Some Issues," *Strategic Analysis* (New Delhi) 11 (February 1988):1239–1264; Wang Hongwei, "Chenggong de er fu you chengguo de fangwen," ("A successful visit with plenty of results"), *Nanya yanjiu* (South Asian Research) (Beijing) 2 (1989): 78–80. I conducted discussions with Indian diplomats in Beijing in April-May 1990.

[3] Indian Foreign Secretary K.P.S. Menon had conveyed to Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Liu Shuquing India's general acceptance of the idea of macrodiplomatic cooperation during the eighth round of bilateral talks in November 1987. *The Statesman* (New Delhi), 18 November 1987, 1. Quoted in Dutta, "Sino-Indian Relations," 1241.

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when China and India worked together to push for the free international transfer of technology necessary for manufacturing chlorofluorocarbon substitutes.

To some degree, macrodiplomatic cooperation is a substitute for a lack of convergent Chinese and Indian interests on security issues and for the paltry results of efforts to increase trade and economic relations between the two countries. While both sides have devoted considerable energies to expanding trade, it remains low because of the competitive rather than complementary nature of the two economies. Despite the conclusion of a comprehensive trade agreement and mutual bestowal of Most Favored Nation status in 1984, Chinese-Indian trade remained paltry. In 1988, China's exports to India totaled $149 million, placing India between Morocco ($130 million) and Switzerland ($203 million) in a ranking of China's trading partners.

Another product of the 1987 shift in India's China policy and the consequent improvement in Sino-Indian relations was the establishment of party-to-party ties between the Chinese Communist party (CCP) and the Congress party in May 1988. Chinese Ambassador Li Lianqing had first proposed this to Rajiv Gandhi in January 1985, and Gandhi accepted in principle. It subsequently turned out, however, that Congress was "too busy" to send a delegation to Beijing to pursue the matter. Not until May 1988 did a Congress delegation pay a formal visit to China.[4] The 1987 shift in India's China policy opened the door to increased high-level exchanges. In the nine years between 1978 and early 1987, there were only three ministerial level exchanges. Beginning in 1987, however, such visits averaged about two a year. Finally, exchanges between Chinese and Indian military establishments were reestablished in July 1990 after a hiatus of thirty years.

Chinese Support for Pakistan over Kashmir

Changes in China's support for Pakistan on the Kashmir issue are one measure of the impact of Sino-Indian rapprochement on the Sino-Pakistan entente. Improvements in Indian-Chinese relations led to a weakening of China's endorsement of Pakistan on this key issue. Kashmir has been the crux of Indo-Pakistani conflict since 1947. From Pakistan's perspective, the essence of the problem is that India has denied basic human rights to the people of Indian-occupied Kashmir, most importantly the right to self-determination as provided for by United Nations Resolutions of 1948 and 1949 on Kashmir. India contends that the Kashmir issue was settled in 1954, when the constituent assembly of Kashmir voted for accession to India, thereby exercising the Kashmiri people's right of self-determination. In any case, India contends, if there is a problem over Kashmir, according to the Simla agreement signed by India and Pakistan in 1972 after Pakistan's defeat in the third Indian-Pakistan war, that dispute should be solved via bilateral negotiations. In India's view, the Simla agreement supersedes earlier United Nations

[4] Li Lianqing, "Shi Yin suoji," (Trivial record of ambassadorship to India), *Shijie zhishi* (World knowledge) no. 12, 1988, 21–22.

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resolutions on Kashmir and precludes efforts by Pakistan to internationalize disagreements that India and Pakistan might have over Kashmir. Pakistan contends that the Simla agreement in no way supersedes United Nations resolutions on Kashmir, or limits Pakistan's right to avail itself of various international mechanisms to resolve disputes—for example, through appeal to the United Nations under the UN Charter and various UN resolutions. In this context, references to self-determination or to United Nations resolutions constitute support for Pakistan, while references to strictly bilateral efforts to resolve the Kashmir problem indicate support for India.

The Kashmir issue erupted just as Sino-Indian rapprochment was getting into high gear in July 1989, when a series of anti-Indian bombings in Srinagar were followed by police repression, which in turn was followed by demonstrations protesting these police actions. Clashes soon occurred between demonstrators and police. New Delhi attempted to repress the growing anti-Indian movement by massive application of police force, and a cycle of escalating repression and resistance began. The extent of alienation among the Kashmir population was indicated during India's November 1989 general election, when voter turnout in Jammu and Kashmir was perhaps as low as 5 percent. By January 1990, Kashmir was under military control and large numbers of people had been arrested, yet demonstrations and armed attacks on Indian forces by Kashmiri militants continued.

Kashmir had long been the touchstone around which the Soviet Union and China have oriented themselves regarding the Indo-Pakistan confrontation. Moscow came down squarely on India's side of the Kashmir issue in 1955, China on Pakistan's side in 1964. The joint communiqué signed during Zhou Enlai's February 1964 visit to Pakistan said that the two sides "expressed the hope that the Kashmir dispute would be resolved in accord with the wishes of the people of Kashmir as pledged to them by the people of India and Pakistan."[5] This was an elliptical reference to the Kashmir people's right of self-determination and to the United Nations declaration of 1948–1949. In February 1979, when Indian External Affairs Minister A.B. Vajpayee visited China, he told Chinese leaders that China's post-1964 position on Kashmir had been "an additional and unnecessary complication to the prospects of Sino-Indian relations." For the sake of better relations with New Delhi, China responded to Vajpayee's suggestion and adopted a somewhat more neutral position on Kashmir. In June 1980 Deng Xiaoping stated that the Kashmir issue was a *bilateral* dispute between India and Pakistan that should be solved peacefully. This nod to New Delhi was balanced in December 1980 when Pakistan Foreign Minister Agha Shani visited Beijing and Foreign Minister Huang Hua stated that China "appreciated Pakistan's efforts to seek a just settlement of the Kashmir issue in the spirit of the Simla agreement *and in accordance with the relevant United Nations resolutions*."[6] By mentioning

[5] *The China Quarterly*, "Chronicle," (October-December 1965), 172.

[6] Naveed Ahmad, "Sino-Pakistan Relations, 1971–1981," *Pakistan Horizon* (Karachi) 34 (no. 3 1981): 73. (Emphasis added.)

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both the Simla accords and the UN resolutions, Beijing straddled the Pakistan and Indian positions. After 1980, Chinese officials no longer mentioned the Kashmiri people's right to self-determination, much less endorsed it, as they had done consistently throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Yet such an endorsement was still implicit in references to "relevant United Nations resolutions." Moreover, by linking the Simla accord with the UN resolutions, China implicitly endorsed Pakistan's contention that these were not mutually exclusive. Thus, while China's post-1980 position on Kashmir was substantially more neutral than before, there remained a subtle but perceptible pro-Pakistan slant.

During the Kashmir crisis of 1990, China's stance on Kashmir moved another increment toward India's position. Initial statements about the escalating Kashmir issue were made by Li Peng during his November 1989 visit to Pakistan and by Foreign Ministry spokesmen in early February 1990 as the Indo-Pakistan confrontation over Kashmir escalated to the brink of war. The relevant words on these occasions are displayed in Table 1. In none of these early statements was there mention of the United Nations or its resolutions, but only of bilateral negotiations leading to a peaceful settlement of the issue. This omission reflected Beijing's desire to hew to a more strictly neutral line, thus avoiding antagonizing India. Pakistan, however, was dissatisfied with Beijing's new formulations, since failure to mention the United Nations resolutions contributed to the world-wide impression, which India assiduously attempted to foster, that the United Nations resolutions were obsolete and had been superseded by the Simla agreement. Pakistan's displeasure, along with a direct plea for a return to mention of the UN resolutions, was conveyed to China's leaders by Premier Benazir Bhutto's foreign policy and National Security Adviser Iqbal Akhund in February 1990. China responded positively to Islamabad's request with statements mentioning the United Nations made by Li Peng and Qian Qichen to Akhund on 15 and 16 February and by Defense Minister Qin Jiwei to Bhutto on 20 February.

New Delhi reacted strongly to Beijing's renewed mention of UN resolutions on Kashmir. From India's perspective, Beijing was returning to its old line of supporting Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. Talk of UN resolutions was tantamount to raising the plebiscite issue, and both UN resolutions and plebiscite had been rejected by India. The Kashmir issue was entirely India's internal affair, India insisted, in which Pakistan was interfering. As such, there was no role for the United Nations, its outdated resolutions, or other variants of Islamabad's efforts to internationalize the issue. The way to solve the Kashmir problem, New Delhi said, was for Pakistan to stop interfering in India's internal affairs and to stop supporting and encouraging the extremities in Kashmir. The implicit message was: if China wanted friendly relations with India, it had better stop siding with Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. These views were conveyed to Foreign Minister Qian Qichen during his talks with External Affairs Minister I.K. Gujral in New Delhi in March 1990.[7] Beijing got the message and complied. Beginning with

[7] *Times of India*, (New Delhi), 22 March 1990.

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TABLE 1

Evolution of PRC Position Regarding Solution of Kashmir Question during the 1989–1990 Crisis

16 November 1989, Li Peng TV interview in Pakistan	"resolve on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and through friendly consultations"
5 February 1990, MFA Spokesman	"settle peacefully through friendly consultations"
15 February 1990, Li Peng to Akhund	"act in accord with relevant UN resolutions and accords reached by both countries, and resolve the dispute on the basis of friendly consultations"
16 February 1990, Qian Qichen to Akhund	"resolve peacefully through friendly negotiations in accord with the relevant decisions of the United Nations and the Simla agreement reached by the two countries"
20 February 1990, Qin Jiwei to Bhutto	"solve the Kashmir issue in accordance with the relevant United Nations resolutions and agreement between the two countries"
23 March 1990, Qian Qichen in New Delhi	"resolve problems through mutual peaceful consultations on basis of Five Principles of Peaceful coexistence." The Kashmir issue "has been discussed by the United Nations"
4 April 1990, MFA Spokesman	"sit together soon and seek a peaceful solution through negotiations"
19 April 1990, MFA Spokesman	"seek a peaceful solution through negotiations"
3 May 1990, Wan Li in Pakistan	"find a peaceful solution through negotiations"
8 May 1990, Li Peng to Nusrat Bhutto	"seek a peaceful solution through mutual consultation"
24 May 1990, MFA Spokesman	"should work to ease tension through dialogue"

Sources: Xinhua in FBIS, *DRC*, 17 November 1989, 2; AFP in FBIS, *DRC*, 5 February 1990, 7; Xinhua in FBIS, *DRC*, 15 February 1990, 6; Xinhua in FBIS, *DRC*, 16 February 1990, 4; Xinhua in FBIS, *DRC*, 21 February 1990, 6; Xinhua in FBIS, *DRC*, 23 March 1990, 4; *Renmin ribao*, 4 April 1990, 4; Xinhua, 19 April 1990; Xinhua in 7 May 1990, 14; *The Muslim* (Islamabad), 9 May 1990, 9; Xinhua in FBIS, *DRC*, 24 May 1990, 1.

Qian's visit, Chinese formulation referred only to resolving the crisis via "consultations." As the president of the Indian Council of World Affairs noted shortly after Qian's visit, this formulation was essentially the same as India's.[8] In subsequent Chinese formulations by Foreign Mininstry spokesmen on 4 and 19 April, by Wan Li in Pakistan on 3 May, and by Li Peng on 8 May 1990 there was no reference to the United Nations or its resolutions.

In response to insistent Pakistani demands for stronger Chinese support on the Kashmir issue, and to avoid misunderstandings with Pakistan over this issue, National People's Congress Chairman Wan Li traveled to Islamabad in early May for discussions. The differences between the two sides were clear when their speeches are juxtaposed. At a banquet welcoming Wan, Speaker of the

[8] "Forty Years of Indian-Chinese Relationship," on the 40th anniversary of the establishment of Indian-Chinese diplomatic relations, *Foreign Affairs Reports* 24 (April 1990): 52.

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Pakistani National Assembly Mehraj Khalid praised the Pakistan-China bond for upholding the United National Charter and referred to Pakistan's support of the struggle of the Kashmiri people for self-determination. Wan made no mention of the United Nations or its resolutions. Instead, he said China "appreciated" Pakistan's willingness to solve the problem through negotiations.[9] Beijing also declined to support Pakistan's effort to mobilize international support for the convocation of a special session of the United Nations on Kashmir. According to Chinese diplomats in Islamabad, in 1990 China advised against efforts to bring the Kashmir issue before the UN or to convene a special session of the United Nations. There was simply too little international interest in the issue, they said.

India was satisfied with China's position on Kashmir during the 1990 crisis. High-level Indian diplomats in Beijing during the 1990 crisis characterized China's position as relatively balanced. China had not reiterated its old position of support for Pakistan on this issue. Nor had it made any moves to involve the United Nations. China's primary objective was to avoid a conflict between India and Pakistan, they said, and to this end it had encouraged deescalation and all trends in that direction.

The improvement of Sino-Indian relations in the late 1980s also led to a weakening of China's verbal deterrent support for Pakistan. Deterrent support here refers to threats, explicit or implicit, that China might enter an Indo-Pakistan military conflict on the side of Pakistan. Such support was an important component of the Sino-Pakistan relation during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. When Chinese Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian visited Pakistan in July 1983, for example, at a time when Moscow was outraged at Pakistan's role in supporting the Afghan Mujahadeen and was reportedly trying to persuade India to take action against Pakistan on the latter's eastern front, Wu was asked at a press conference what China's position would be if Pakistan suffered foreign armed attack. Wu replied: "Pakistan is China's exceptionally friendly neighbor. If there is a war and Pakistan suffers foreign armed attack, the Chinese government and people will, of course, stand on the side of Pakistan."[10]

Again in 1987 Indo-Pakistan tensions soared and China weighed in on Pakistan's side. The Sino-India confrontation coincided with sharply increased Indo-Pakistan tension. Late in 1986, India launched a four-month long, multicorps exercise in the Rajasthan desert designed to pressure Islamabad to stop supporting Sikh separatists. This was the largest peacetime exercise ever conducted by India, involving nearly one third of India's army operating under conditions of very high readiness. Pakistan refused to be cowed and launched a counter-mobilization. Tensions spiraled. Tension was still high when Premier Zhao Ziyang paid an official visit to Pakistan in June 1987. Zhao and his Pakistani counterpart Mohammad Khan Junejo reached an "identity of views" regarding "regional issues of mutual concern." Junejo told Zhao that Pakistan was particularly concerned

[9] *Renmin Ribao*, 5 May 1990, 1; Xinhua, Islamabad, 3 May 1990.
[10] *Renmin Ribao*, 30 July 1983, 6.

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about peace in South Asia, while Zhao pledged that "The Chinese government and people will, as always, firmly support the Pakistani government and people in their just cause of safeguarding national independence, upholding stated sovereignty and promoting economic development."[11] Zhao's words in 1987 were more circumspect than those of Wu Xueqian's in 1983, but the point was still the same: China sympathized with and supported Pakistan in its confrontation with India.

The next Indo-Pakistan crisis came in late 1989-1990 over Kashmir. By this time Sino-Indian rapprochement was well under way. We may thus compare Chinese deterrent support during this crisis with those issued during 1983 and 1987 to gauge the impact of Chinese-Indian rapprochement on the Pakistan-Chinese relation. Using this criteria, it seems there was a significant weakening of Chinese deterrent support at the level of explicit verbiage.

During a November 1989 visit to Pakistan, Li Peng dodged an opportunity comparable to that given Wu Xueqian in 1983. When a Pakistani reporter recalled that China had stood with Pakistan whenever it had faced aggression in the past and asked if China would continue to do so in the future, Li replied that the question seemed to refer to a possible conflict between Pakistan and India. This was a purely hypothetical situation, Li said. China hoped there would be no such conflict. On another occasion Li was briefed by Pakistani officials about the India-Pakistan conflict over the Siachen glacier and about how the agreement to reduce forces in that region had run into snags. When asked if he agreed with the presentation, Li replied that it was not a question of whether he agreed or disagreed but whether Pakistan and China shared common perceptions, which they did.[12]

War clouds thickened in early 1990. New Delhi's strategy apparently was again to increase military pressure on Pakistan, forcing it to suspend its putative support to the Kashmiri and Punjabi militants.[13] Failing that, New Delhi was preparing the option of striking against the supposed training camps in Pakistan or, in extremus, for a fourth war with Pakistan. Pakistan denied supporting the Kashmiri militants and refused to repress demonstrations of sympathy within Pakistan for the Kashmiris. In the face of Indian pressure, Islamabad responded with a counter-buildup of its own. In December 1989, Pakistan launched its largest ever peacetime military exercise—a three-week long operation involving 200,000 troops simulating defense against an Indian invasion. As the buildup of Indian forces along Pakistan's borders quickened in early 1990, Indian spokesmen made ominous statements about the danger of war and condemned Pakistani interference in India's internal affairs. Pakistani spokesmen rejected Indian allegations and protests, condemned India's "provocative ultimatums," and called on

[11] Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) *Daily Report, China* (DRC), 23 June 1987, F1–F3.

[12] *Frontier Post*, 17 November 1989; *Pakistan Times*, 15 November 1989.

[13] "Gujral Talks about Aspects of Kashmir Conflict," interview with Indian Minister of External Affairs I.K. Gujral, *Frontier Post*, 9 June 1990, 1, 3.

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India to cease its suppression of Kashmiri Muslims. On 5 February, 30,000 Pakistanis demonstrated on the border, with some pushing across the border into Indian territory. When a further border crossing occurred on 11 February, Indian troops opened fire. The Indian and Pakistani foreign offices traded protests. The situation was fraught with the danger of miscalculation.[14]

In the midst of these mounting tensions, Chinese Defense Minister Qin Qiwei arrived in Pakistan on 19 February at the head of a ten-man military delegation including the deputy chief of staff, the commander of the Lanzhou military district (which included China's borders with Pakistan and India's Ladakh), and the deputy commander of the Beijing military region. During his speech at a banquet hosted by Pakistan's minister of defense, Qin lauded Sino-Pakistan friendship as solid and having withstood the test of time. He praised Pakistan for its support of the Afghan people's struggle against foreign aggression and for having played an active role in maintaining peace and stability in South Asia. The implicit content of these words was significant: Pakistan was an important strategic partner of China's. The deterrent support offered by Qin was, however, equivocal: "The Chinese government will never change its policy" [of] "supporting the Pakistan Government, people, and *armed forces* in safeguarding their state sovereignty and territorial integrity, no matter how the international situation changes."[15] This was China's strongest statement of deterrent support for Pakistan during the 1989–1990 Kashmir crisis. Qin Qiwei's 1990 words represented far weaker support for Pakistan than Wu Xueqian's 1983 comments, and somewhat weaker support than Zhao Ziyang's 1987 reference to identity of views. Of course, the visit by Qin Qiwei's military delegation to Pakistan in the context of the escalating Indo-Pakistan confrontation was itself an important nonverbal manifestation of Chinese support.

Most Chinese statements during the 1990 Kashmir crisis simply called for peace. During Iqbal Akhund's February mission to Beijing, for example, Li Peng said that China was "very concerned" about the developing situation in Kashmir and hoped that that situation would soon "calm down." The Chinese government expected, Li said, that Pakistan and India would settle their disputes in line with the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence through negotions and without resorting to force in order to prevent the situation from getting worse. This would be beneficial to stability and peace in the subcontinent and in Asia.[16] China's approach did not change even as tension peaked in April and May with small but lethal clashes between Pakistani and Indian forces and press reports that both sides were readying nuclear weapons for use. During his visit to Pakistan in

[14] *Asian Recorder*, 29 January–4 February 1990, 20987; *Asian Recorder*, 26 March–1 April 1990, 21069-70.

[15] FBIS, *DRC*, 22 February 1990, 11. (Emphasis added.)

[16] FBIS, *DRC*, 15 February 1990, 6. Qin Qichen's comments to Akhund were similar but less elaborate than Li's. So too were Ministry of Foreign Affairs statements on 8 February, 4 April, and 19 April.

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early May at the height of the crisis, Wan Li merely said "We appreciate Pakistan's attitude on opposing the use of military force, trying to stop the escalation of the situation, and resolving the issue through negotiations."[17]

We can conclude that, measured against earlier periods, China's verbal deterrent support for Pakistan during 1990 was weak; it had weakened under the new conditions of Sino-Indian rapprochement. While this is a significant development, one should not conclude that Pakistan's leaders were particularly unhappy with China's stance during the 1990 crisis. While they would undoubtedly have liked stronger nuances in China's choice of words, they nonetheless felt that China's pro-peace stance benefited Pakistan. Pakistani officials and specialists in Islamabad during the summer of 1990 were not unhappy with the level of Chinese support during the 1990 crisis. They saw China as a reliable friend who could be counted on in times of emergency. Subtle nuances of words were less important to them than underlying perceptions and purposes, and these, they were confident, would lead China to continue to support Pakistan against India. They understood Beijing's need to mince words for the sake of placating India, but remained confident that when push came to shove, China would be there. According to Chinese diplomats in Islamabad, Pakistani journalists would sometimes expect Chinese leaders to speak bluntly, and when they declined to do so, would misinterpret China's intentions. (This was an apparent reference to Li Peng's response to reporters' leading questions during his November 1989 visit to Pakistan.) On these occasions, Chinese diplomats would seek out these reporters and explain that in view of the long friendship between China and Pakistan, a friendship tested by adversity, China will not abandon Pakistan in the event of a crisis. Most journalists understood and appreciated these comments, according to Chinese officials.

China's Support for Pakistan's Comprehensive National Security

The incremental shift in Beijing's Kashmir position toward India's stance and the increased ambiguity of Chinese deterrent support for Pakistan against India are offset by continuing robust Chinese support for Pakistan's efforts at national security modernization. This is another critical dimension through which the impact of Sino-Indian rapprochement on the Sino-Pakistan entente may be gauged. The close military ties that developed between China and Pakistan during the 1960s have been a major source of friction between India and China. From India's perspective, the Sino-Pakistan military relationship confronts India with a two-front threat, which has materialized several times. New Delhi also believes that China's large-scale assistance to Pakistan's military development is fundamentally anti-Indian. The realities of the situation were clear, from India's point of view: China was arming Pakistan against India. New Delhi also blames the Sino-Pakistan military link for drawing extraregional powers into South Asia,

[17] Xinhua, Islamabad, 3 May 1990.

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TABLE 2

Sino-Pakistan Military Exchanges, 1988–1990

March 1988	PLA air force commander to Pakistan
	Pakistan navy commander to China
July 1988	Pakistani air force delegation to China
October 1988	PLA deputy chief of staff to Pakistan
December 1988	Pakistan army delegation to China
March 1989	PLA chief of staff to Pakistan
April 1989	Pakistan air force commander to China
September 1989	Pakistan defense secretary to China
October 1989	Pakistan army deputy chief of staff to China
November 1989	PLA deputy chief of staff to Pakistan
December 1989	China minister for national defense industry to Pakistan
December 1989	PLA navy commander to Pakistan
	Pakistan minister of defense to China
February 1990	China minister of defense to Pakistan
May 1990	Pakistan navy chief of staff to China
November 1990	Pakistan army chief of staff to China

where they had no proper role. From New Delhi's perspective, the Sino-Pakistan link has drawn not only China but the Soviet Union and the United States as well into South Asia. In other words, the Sino-Pakistan entente is, in India's opinion, a stimulus to further militarization and great power rivalry in South Asia. Within this context, it is important for our purposes to examine recent developments in Sino-Pakistan military relations. Was there a diminution of Chinese-Pakistan military as Sino-Indian rapprochement unfolded in 1987–1990?

The answer seems to be no. In fact the opposite has occurred. A count of high-level military exchanges between China and Pakistan based on indexes of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service indicates that there were five in 1985, three each in 1986 and 1987, six in 1988, eight in 1989, and three in 1990. Exchanges during the 1988–1990 period, the period of Sino-Indian rapprochement, are quite impressive. They are listed in Table 2.

The slight increase in military exchanges in 1988 and 1989, as China maneuvered toward rapprochement with India, may have been part of a Chinese effort to prevent China's relation with India and Pakistan from becoming a zero sum game. A major purpose behind Li Peng's November 1989 South Asian tour was to reassure China's friends in that region that China planned to stay engaged there. Li Peng was accompanied by Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) Deputy Chief of General Staff He Qizhong, who conducted talks with the Pakistan army chief of staff on "matters of mutual interest."

China also remained strongly supportive of Pakistan's military modernization efforts. Among the four agreements signed during Li Peng's November 1989 visit was one regarding economic and technological cooperation financed by a Chinese loan of Rmb 100 million. According to press reports, one aspect of this agreement dealt with Chinese assistance to Pakistan's rocket development program. In February and May 1989, Pakistan tested 80 and 300 kilometer-range

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surface-to-air missiles. New Delhi reacted strongly to both tests. Two weeks after Li Peng's visit, Lt. General Ding Hanggao, head of China's State Commission for Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense, signed a memorandum of understanding in Islamabad covering stepped-up joint procurement, research, and development in the national defense industry over a ten-year period. Electronics and computers were two areas stressed by the agreement. China also continued to assist Pakistan's nuclear energy program under an agreement signed in September 1986. In November 1989 and February 1990, two mini-reactors used for research purposes and sold by the China National Energy Corporation went into operation in Pakistan. During Li Peng's November 1989 visit, China announced its willingness to sell to Pakistan a 300 megawatt pressurized water nuclear power plant.[18] The Pakistan press lauded China's decision as a move breaking the U. S. led embargo on assistance to Pakistan's nuclear energy program. Pakistan faces a critical shortage of electricity, and there are sound economic reasons for it to develop nuclear energy. Yet given India's suspicions regarding Pakistan's putative nuclear weapons program, the reactor sale was especially significant.

Chinese arms sales to Pakistan have also continued apace. Between 1986 and 1988, China delivered 90 A-5 Fantan A fighters and 60 F-7 fighters to Pakistan. In 1987, Pakistan ordered another 150 F-7 fighters from China to be fitted with U. S. General Electric-made F404 engines and U. S. designed avionics and fire control systems.[19] Deployment of these hybrid aircraft, a highly modernized version of the MiG-21 with much greater engine performance, lethality, and weapons-carrying ability, began in 1989. These fighters were intended to replace the older F-6 (also a Chinese aircraft) as Pakistan's main ground support aircraft. China also agreed to help Pakistan modernize its tank force of which China supplied Pakistan with 825 T-59 tanks between 1978 and 1988.[20] In June 1990, the North China Industries Corporation (NORINCO) and the Pakistan Defense Ministry signed an agreement regarding the joint design and development of a new tank to be Pakistan's main battle tank in the 21st century. It is to be a state-of-the-art weapon with increased mobility, lethality, and survivability. NORINCO was also to provide Pakistan with the technology for the manufacture of T-69 and T-85 tanks.[21]

China's assistance to Pakistan's efforts to develop defense-related heavy industry also remained large and diverse. During the late 1980s, China assisted the development of an aeronautical complex at Kamra, a Light Aircraft Manufacturing Factory, the Pakistan Machine Tool Factory, the Karachi shipyard and

[18] FBIS, *DRC*, 20 November 1989, 9.

[19] *SIPRI Yearbook 1989* (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1989), 259.

[20] *Asian Recorder*, 24–32 December 1990, 293; Altaf A. Shaikh, "China–A Friend Indeed," *Nation* (Lahore), 24 November 1989; *India Express*, 4 February 1990; Aabha Dixit, "Enduring Sino-Pak Relations: The Military Dimension," *Strategic Analysis* 12 (December 1989): 981–990.

[21] *Frontier Post*, 10 June 1990, 1.

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engineering works, and three research and development laboratories involved in propulsion, ballistics, and aerodynamics. The Heavy Machinery Complex (HMC) at Taxila north of Islamabad exemplifies China's large and ongoing support for Pakistan's heavy industry. This 125-acre capital goods manufacturing complex employs over 3,500 workers and has an annual capacity of 17,000 tons of capital goods. Construction began on the HMC in 1967 and operations began in 1971. China provided just over half of the cost of the project. Since then, the HMC has become Pakistan's major indigenous source of capital goods, producing machinery and equipment for sugar and cement mills, chemical and petrochemical plants, road building and construction equipment, railway carriages and wagon axles, overhead electric cranes, mobile cranes, boilers, truck and bus chassis, pressure vessels, and general steel structures.[22] Chinese technical personnel routinely visited the HMC in the early 1990s to help solve various problems.

China is also substantially involved in the development of Pakistan's energy sector. China exported its first power station to Pakistan in 1986. Installation of two additional units got underway in late 1989. In August 1989 a contract was signed for the sale of three more thermal power units of 50 megawatts each that came into operation in 1992 and 1993. As of 1990, other Chinese-assisted projects included the drilling of several hundred water wells, an oil tank storage project in Karachi, a drainage project on the right bank of the Indus River, construction of a 20-story building in Islamabad, a sewage plant in Hyderabad, channel maintenance and dredging at Qasim Port, the reconstruction of the Jamro channel, and construction of a 500-kilovolt transformer and power transmission line. In 1990, Chinese companies were also carrying out eight projects under contracts from the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank worth a total of $36.6 million. Under an educational exchange program begun in 1988, China offered twenty Ph.D. scholarships per year to Pakistani youth, and Pakistan offered six scholarships per year to Chinese students. In that year, about fifty Chinese students were studying at the International Islamic University in Islamabad. All of this represents China's most extensive foreign assistance program.

In sum, China's assistance to Pakistan's national development efforts remained quite substantial. Many of these efforts, especially those touching on military capabilities, created discomfort in New Delhi. Beijing was cognizant of these difficulties and tried to address them. Shortly before Qin Qiwei's visit to Pakistan in 1990, China's foreign ministry briefed Indian embassy officals on recent Chinese military exchanges with Pakistan, in an effort to develop a mechanism to exchange information regarding interactions between China and India's South Asian neighbors, thereby minimizing misunderstanding. Clearly Beijing wants to assure New Delhi of the defensive intent of its military relations with India's neighbors, thus maximizing chances that China will be able to improve relations with India without sacrificing its close relations with Pakistan.

[22] *Pakistan Times*, 21 June 1987.

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The basis upon which relations among all countries of the region should be based, Chinese diplomats tell their Indian counterparts, is the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. In plain words this means that India cannot expect China to stunt its relations with Pakistan for India's sake, and if India does not attack or threaten Pakistan, Pakistan's China-supplied weapons will not be directed against India. The Indian attitude, as expressed by a high-level Indian diplomat in Beijing, is that India realizes the broad diplomatic value to China of its relationship with Pakistan and does not question it. Nor is dilution of China's relation with Pakistan a precondition for improved Sino-Indian relations. India has, however, taken note of the expansion of China's military ties with India's neighbors over the past several years.

Limits of Sino-Indian Rapprochement I: The Territorial Dispute

Sino-Indian rapprochement is limited by two factors: a basic instability arising out of the territorial conflict, and fundamentally conflicting views about the proper nature of China's relations with the South Asian countries. The tensions in Sino-Indian relations arising from these two factors continue to provide the strategic glue necessary to hold together the Sino-Pakistan entente.

Immediately prior to the recent period of Sino-Indian rapprochement, the two countries went to the brink of war over a disputed valley near the tri-juncture of the Chinese-Indian-eastern Bhutan border. Indeed, this confrontation with the possibility of war was an important factor motivating the desire for better relations in the late 1980s. The border confrontation of 1986–1987 focused on a small and extremely remote canyon called Sumdorong Chu by the Indians and lying to the southeast of the Thagla Ridge, which dominates the terrain of the tri-border region. India places the boundary along the top of Thagla Ridge; China places the line of actual control to the south of Sumdorong Chu. Thus, both sides claim this valley. The Thagla Ridge region is perhaps the most sensitive sector of the entire Sino-Indian border. This is also one of several areas where the famous line drawn by Sir Henry McMahon on his map at Simla in 1914 went south of the actual Himalayan crest line and where Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru later moved the line northward to correspond to what he took to be McMahon's intent—to follow the crest line. The Thagla area is also a traditional trade route between Tibet and the southern Himalayas and, as such, a region where Chinese analysts believe their claims of historic cultural and administrative links with Tibet are especially strong. It is an area of considerable geostrategic significance. On a straight north-south line, Sumdorong Chu is only about 180 miles from Bangladesh's northern borders. Were China to decide to launch a large-scale offensive to oust India from the 90,000 square kilometers of Chinese territory it believes India illegally occupies in this region, this is one of the probable jumping off points for such an offensive. It was also here that heavy fighting began in October 1962 and from here that Chinese forces launched their major offensive in that brief but intense war.

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There is a general convergence of Chinese and Indian accounts regarding developments in the Thagla Ridge area in the mid-1980s. The Chinese maintain that Sumdorong Chu lies within a twenty-kilometer strip north of the line of actual control behind which the PLA voluntarily withdrew at the conclusion of the 1962 war. The purpose of pulling back to a line north of the line of actual control was, according to the Chinese, to create a demilitarized buffer zone to minimize tension and conflict along the border. Chinese forces patrolled this strip, but did not maintain posts in it. During the mid-1980s, Indian forces began patrolling into this twenty-kilometer demilitarized strip in Sumdorong Chu and other areas along the border as well. Chinese patrols found physical evidence of such patrols—tin cans, discarded equipment, garbage, and so on. Moreover, in some regions, such as Sumdorong Chu, Indian forces built seasonal posts. The purpose of these Indian moves was, in the Chinese estimate, to push Indian control gradually forward, ultimately establishing a new line of actual control.[23] Indian sources confirm that beginning in 1984 ten-man squads of Indian soldiers led by intelligence officers began patrolling the Sumdorong Chu valley during the summer, leaving their base camp at Tawang in early July after the snows melted, and hiking for two days to reach Sumdorong Chu, where they set up an observation post on the south bank of the river and watched Chinese movements on the opposite side of the valley. The Indian squad stayed until October, when approaching winter forced them to return to their Tawang base camp.[24]

In the spring of 1986, the Chinese moved to prevent further Indian patrols into Sumdorong Chu by deploying their own forces to the region two weeks prior to the arrival of the Indian squad. When the Indian force reached the Sumdorong Chu in early July 1986, they found forty Chinese soldiers camped there with a permanent shelter, a jeep road running from the rear area to the forward position, and a landing zone for helicopters. Four kilometers further to the north were another 500 Chinese soldiers. It was soon apparent from the construction and stockpiling activities that the Indians observed, that the Chinese planned to stay the winter in Sumdorong Chu. The Indian army responded to what they judged to be a Chinese intrusion by sending reinforcements to occupy the ridges overlooking the Chinese position. Indian forces also stepped up their patrolling of previously unoccupied areas along the border. "The last thing we want is another Chinese patrol holing up at yet another unoccupied hill feature that we consider to be ours," an Indian army officer explained.[25] At the diplomatic level, India protested the Chinese "intrusion." Beijing rejected the Indian protest, countering that it was Indian soldiers who had pushed into Chinese territory.[26]

The confrontation in Sumdorong Chu occurred against the backdrop of ongoing and difficult border negotiations. During the first several rounds of border

[23] Interview at Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 24 April 1990.

[24] *India Today*, 31 August 1986, 91; Mira Sinha Bhattacharjea, "What Is Our China Policy?" *Mainstream* (New Delhi), 9 May 1987, 10.

[25] *India Today*, 31 December 1986, 74–75.

[26] *Renmin Ribao*, 17 July 1986, 4.

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talks between 1981 and 1985, India pushed for a withdrawal of Chinese forces from areas in Ladakh, which it contended were occupied by Chinese forces between 1959 and 1962. China denied that there had been any forward movement by Chinese forces during those years and insisted that the line of actual control established after China's unilateral cease fire and withdrawal in 1962 was essentially the same as the 1959 line of control. More broadly, New Delhi demanded that China renounce its claims to the southern slope of the Himalayas in the eastern sector and accept the principle that the boundary in that sector ran along the watershed/crest line. In order to secure Chinese concessions in both eastern and western sectors, New Delhi pushed for a sector-by-sector consideration of the border issue, believing that in this fashion the merits of India's case in each sector could stand on their own and that India would not be compelled to drop its claims in one sector in exchange for Chinese acceptance of Indian claims in the other. From the Indian perspective, such an approach is eminently fair and reasonable, since India's ownership of the eastern sector is based on the principle of the watershed, a principle generally accepted by the international community, while China's possession of land in the western sector is based on the aggression that culminated in the 1962 war. In the Indian view, China's offer to recognize Indian ownership of disputed territory in the eastern sector in exchange for Indian acceptance of Chinese claims in the western sector is like a thief stealing a man's coat and wallet and then offering to return the coat if he is allowed to keep the wallet.

India's position that Chinese concessions in the eastern sector could not provide a quid pro quo for Indian concessions in the western sector was also based on a belief that Beijing had tacitly accepted the watershed principle in the eastern sector. This was implicit, New Delhi believed, in Zhou Enlai's 1960 proposal, unofficially revived by Deng Xiaoping in June 1980, that China would accept Indian claims in the eastern sector in exchange for Indian acceptance of China's claims in the western sector. External Affairs Minister P.V. Narishimha Rao had explained India's view of China's proposed east-west swap to the Lok Sabha in July 1980: "The government of India has never accepted the premise on which it is based, namely, that the Chinese side is making a concession in the eastern sector by the giving up of territory which they allege is illegally incorporated into India. Nevertheless, we welcome the prospect of the eastern sector being settled without any particular difficulty."[27] Given New Delhi's belief that Beijing tacitly accepted the watershed principle in the east, uncoupling the eastern and western sectors via a sector-by-sector approach would allow India to minimize pressure on it to make concessions in the west in exchange for formal Chinese recognition of the McMahon line in the east.

From the Chinese perspective, the Indian position was the height of arrogance. Chinese characterized the Indian position as, "What I have is mine and what you have is mine too," an attitude which is, Chinese believe, the antithesis of a fair,

[27] *Keesing's Contemporary Records* 27 (no. 43, 1981): 31153.

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reasonable willingness for mutual compromise. To move the border talks forward, Beijing agreed at the fourth round in October 1983 to a sector-by-sector approach, but with the caveat that the objective was to be achievement of an overall settlement. The sixth round of talks in November 1985 focused on the eastern sector. Both sides were optimistic going into this round of talks, but emerged disillusioned.[28] China apparently emerged from the sixth round convinced that it had to disabuse India of the belief that China tacitly accepted the watershed principle in the east and was not serious about its claims in this sector. The lead article in the April 1986 edition of the authoritative journal *Guoji wenti yanjiu* (Research in international affairs) stressed China's claims in the eastern sector. "The major dispute on the Sino-Indian border is in the eastern sector," the editor's introduction to the article explained.[29] Shortly afterward, China's vice foreign minister and principal in the border talks, Liu Shuqing, informed reporters that while some irregularities in the western sector had been solved by the "unfortunate" 1962 war, problems still existed in the middle and eastern sectors. "The eastern sector is the biggest dispute and the key to the overall solution," Liu said.[30] If India was willing to make concessions in the east, China would certainly consider concessions in the west. When asked if this amounted to a reversal of Zhou Enlai's 1960 proposal, Liu replied, "Premier Zhou was only talking about ideas, not specific proposals." It was in this context that Chinese forces took up fixed positions in the Sumdorong Chu valley.

New Delhi viewed the Chinese move in Sumdorong Chu as part of a broader pattern of Chinese maneuvering on the border. This it may have been, but Chinese sources explained the move rather differently. The root of the problem was Indian "nibbling" of Chinese territory. It has been such "nibbling" in 1959–1962 under Nehru's "forward policy" which had led to the 1962 war. Now in the Sumdorong Chu, India had resumed its nibbling operations. To the Chinese this reflected an extremely arrogant attitude of refusing to compromise at the boundary talks while pushing forward militarily, seizing more Chinese territory and attempting to present China with a fait accompli.[31]

New Delhi viewed Beijing's new emphasis on the eastern sector and the establishment of the encampment in Sumdorong Chu as a manifestation of a new, tougher Chinese approach to the territorial issue. It decided to play the same game, and on 15 July 1986, six days before the seventh round of border talks were scheduled to begin, New Delhi radio announced the Chinese "intrusion" in Sumdorong Chu. At the seventh round of talks, India reiterated its position: the eastern boundary stood already defined by history and legitimized by the

[28] Shen Chun-ch'uan, "Peking-New Delhi Relations in Recent Years," *Issues and Studies* (Taibei), 22 (March 1986): 150-151.

[29] Jing Hui, "You guan Zhong Yin bian jie zhengduan de yi xie qingquang he beijing," (Several circumstances and background about the Sino-Indian border dispute), *Guoji wenti yanjiu*, no. 2, 1986, 1-8.

[30] *Indian Express*, 3 June 1986; also, *The Statesman* (New Delhi), 7 June 1986, 2.

[31] See, *Shijie Zhishi*, (World knowledge), (Beijing), 6 November 1987, 82.

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Simla agreement of 1914. China countered that India had aggressively occupied Chinese territory on the southern slope of the Himalayas and demanded that it be restored.[32] After the deadlock at the seventh round, both sides accelerated their military preparations. The situation took a sharp turn for the worse in December 1986, when the Indian parliament passed a bill transforming the union territory of Arunachal Pradesh into the twenty-fourth state of the Indian Republic. Arunachal Pradesh includes the 90,000 square kilometers of land claimed by China in the eastern sector. From the Indian perspective, the formal incorporation of Arunachal Pradesh into India was a response to the revival of Chinese claims to the southern slope of the eastern Himalayas in 1985 and 1986. It was a move intended to eliminate any ambiguity regarding the ownership of this piece of land and dispel for all times any idea that India might someday relinquish it. From China's perspective, this move was a unilateral action altering the status quo of a critical region of the territorial dispute while delicate negotiations regarding that region were under way.

China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) issued a strong protest against "the establishment of an Indian state on Chinese territory illegally occupied by India." The creation of Arunachal Pradesh constituted "serious aggression" against China's "territorial sovereignty," "deeply hurt the feelings of the Chinese people," and was a continuation of India's northward encroachment on Chinese territory since the 1940s. It also created a new and difficult obstacle to a settlement of the boundary issue. China could never recognize the so-called Arunachal Pradesh, "established in the most disputed eastern sector of the Sino-Indian border."[33] When the December bill took effect in February 1987, the MFA issued another protest.

By early 1987 both sides were mobilizing for war. Neither side wanted war, but both saw the other as acting aggressively and felt that to back down in such circumstances would send a message of weakness and irresolution. In mid-March, India launched Operation Chequerboard, a mobilization based on a hypothetical war with China. Beijing expressed its "extreme concern" with Operation Chequerboard and accelerated its own deployments.[34] By May, the People's Liberation Army was shifting 20–22,000 soldiers, fighter-bombers, and U.S.-made Blackhawk high-altitude helicopters from the Chengdu and Lanzhou military districts into Tibet. The 1987 confrontation carried the danger of a wider conflagration. In June, Chinese Communist Party Politbureau Member Qiao Shi traveled to Burma, Nepal, and Bangladesh for discussion of "international issues of mutual concern." Subsequent press reports asserted that Qiao delivered to Dhaka a request that in the event of a Sino-Indian war, Bangladesh not allow India to move men

[32] Neville Maxwell, "India's Second China War," *Pakistan Times*, 14 July 1987; also, *Keesing's*, 33 (2, 1987): 34947.

[33] *Renmin Ribao*, 22 February 1986, 1.

[34] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs' protest is in *Renmin Ribao*, 23 April 1987, 1; also 26 April 1987, 6.

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or supplies across its territory. When Bangladeshi President Hussaih Mohammad Ersad visited Beijing the following month, he reportedly gave Beijing the required assurances.[35] During his stop in Kathmandu, Qiao Shi reiterated China's opposition to "hegemonism of all forms" and promised that the Chinese people would always remain reliable friends of the Nepalese people in their struggle for independence, nonalignment, and against "external opposition in all forms." Nepali King Birenda replied that China's support for Nepal greatly inspired the Nepalese people. There may also have been a linkage between the 1987 Sino-Indian confrontation and China's sales of arms to, and reported intelligence exchange agreement with, Nepal during 1988.[36]

As Sino-Indian tension escalated, India moved to line up support from its friends. Late in May 1987 Gorbachev's foreign policy adviser, Anatoliy Dobrynin, visited India for talks on India's "security environment." Two months later, Rajiv Gandhi called in Moscow for further talks on Sino-Indian relations. Gandhi emerged from talks with Gorbachev to tell the press that Gorbachev "understood India's stand and its difficulties in finding ways to settle issues concerning relations between India and China." This was weak Soviet support reflecting Gorbachev's accelerating drive to improve relations with Beijing.[37] High-level military contacts between Vietnam and India in May 1987 also led to reports that India had requested Vietnamese action on its borders with China in the event of a Sino-Indian war. U. S. sources at the time believed that in the event of a Sino-Vietnamese conflict arising from a Sino-Indian war, Thailand would help China by putting pressure on Vietnam along Thailand's border with Cambodia.

The danger of general war erupting in South Asia in 1987 should not be exaggerated. International alignments then were much less rigid than they were, say, in Europe in 1914. None of the governments involved in the escalating crisis of 1987 had any illusion about the consequences of war for their nation's economic development efforts. Moreover, both the United States and the Soviet Union exercised their influence to defuse the crisis. What is important for our purposes, however, is that the unresolved Sino-Indian border-territorial issue creates a basic instability in Sino-Indian relations; and that because of this instability, neither side can rule out the possibility of a major war. Moreover, there are webs of mutual commitment that could act as power trains escalating a Sino-Indian conflict into a broader war. This, in turn, has important consequences for China's relations with Pakistan; Beijing cannot allow India to relieve itself of its two-front threat by subordinating Pakistan.

[35] *Renmin Ribao*, 4 June 1987, 42; Manoj Joshi, "Situation of the Sino-Indian Border," *Mainstream*, 30 May 1987, 4; Jari Lindholm, "The Dragon's Teeth," *India Today*, 15 August 1987, 82–84. *FEER*, 23 July 1987, 7.

[36] See John W. Garver, "Sino-Indian Rivalry in Nepal: The Question of Chinese Arms Sales," *Asian Survey* 31 (October 1991): 956–75.

[37] See John W. Garver, "The Indian Factor in Recent Sino-Soviet Relations," *The China Quarterly* 125 (March 1991): 55–85.

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The war crisis of 1986-1987 is relevant in another way as well. It confirmed deep-rooted Chinese beliefs about the arrogant and duplicitous nature of India's leaders, who understand only the language of force. This set of perceptions is not necessarily the dominant Chinese view of India, but it is an important ideational complex usually lying just below the psychological surface of Chinese minds ready to be activated by Indian actions. Thus, India began pushing into the Sumdorong Chu area in 1984 just as Sino-Indian relations were beginning to thaw. When China countered India's nibbling aggression by military counter-moves and refused to back down before India's Operation Chequerboard, India finally came to its senses and reoriented its China policy in mid-1987. The rapprochement of 1988-1990 followed. The conclusion China drew is that a firm attitude is necessary to force India to act soberly.

There are different opinions among Chinese academic specialists regarding the terms on which China should settle the territorial conflict with India. Presumably, these divergent views are reflected among China's top-level leadership. According to high-level Indian diplomats in Beijing, India has received mixed signals from the Chinese side regarding China's terms for settlement. According to one point of view, China cannot expect to recover the bulk of the 90,000 square kilometers it claims in the eastern sector. Realistically, it can expect to recover part or all of the Thagla Ridge, since in this area there is the clearest and most abundant historical evidence of cultural and administrative links with Tibet over a long period. In other regions of the eastern sector, however, the evidence of sustained interaction with Tibet is less substantial or even nonexistent. Thus, if India is willing to make concessions in the Tawang region, China should be ready to settle the dispute. In return for Indian concessions in the Tawang region, China might make a few concessions in the western sector that did not threaten the security of the Aksai Chin road. Another point of view stresses the economic and strategic value of the southern slope of the eastern Himalayas and believes that China must in fact recover this lost territory. According to this perspective, the disputed territory in the eastern sector is historically Tibetan-Chinese land encroached upon by British imperialism and then turned over to the Indian heirs of the British empire. It is also an area rich in timber, hydroelectric potential, and mineral resources—roughly one-third of all Tibet's total resources in each of these areas, according to one authoritative Chinese analyst at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. It is also an area conducive to agriculture that could help sustain a larger population in Tibet. China, with its one billion one hundred million people, cannot afford to give up this large and wealthy tract of land. As with the first point of view, this second perspective proposes Chinese concessions in the west in exchange for Indian concessions in the east, the western sector being much less important economically and strategically. Regarding Zhou Enlai's 1960 proposal involving Chinese relinquishment of the eastern sector, that offer was made at a time when the People's Republic of China was young, weak, and isolated. That is no longer the case. India lost its opportunity by not accepting Zhou's offer in 1960.

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The Limits of Sino-Indian Rapprochement II: China's Relations with South Asia

A second fundamental limit on Sino-Indian rapprochement has to do with sharply divergent attitudes about the proper nature of China's relations with various South Asian countries. As noted earlier, China believes that it has the right to establish and expand relations with all countries of South Asia on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Decisions regarding the type and level of these relations are exclusively a matter for the two governments concerned. Moreover, military relations are a part of the normal range of state-to-state relations, and if the governments of China and one of the independent states of South Asia deem it proper, those relations may be expanded or diminished in accord with the decisions of these sovereign governments. India, on the other hand, believes that it has legitimate security concerns in South Asia, which entitle it to exclude military links between extraregional powers and India's South Asian neighbors. The realities of several decades of conflict and hostility between India and China legitimately entitle India, New Delhi believes, to take measures to limit China's military presence in South Asia. This right is derived from India's basic right of national self-defense. From Beijing's perspective, India's attempts to limit Chinese relations with various South Asian countries is a manifestation of Indian hegemonic thinking. India's bourgeois democratic leaders inherited not only their political institutions from their old British rulers, China's Communist rulers believe, but also the imperialistic ideology of the British Indian Empire. Policies and actions based on imperialistic spheres-of-influence ideology excluding China from contacts with its own neighbors are unacceptable.

Twice between 1987 and 1990, these two points of view and interpretations of national interest came into conflict. In both cases, China backed down, but did so with considerable resentment. The first case involved Sri Lanka. As India and Sri Lanka moved toward confrontation in 1986–1987 over questions related to the Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka, China first supported Colombo and then quietly suspended its military ties with Colombo, adopting a neutral stand on the Indo-Lankan confrontation. Nor did China support, at least publicly, Colombo's efforts during 1989 and 1990 to secure a withdrawal of the Indian Peace Keeping Force from Sri Lanka. The other case involved Nepal. In line with its view of military relations between itself and South Asian countries, in 1988 NORINCO sold a substantial batch of weapons to Nepal. India responded by implementing an economic blockade of Nepal. Over a period of eighteen months, New Delhi strangled Katmandu into submission, bringing about in the process a basic change in Nepal's political system that was much to India's advantage. China tried to support Katmandu during the Indian embargo, but there were severe geographic and financial constraints on its ability to do so. In the end, Nepal returned to the Indian fold. China's leaders did not publicly condemn India's actions toward Sri Lanka and Nepal. Privately, however, they were angry.

During the early 1990s Myanmar (Burma) emerged as the key arena of Chinese-Indian rivalry south of the Himalayas. Following the stern reassertion of

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military authority in Myanmar in 1988, that country's ties with the West and with India deteriorated. Rangoon turned to China. Economic and military relations expanded rapidly. By 1994 China had emerged as Myanmar's most important trading partner with Chinese goods flooding into Myanmar in exchange for Burmese timber and gems. Military relations also expanded rapidly with China supplying large quantities of military equipment to Burma and assisting in the construction of a series of naval and electronic surveillance facilities on the entrance to the Bay of Bengal just north of India's Andaman Islands territory. India is extremely concerned with China's expanding relations with Myanmar. If at some point New Delhi moves to abort that relation, Chinese-Indian tensions will again spiral. If India does not act, its apprehension about China will mount. From Beijing's perspective the way to induce Indian acquiesence to the developing Chinese-Burmese entente is to confront India with a position of strength, which would make Indian intervention very risky and potentially very costly. From this perspective, a strong, tenaciously independent Pakistan on India's western frontier is extremely valuable.

Conclusion

China's overriding strategic interest in South Asia is to maintain a balance of power favorable to itself. Most fundamentally, this entails the perpetuation of Pakistan's existence as a strong center of power in South Asia, independent of Indian domination, and confronting Indian defense planners with the likelihood of Pakistani entry into a major war between China and India. A strong, independent Pakistan confronts India with a two-front threat, thereby forcing India to divide its forces in the event of a war with China. Subordination of Pakistan would ease India's two-front dilemma, permitting it to concentrate its forces against China. Concession of the South Asian region to an Indian sphere of special interest would also stunt the development of China's role and stature as the leading power in Asia. If China abjures military links with the countries of South Asia because of Indian objections, it will ipso facto consign itself to a much more limited role, confined geographically to East and perhaps Southeast Asia. Again, the best way of preventing India from consolidating its claim of special security interests in South Asia is by supporting the existence of a Pakistan strong and confident enough to challenge and resist Indian claims as regional overlord.

Because of the gravity of China's national interests underlying its entente with Pakistan, the interplay between Chinese-Indian and Pakistan-Chinese relations is not likely to become a zero sum game. The improvement of Indian-Chinese relations over the past two years has made relations between Beijing and Islamabad more nuanced, more subtle, and complex. Beijing has tried to balance its entente cordial with Pakistan against its new rapprochement with India. This was manifest in the Kashmir crisis of 1990, when Beijing ceased referring to the United Nations after Qian Qichen's discussions in New Delhi, in China's lack of enthusiasm for

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Pakistan's efforts to internationalize the Kashmir issue, and in the softness of Chinese deterrent support for Pakistan during this crisis. The substance of China's support for Pakistan, both in terms of its material support for Pakistan's national security development efforts and in terms of its nonverbal deterrent support for Pakistan, continued.

China's continuing large support for Pakistan's national development efforts and the continuing close military relations between Beijing and Islamabad indicate that China is not prepared to sacrifice its entente with Pakistan on the altar of Indian-Chinese friendship. Beijing would like to have good relations with both Pakistan and India. For this reason, Beijing lauds and encourages efforts to improve Pakistan-Indian relations, for it knows that Indo-Pakistan conflict will present it with difficult choices between the two subcontinental powers. Under the new conditions of Sino-Indian rapprochement, Beijing will do everything it can to avoid such a choice. This was one important reason for its peace diplomacy during the 1990 Kashmir crisis. But in extremus, if forced to choose, Beijing will not sacrifice Pakistan.

Chinese perceptions of India underlie this *Realpolitik* approach. There is an important consensus among Chinese analysts of Indian affairs that only a firm policy based on a position of strength will compel India to act soberly toward China. One classified study, which took a relatively optimistic view about Sino-Indian relations, concluded that a precondition for the development of Sino-Indian friendship was the maintenance of adequate deterrent force on China's border with India. Even though pro-peace people were dominant in India's elite, many others wanted a test of strength with China to avenge India's defeat in 1962. India was also plagued by many internal contradictions, which could lead to foreign adventures. China should recognize the Janus-faced nature of India's leaders—their tendency to speak of peace and rely on force. Therefore, China had to remain diligent.[38] Were India able to dissolve this two-front threat by subordinating Pakistan, its position against China would be much stronger. Another classified Chinese study made this explicit. While there were no indications of a major war between China and India in the immediate future, the study said, under certain circumstances India's leaders might decide on war with China. The main precondition for such a war would be improvement of Indian relations with Pakistan so that India could avoid a two-front war.[39] In other words, a prudent Chinese policy would sustain Pakistan against India.

Pakistan is in a different category from Sri Lanka or Nepal, where China in 1986–1987 and 1989–1990 left those countries to their fates at India's hands. The substance of Pakistan's national strength puts it in a different category.

[38] Wang Hongwei, "Yindu dui Hua zhengce de diaozheng yu wofang guice de jianyi," (Adjustments in India's policy toward China and proposals regarding China's response) *Ya tai ziliao* (Materials on Asia and the Pacific) (Beijing: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 3 April 1989).

[39] Fan Mingxing, "Qian tan Yindu de dui Hua zhanlue" (India's strategy toward China), n.d., but apparently written in 1989.

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Pakistan is a significant mid-range power, which has demonstrated a substantial staying power against India over the past forty years. The territorial dispute remains a fundamental source of instability in Sino-Indian relations and, given the possibility of war arising out of this conflict, it would not be prudent for China to sacrifice its major subcontinental ally. Moreover, China has aspirations to be an Asian and ultimately a global power. To sacrifice Pakistan and concede South Asia as India's sphere of influence would constitute a devastating blow to those aspirations. A reunited subcontinent or a subcontinent under effective Indian domination would also pose a much greater threat to China. The reality of overwhelming Indian power may eventually compel China to accept this, but China will resist.*

* The author spent four months in 1990 in Beijing and Islamabad studying China's relations with South Asia under the auspices of the U.S. National Academy of Science's Committee on Scholarly Communications with the People's Republic of China and the American Institute of Pakistan Studies. He would also like to thank the University of Michigan's Center for Chinese Studies for a Library Travel grant.

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Book Reviews

Totalitarianism: The Inner History of the Cold War *by Abbott Gleason. New York, Oxford University Press, 1995. 307 pp. $25.00.*

The book under review belongs essentially to intellectual history. It does not offer a systematic and critical analysis of the theories of totalitarianism; neither does it contain an historical account of the emergence, disintegration, and disappearance of the totalitarian systems. It deals above all with the history of the concept; its different uses and abuses by politicians, political scientists, and publicists; and its crucial importance in ideological debates of the cold war period. The author looks at this subject from the vantage point provided by the end of cold war, which followed the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and, somewhat earlier, in East-Central Europe. This enables him to treat totalitarianism as a phenomenon of the past and, therefore, to assume that the controversies over totalitarianism have lost their direct political relevance.

The story Gleason tells is very rich and instructive. It includes an amazing variety of concepts: from the fascist view of totalitarianism as a positive overcoming of atomistic liberalism and the entire legacy of the Enlightenment (Mussolini) to the reversal of this view in the theories of the Frankfurt school, which saw totalitarianism as the consummation of liberalism and the final outcome of the instrumental reason of the Enlightenment (Theodore Adorno and Herbert Marcuse); from positive evaluations of the strength and activism of the totalitarian states to the view of the economic liberals for whom any increase of state interventionism in economy meant an inevitable sliding down towards totalitarian slavery (compare Herbert Hoover's view on the New Deal and, of course, Friedrich A. Von Hayek's *Road to Serfdom*). One of Gleason's original contributions to this fascinating story is his attempt to classify different approaches to the Soviet Union according to generational criteria and his careful reconstruction of the "inner history of the cold war" in the United States. His generational approach proves to be very fruitful in interpreting the well known controversy between the defenders of the classical totalitarian model, one of whom was the author's own father, and the younger revisionists, formed under the influence of the intellectual upheaval of the late 1960s.

The author tries to render justice to both sides of this important dispute. He explains the political, intellectual, and psychological reasons of the revisionist position, but unlike most revisionists, he does not distort or simplify the totalitarian model. He shows its usefulness as an ideal type and reveals a capacity for an empathic understanding of the militant anticommunism of many liberals of the 1950s. He seems to side with the critics of the totalitarian theory when he writes that the distinction between totalitarianism and traditional authoritarianism has

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become unclear and even morally compromised. At the end of the book, however, he explains the defeat of communist totalitarianism as meaningfully related to the loss of faith in revolutionary ways and to the general disillusionment in "modernist" eschatologies (p. 210). He develops this view by stating that the threat of totalitarianism has become replaced by another danger—the danger of fundamentalisms of all kinds, rekindling the traditional, religious, and ethnic exclusivities and hatreds. If so, it is logical to conclude that the distinction between future-oriented totalitarianism and traditional authoritarianism has not lost its practical relevance and theoretical importance.

The scope of the book is very wide: it covers not only the English-speaking world but also Western Europe, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Russia. The informative value of the relevant chapters is remarkable; the analysis of several classical books on totalitarianism is very convincing; but the presentation and explanation of the different generational experiences of totalitarianism in the European countries is rather disappointing. For instance, the book does not explain why the French intellectuals of the first decade after World War II were so profoundly influenced, often mesmerized, by Stalinist totalitarianism. The chapter on Russia is too brief and, therefore, can serve only as a first approach to the subject. The part devoted to Poland does not reveal sufficient awareness of the uses of the antitotalitarian rhetoric in the post-totalitarian political reality—both after and before the great change of 1989.

Despite these critical remarks, the value of Gleason's book is undeniable. It is a pioneering, lucid, and highly stimulating outline of a vast and important problem. It deserves to be recommended for graduate courses in political science and modern history.

ANDRZEJ WALICKI
University of Notre Dame

Diplomacy in the Former Soviet Republics *by James P. Nichol. Westport, CT, Praeger, 1995. 256 pp. $55.00.*

This book discusses the experience with diplomacy of the fifteen Soviet union republics before they became independent when the USSR broke up at the end of 1991. Attention is paid to their foreign relations between the Bolshevik revolution in 1917 and the coming to power of Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985, though there is not much that can be said about this. The main focus of the book is on diplomacy between 1985 and 1991, when the union republics greatly expanded their contacts with states outside the USSR.

The Gorbachev administration began to encourage the union republics to individually seek aid from and trade with other countries in 1987. But far from limiting themselves to this narrow agenda, the union republics pursued broader political objectives, including international recognition as independent states.

The fifteen republics did not pursue diplomacy in the same way. Those union republics that pursued their own policy most aggressively were those that had had the most experience with international relations in the pre-Gorbachev era. The three Baltic states—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—had actually been independent from the Bolshevik revolution until Stalin's forces occupied them in 1940, and so had a history of independent diplomacy to draw from. Unlike other union republics, they were assisted in their quest for international recognition by the fact that many Western states had never recognized their forcible incorporation into

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the USSR. Ukraine and Belarus also had some experience with diplomacy, since Stalin had arranged for them both to become members of the United Nations at the end of World War II. The Central Asian republics had had the least contact with other states before the breakup of the USSR.

Nichol examines how the union republics used their growing diplomatic ties successfully to undermine Moscow's control. He shows that while the major Western powers were not particularly receptive to their efforts, contacts with neighboring states as well as with one another expanded dramatically during the Gorbachev years. Particularly significant was the diplomacy of the Russian Federation after the relatively free elections there in 1990. The willingness of Russian President Boris Yeltsin to recognize the independence of the non-Russian republics was especially important in thwarting Soviet President Gorbachev's efforts to keep the union intact.

The book is not without flaws. The author notes that "the Soviet Union did not have diplomatic relations" in the 1970s with "Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Jordan, Tunisia, the Persian Gulf emirates, and North Yemen" (p. 18). This is not quite accurate; Moscow did have diplomatic relations with Morocco, Jordan, Tunisia, Kuwait, and North Yemen during this period.

In addition, a strange feature of the book is that while there is an individual section on the diplomacy of each of the other fourteen union republics, there is no such section on Uzbekistan. Nor is there any explanation for its omission. On the whole, however, this is a useful book for scholars and others who seek to understand the origins of the diplomacy of the Soviet Union's successor states.

MARK N. KATZ
George Mason University

The Korean War: An International History *by William Stueck. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1995. 484 pp. $35.00.*

The cold war started and ended in Europe, but its legacy lives on in Asia. Perhaps the greatest dangers to world peace stem from tensions in the Korean peninsula and the Peoples Republic of China's (PRC) commitment to reclaiming Taiwan. Here, as in many areas, the Korean War left its imprint. William Stueck has now given us the best treatment of the causes, course, and consequences of this conflict. It is a work more of synthesis than of new discoveries or arguments, but synthesis so insightful, complete, and intelligent that it has much to offer experts as well as those with a passing interest in our era. The major problem is an unavoidable consequence of the happy fact that a torrent of Soviet and Chinese documents have recently released: while Stueck made good use of those that were available when he wrote, some of his analysis will need to be revised in light of new information.

Stueck's truly is, as the subtitle promises, an international history. While not neglecting the interactions between the two camps, he pays great attention to the stresses within them and those imposed by domestic politics as well. In the short run, the war placed greater stress on the West, and in retrospect it is easy to overlook the American frustration with allied foot-dragging and the fear of the allies and neutrals that American adventurism would end in catastrophe. In the end, the West not only held together during the war, but successfully dealt with a host of crucial issues, especially concerning Germany, that threatened to destroy

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NATO. One comes away from this account with renewed admiration for the skill of American and European diplomats at dealing with their relations.

Less skill was displayed by American and communist diplomats in dealing with each other. Each side overreached: the North Koreans and Soviets in the initial attack, the Americans in crossing the 38th parallel and moving to the Yalu River, and the Chinese in the wake of their successful intervention. At various points in the war, one side or the other could have ended the war on more favorable terms than those finally agreed to. The explanation is not simple, but Stueck points to the importance of ideology on the communist side, fed by the earlier American failure in China, and domestic and bureaucratic politics on the American side. Stueck is also insightful on the interrelations between military and diplomatic events. In the days following the Inchon landing, the pace of military success was too fast to permit careful deliberation by the United States, extensive consultation with its allies, or diplomatic probings of the other side. Throughout the war, diplomacy was affected by the fortunes of war: each side was influenced by how well it was doing on the battlefield and what it could foresee in the future. Joseph Stalin was also strongly influenced by his perceptions of divisions within the Western camp.

The communist side made most of the concessions that permitted an armistice. In Stueck's view, changes in government on both sides played a large role here. While Stalin was softening his position before he died, it is unlikely that he would have moved as far as fast as his successors. The change in administration did not bring better terms, as the communists may have hoped, but intensified bombing and threats of more to come, which in Stueck's view convinced the USSR and PRC to accept the American ultimatum.

Throughout, Stueck provides reconstructions of the motives and calculations of the decision makers that are always plausible and usually convincing. If the communists were more driven by perceived opportunity and the West more by fear, elements of both were present in a changing mix that Stueck carefully delineates. Harry Truman does not cut a large figure in these pages. He usually accepted the views of his advisers, for better or for worse. The one exception—and it was a crucial one—was that Truman insisted that the communist prisoners of war not be returned against their wills, although of course it cannot be ascertained whether he would have done so had he realized that this stance, however moral, would prolong the war for two years and contribute to his party losing the presidency.

Readers will find places to quarrel: I think Stueck exaggerates the dangers of escalation in the aftermath of the Chinese intervention. But they will also find a number of puzzles unraveled and many questions worth pondering. It is a fine book.

ROBERT JERVIS
Columbia University

The FDR Years: On Roosevelt and His Legacy *by William E. Leuchtenburg. New York, Columbia University Press, 1995. 377 pp. $29.50.*

"Can't repeat the past?" says an incredulous Jay Gatsby in the quintessential novel of the 1920s. "Why of course you can!" For most of his distinguished career, William E. Leuchtenburg, William Rand Kenan, Jr. Professor of History at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, has done just that—repeat his formative years in the 1920s and 1930s through a judicious brand of revisionism that has worn well and inspired scores of graduate students.

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He has deepened our understanding of the 1920s and imbued that underappreciated decade with substance and significance. He has penetrated the complexities of Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal, explored their legacies, and illuminated the evolution of the modern presidency and the liberal state. Now, in a splendid collection of some of his best known (and a few lesser known) essays, William Leuchtenburg repeats his scholarly past and in many cases updates it. And almost puckishly, he does so through what might be called a *Festschrift* in reverse, dedicating his book to nearly one-hundred former students.

In the preface to the *The FDR Years*, Leuchtenburg confesses a life-long fascination with Franklin Roosevelt. He first heard the name in 1930 when he was seven but had no inkling that it "would accompany me all the rest of my days." Two years later he sat glued to his radio ("way past my usual bedtime"), tallying Roosevelt's victory at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago on a home-made scorecard. In the early days of the New Deal, he brought a National Recovery Administration Blue Eagle sticker home from school and in 1935 spent his savings on a bus ticket to Washington to see the New Deal in action. When he went off to Cornell, it was the National Youth Administration, one of the New Deal's "alphabet agencies," that helped him to pay his way.

Fascination with Roosevelt, even gratitude for the New Deal, have not bred an uncritical eye. Some of the essays—"The New Deal and the Analogue of War," "FDR and the Kingfish," "Roosevelt, Norris, and the 'Seven Little TVAs,' " "The Election of 1936"—will be familiar to scholars. Others—"Franklin D. Roosevelt: The First Modern President," "The Achievement of the New Deal"—may be less well known. At least two—"Hurricane Politics" and "The 'Europeanization' of America, 1929–1950"—are new to me, though they have appeared elsewhere in print. All are marked by the same fluency, incisiveness, and balance that have become the hallmarks of William Leuchtenburg's scholarship. In almost every case, he has freshened his arguments with new material, reexamining his work on regional planning, for example, in light of later state-centered theory. He remains, as ever, clear headed in his praise and unblinking in his criticism. Indeed, at one point, he ticks off a breathless list of faults he finds with the New Deal that runs well over a page in length (pp. 278–79).

For all the insights and freshness, the essays may strike some as old-fashioned in their focus on Roosevelt and his circle, on politics, and on public policy. Current scholarly fashions are leading historians elsewhere: inward toward microcosmic studies of New Deal agencies as well as outward toward the broader social and cultural changes of the 1930s. Leuchtenburg anticipated as much in a conversation with the historian John Garraty in 1972 (reprinted here as "The Great Depression and the New Deal"). In it, he drew a research agenda for coming decades that revolved around charting the various New Deal agencies and addressing the then-unanswered question of "How much social change actually took place [during the 1930s]?" (pp. 231–32).

What might not be up to the latest scholarly wrinkle is nonetheless valuable. *The FDR Years* distills a lifetime of careful study and seminal scholarship on Roosevelt and the New Deal into a single volume and represents some of the best work we have on those subjects. The scholarly pendulum has perhaps swung too far away from the study of politics and politicians. William Leuchtenburg's wise book reminds us of the importance of both in the "FDR years."

MICHAEL B. STOFF
University of Texas at Austin

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Securing the Covenant: United States-Israel Relations After the Cold War *by Bernard Reich. Westport, CT, Praeger, 1995. 171 pp. Cloth $55.00; paper $15.95.*

With the ending of the cold war following the collapse of the Soviet Union, questions have been raised in some quarters about the future of the Israeli–American relationship, because by the 1980s, much of the relationship had become based on an anti-Soviet strategic alliance. Bernard Reich, a professor of political science at George Washington University, argues that the U.S.–Israel relationship is far deeper than one based on transitory security concerns alone and is likely to endure well into the twenty-first century. After giving a brief overview of Israeli–American relations since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, Reich concentrates his analysis on three aspects of the relationship: the strategic, the political, and the economic. The chapter on U.S.–Israeli relations was written by economic analyst Howard Rosen of the Washington Competitive Policy Council. Although the United States had begun direct arms sales to Israel in 1962, when President John Kennedy sold Hawk anti-aircraft missiles, and U.S. weapons sales were stepped up in the 1970s, it was not until November 1981 that Israel and the United States signed a memorandum of understanding on strategic cooperation "designed against the threat to peace and security in the region caused by the Soviet Union or Soviet-controlled forces from outside the region introduced into the region" (p. 41). While the United States suspended the memorandum due to Israel's annexation of the Golan Heights one month later and despite conflict over the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and its consequences (the Sabra and Shatilla massacres by Christian Lebanese seeking revenge for the murder of their leader Bashr Gemayel), by October 1983 the Israeli–American relationship had improved to the point that President Ronald Reagan signed Security Directive 111, which both reinstated the concept of strategic collaboration and opened the way for discussion on joint military exercises, the stockpiling of U.S. military equipment, the sharing of intelligence data, and the use of Israeli ports by the U.S. Sixth Fleet.

To be sure, there were problems in the U.S.–Israeli security relationship even before the fall of the Soviet Union. In the spring of 1970 Israel complained it did not receive sufficient arms to counter the Soviet pilots and planes pouring into Egypt to help Gamal Abdel Nasser fight the war of attrition, and in the mid-1980s the Jonathan Pollard affair soured intelligence cooperation. The major security problem for Israel in recent years has been the sale of sophisticated U.S. weapons to its Gulf Arab allies such as Saudi Arabia, which Israel fears might one day be used against it. Nonetheless, the continued U.S. efforts to establish a comprehensive Arab–Israeli peace agreement may mitigate these dangers to Israel.

It is political, not strategic relations that lie at the heart of the Israeli–American relationship, argues Reich, and in this I fully agree. Reich analyzes the political strength of the American Jewish community in depth, noting that in 1992 nine states with significant Jewish populations (California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania) held 202 of the 270 electoral votes needed for victory. Although Jews are only about 2.4 percent of the American population, their voting percentage is much higher than the U.S. average of 50 percent and this has a significant impact. While American Jews have increasingly distinguished between a general concern for Israel and support for a particular Israeli government's policy, they do provide a bedrock of support for Israel and are an important part of the pro-Israeli lobby, which Reich analyzes in great detail. Other elements of support for Israel include the U.S. Congress, which regularly votes $3 billion in economic and military aid to the Jewish state, and the American public at large, which sees Israel as a fellow democracy with shared values of the Judeo-Christian heritage.

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In sum, for anyone looking for a quick, yet thorough primer on Israeli–American relations, this is the book to turn to.

ROBERT O. FREEDMAN
Baltimore Hebrew University

The Disenchanted Isle: Mrs. Thatcher's Capitalist Revolution *by Charles Dellheim. New York, W. W. Norton, 1995. 416 pp. $25.00.*

Writing about events already familiar to close observers of British politics, Charles Dellheim provides a broader readership an interesting, well informed, and sophisticated interpretation of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's intentions and accomplishments. He makes good use of the revealing memoirs by Thatcher's colleagues and opponents along with her own memoirs, and he also draws on relevant novels and plays to illustrate the cultural context in which Thatcherism was perceived. Moreover, the author interviewed many high-level politicians, but not apparently Thatcher herself, as well as journalists, business figures, and academics. Altogether, his familiarity with British life, not just British politics, is impressive.

A history teacher at Arizona State University, Dellheim adopts a critical position that is neither wholly favorable nor unfavorable to Thatcher's program. For him, Thatcherism is an only partially successful effort to revitalize capitalism in a society whose intellectual and social leaders had often rejected it, not merely for the socialism enacted after World War II but from a long-standing preference for gentlemanly pursuits outside of trade and industry. Here, Dellheim appears to sympathize with Thatcher's attempt to restore Victorian capitalist vigor. So too he seems to agree that Britain could not afford all of the welfare measures of the post-1945 era or all of the consequences of unregulated trade-union power. At the same time, however, he dislikes what he sees as Thatcherite neglect of the poor and disadvantaged who do not make it in a capitalist society.

The book is not strictly chronological in its organization. It begins with the story of Thatcher's fall from power in 1990, and then devotes two chapters to the Labour and consensual Conservative years between 1945 and 1979. A flashback chapter describes the anticapitalist tradition of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Thatcher's own different background is discussed, with only a little of the psychologizing that tends to appear in discussions of her family, before the book moves to her governments of 1979–1990. The policies of these governments are analyzed selectively rather than systematically or in detail, but their general thrust is made plain. Interspersed are highly readable personality sketches of several of Thatcher's colleagues. They enhance Dellheim's account of the projected capitalist revolution "to undo socialism, contain the Welfare State, domesticate the trade unions, privatize nationalized industry, institute supply-side economics, enliven the free market, and stoke the entrepreneurial spirit" (p. 41). The last of these goals commands the author's attention, for it most directly concerns the cultural issue that he considers paramount. His emphasis is on the Thatcherite challenge to the gentlemanly disdain for industry that he finds deeply entrenched in British life, notably in universities, and recently fortified by a large new class of post-1945 intellectuals often benefiting from the kind of government support that Thatcher wanted to curtail. Dellheim is critical of the values of this new class, using the phrase "contemptuous consumption" (p. 310) to refer to the enjoyment of bourgeois styles

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by those professing socialism. In the end, however, he doubts that the capitalist revolution triumphed over those values despite its particular policy victories.

LEON D. EPSTEIN
University of Wisconsin–Madison

Satellites and Commissars: Strategy and Conflict in the Politics of Soviet-Bloc Trade *by Randall W. Stone. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1996. 283 pp. $39.50.*

The central puzzle in this provocative and thoroughly researched book is why the Soviet Union, an overwhelmingly powerful hegemon within the Eastern bloc, was unwilling or unable to use its considerable economic and military leverage over its satellites to achieve some of its core foreign policy objectives in the region. Randall Stone investigates sequentially two related issues: first, the persistence of a pattern of bilateral trade within the bloc, which disproportionally favored the satellite states over the core; and second, the Soviet Union's repeated failure to translate the economic leverage its patronage should have generated into success on a political/economic issue of (purportedly) great importance to Moscow, that of socialist economic integration. Borrowing from the principal-agent branch of the new institutional economics literature, Stone argues that both of these conspicuous failures can be understood as the product of a defective bargaining strategy in commercial negotiations, compounded by a perverse domestic incentive structure that impeded rational pursuit of the national interest.

The first critical issue for Stone, and the one that has attracted the most scholarly attention, is that of Soviet implicit trade subsidies to Eastern Europe. The subsidies resulted from the sale of Soviet raw materials at lower-than-world-market prices in exchange for poor-quality East European manufactured goods sold at higher-than-world-market prices. The power-politics explanation for the subsidies views this as the economic price Moscow paid in exchange for political, ideological, and military compliance from the Warsaw Pact allies, but Stone marshals impressive statistical and case-study evidence to challenge the viability of this argument. One of the central arguments of the book is that the fragmented Soviet bureaucracy prevented the effective linkage of economic and political issues. Therefore, the only interpretation of the subsidies that fits his analysis of the data is that the East European countries bargained more effectively to receive steady supplies of comparatively cheap raw materials. Due to imperfect information about relative prices and product quality, the Soviets bargained ineffectively; once the problem was identified, the incoherence of Soviet economic institutions made it difficult to redress these inequalities through concerted action.

The power-politics position groans under the weight of Stone's sophisticated technique. Still, two problems could be raised with the alternative principal-agent explanation advanced in the book, which might have benefited from a similar degree of attention to methodological rigor. First, Eastern Europe's success in resisting Soviet policy initiatives suggests that there is more variation in bargaining behavior among countries who share identical institutional structures than one might expect from the model. Stone maintains that the trade subsidy itself explains why the East Europeans faced fewer bargaining obstacles in commercial negotiations: they could rely on inertia to maintain steady flows of subsidized commodities, while the Soviets had to "raise the quality-level of East European exports, which involved solving intricate technical and managerial problems," (p. 21).

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This no doubt provides part of the explanation, but there is variation in Soviet behavior that Stone does not adequately account for. As the loser in trade, Moscow was highly motivated to break out of this pattern by introducing a range of compensatory measures that sought to curtail the implicit subsidies, not by reducing quality discounts (which were the smaller component of the subsidy), but by changing the commodity composition of trade and reforming the price rule that prevented the Soviets from capitalizing on changes in relative scarcities on world markets. In the 1970s, both of these measures were carried out unilaterally and to great effect (subsidies thereafter were well-contained and ballooned only temporarily as a result of the 1979 oil shock), suggesting that the technical and managerial obstacles to stemming the flow of subsidies to the periphery were hardly insurmountable.

The second problem with the book's principal-agent analysis regards the immutability of socialist institutions: if the Soviet Union's bargaining problems stemmed from institutional inefficiencies, what was preventing Soviet officials from altering those institutions? Here, Stone argues that Russian decision makers faced weak incentives to do so, because they were unaware of the extent of opportunity costs in Soviet-East European trade. The leadership, therefore, underestimated the potential benefits of institutional reform. But this makes it hard to understand why they would embark on the course of economic integration, which was a costly and complex process designed ultimately to eliminate inefficiencies and, more importantly, subsidies. If, as the book maintains, integration was a "primary foreign policy objective of the Soviet leadership" (p. 3), then it stands to reason that some fairly powerful incentives must have been motivating it; if it was somehow less than primary, then its failure could be a result of a general lack of commitment necessary to see it through.

Part three of the book examines four successive but ultimately failed efforts at socialist integration spearheaded by Moscow. There is much to be learned from Stone's comprehensive reconstruction of the bargaining process based on exhaustive archival research and interviews with participants in the negotiations. However, the historical narrative in these chapters could have been tied closer to the theoretical model to get a better sense for how the independent variables are doing their work. What the case-studies sometimes show is not that traditional principal-agent problems of moral hazard and adverse selection constrained Soviet bargaining, but rather that agreements successfully reached were poorly implemented.

Notwithstanding these criticisms, Stone's book is a major achievement in the field of Soviet studies. It is an original, carefully documented, and theoretically valuable contribution to the field. Moreover, this book effectively crosses disciplines of comparative political economy and international relations, making it essential reading both for theorists concerned with the process of integration and for students of Soviet-East European relations.

ALAN ROUSSO
Cornell University

The Clash With Distant Cultures: Values, Interests, and Force in American Foreign Policy *by Richard J. Payne. Albany, State University of New York Press, 1995. 285 pp. $24.50.*

In this work, Richard J. Payne attempts to demonstrate how culture operates in foreign affairs. He is not content to discuss culture as a mere supplement to traditional foreign relations theory and its realistic emphasis on so-called objective factors. Domestic constraints

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are more important than the international environment, he argues, and these domestic factors are largely functions of culture.

Central to Payne's thesis is his notion of "cultural distance." The more distant and seemingly alien the culture, the greater the tendency to employ force. The likelihood of enmity and violence diminishes if two nations happen to share a cultural "reservoir." As Payne suggests, "U.S. generosity toward and understanding of Europeans are sometimes matched by its hostility toward non-Europeans" (p. 32).

Payne's cultural argument is fleshed out in three case studies. In the 1991 war against Iraq, culturally rooted characteristics—stereotyped perceptions of Arabs, the tendency to equate Hussein with Hitler, an impatience with negotiation, and a corresponding propensity to violent solutions—drove the United States to a military solution. In the Arab-Israeli conflict, Payne argues that "to a much greater extent than security concerns, emotional and cultural bonds have played a pivotal role in the formulation and implementation of America's policy" (p. 135). In the Balkans, America's willingness to tolerate Serbian ethnic cleansing was the product of "America's cultural tendency to avoid using force on behalf of victims from a distant culture when no clear interests are at stake" (p. 182).

While cultural distance is in some instances a useful idea, Payne's approach generates many problems. To start with, culture is not necessarily opposed to realism. It could just as well be argued that culture is perfectly consonant with realism in explaining why clashes of interest exist in the first place. Payne's definition of culture is also so vague as to impair its analytical usefulness. Cultures are not monolithic entities, he argues, and within each, one can find opposing tendencies. But this formulation makes it difficult to understand why now one element, then another, comes to the fore. By positing the existence of internal cultural contradictions, one can explain any action in cultural terms.

There are numerous inconsistencies and arguable points in Payne's case studies. Does the United States favor Europe? Yes, but there are important anti-European elements in the history of U.S. diplomacy. How does culture explain American policy in Asia, say in Vietnam or the commitment to Taiwan? Or does ideology offer a better explanation? Does an internal culture of violence spawn external violence? Post-cold war neoisolationism would seem to suggest otherwise. Were Saddam Hussein's Arab neighbors also guilty of cultural myopia? America's alleged lack of sympathy for the Bosnian Muslims appears to have been overtaken by events. After this book's publication, American policy took a tough anti-Serb line by committing American troops to enforce a peace accord arrived at only as a result of aggressive American mediation. America aside, one wonders how "cultural distance" helps to explain the animosities between Tutsis and Hutus or the Bosnian Muslims and Serbs, peoples whose cultures are extraordinarily alike in most ways.

These kinds of objections only begin to suggest the multitude of questions that arise in a reading of this work. Even those who, like this reviewer, are sympathetic to Payne's main thesis about the limitations of realism are likely to find his argument suggestive but far from conclusive. The problem with culture, as always, is to successfully operationalize the concept rather than to use it as an explanation of last resort for problems that do not fit the realist mold.

FRANK NINKOVICH
St. John's University

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Paths of Emancipation: Jews, States, and Citizenship *edited by Pierre Birnbaum and Ira Katznelson. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1995. 308 pp. Cloth, $55.00; paper, $16.95.*

This superb collection of essays attempts to analyze and compare the ways in which legal, political, social, and economic emancipation reached Jews in the Netherlands, Germany, France, England, the United States, Italy, Turkey, and Russia. To fit the paradigm of comparative history, the contributing scholars addressed the same set of questions. Why did Jewish emancipation come from the outside (as, for example, when Napoleon's armies brought it to Germany)? Why did it develop within a society (as was the case in Italy)? Why did it happen quickly, as in revolutionary France, but endure a long, drawn-out process in England? How was the relationship of the Jews to the state affected by emancipation? Was Jewish emancipation intertwined with a larger, national aspiration, or was it the result of a liberal political climate that was hospitable to minorities? How did non-Jewish populations react to the new situation, especially given the longstanding Jewish prevalence in certain economic spheres? Where and why was Jewish emancipation rolled back after an earlier conferral? Last, and of special concern to chroniclers of twentieth-century Jewry, how did these various emancipations alter the unity and religious traditions of the Jewish communities affected, and how did the newly-enfranchised Jews perceive the rise of a Jewish national movement: Zionism?

The editors' lengthy opening essay sets the stage for the ensuing country-by-country scenarios. Hans Daalder notes a prevailing Dutch-Jewish provincialism before the 1796 emancipation, as well as a declining influence of rabbinical leadership afterward. Werner E. Mosse deals with a Jewish entity that was divided into many different German-speaking jurisdictions and underwent, over a ninety-year period (1781–1871), a process of piecemeal emancipation until the creation of the German empire. Pierre Birnbaum discusses the divergent strategies pursued by the Sephardic and Ashkenazic communities in France and demonstrates throughout his coverage of the Third Republic how so many French Jews served in prominent government and military positions without having, or feeling it necessary, to cut their communal ties to Jews in France or elsewhere. Geoffrey Alderman's useful essay clarifies the "bankruptcy" of an Anglo-Jewish social policy that hoped emancipation constituted the end of Jewish distinctiveness.

Since the United States never contained an organized, institutionalized anti-Semitism, why, one might ask, include a chapter on American Jewish emancipation? Ira Katznelson demonstrates convincingly that foreign-born American Jews were still greatly influenced in their communal and interfaith activities by the European experience, and only later generations felt secure enough to achieve a full measure of social emancipation. Dan V. Segre's contribution proves how Italy's small Jewish population, for all the similarities between its path of emancipation and those of other European Jews, built up a group consciousness and security that resulted in different consequences, especially regarding the resistance to Nazism and the embrace of political Zionism. Aron Rodrigue deals brilliantly with the Jews of Ottoman and republican Turkey, revealing how civic equality was not followed by the typical pattern for emancipated Jews elsewhere—state-supported secular schools aimed at integrating Jews into the "host" population. Michael Stanislawski surveys the largest Jewish community of the nineteenth century, that of Tsarist Russia, a group that never experienced full legal emancipation until the communist takeover but would nonetheless suffer continued indignities for much of the twentieth century.

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In unusually stimulating and provocative chapters, buttressed by erudite historical and histographical writing, the editors have rendered a valuable service to scholars of modern Western history, in general, and of modern Jewish history, in particular.

Irving Katz
Indiana University

Currency and Coercion: The Political Economy of International Monetary Power *by Jonathan Kirshner. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1995. 289 pp. $39.50.*

This is a striking ambitious work—an attempt to develop nothing less than a full fledged theory of international monetary power (defined as state use of currency relations as an instrument of coercive power). In the author's words: "This book makes bold claims to originality and innovation" (p. xiii). Its aim is "to establish a general framework regarding the nature of monetary power, how it works, and when it will be successful" (p. 20).

Divided, like Gaul, into three parts, the work starts with two chapters devoted to an initial exposition of the nature and characteristics of monetary power, distinguishing three separate forms—currency manipulation, monetary dependence, and systemic disruption ("The Theory of Monetary Power"). It continues with three chapters of detailed historical analysis, encompassing some dozen and a half separate cases, to establish the actual existence of each form of monetary power ("The Practice of Monetary Power"); and concludes with two chapters of observations on various matters relating to the use and effectiveness of monetary power ("The Potential of Monetary Power"). Not surprisingly, Kirshner concludes that use of monetary power is both viable in practice and likely to be of increasing importance in the future.

In many respects, the book lives up to the author's ambitions. Clearly written and coherently organized, it provides a useful taxonomy of the various ways in which states can use their currency relationships to promote noneconomic objectives. It also offers a wealth of historical information and a broad range of stimulating policy insights that should be of interest to even the most seasoned students of international monetary affairs.

In other respects, however, the author's reach regretably exceeds his grasp. Two deficiencies, in particular, may be stressed. Fist, despite Kirshner's "bold claims," his purported theory is really not much more than a handy system of classification—three forms of power, each divided into several subcategories with cleverly alliterative titles. Currency manipulation, for instance, may be protective, permissive, predatory, or passive. Monetary dependence may be exploited through enforcement, expulsion, extraction, or entrapment. Systemic disruption may be strategic or subversive. What is missing is an integrated and well specified set of behavioral propositions to explain when, how, and why monetary power will be used in various circumstances. Many lessons are enumerated in the course of summarizing historical episodes, but most are situation-specific and do not add up to persuasive "out-of-sample" generalizations. Different potential explanatory variables are emphasized in separate contexts, making direct comparisons difficult. And no connections are drawn with other relevant bodies of theory from the international relations or international political economy literature, leaving us with little more than a set of colorfully labeled but substantively empty analytical boxes.

Second, for all the book's wealth of empirical detail, one may legitimately question the contemporary relevance of the sample of historical cases selected for investigation. Fully

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half the episodes date from before World War II, and only one – involving Panama's obviously atypical dependence on the U.S. dollar – has taken place since the demise of the Bretton Woods system in 1971. Does this approach really establish the existence of each form of monetary power, as Kirshner claims? Or is it possible that these old stories obscure more than they reveal about the dynamics of monetary relations in present circumstances? Over the last quarter century, monetary relations have been transformed beyond recognition by the globalization of financial markets. Today, private actors are at least as influential as are national governments as agents of currency manipulation or systemic disruption. Yet their role, though implicit in several of the individual cases, is never seriously analyzed in this book, which remains stubbornly state-centric in orientation. In the end, there seems something quaintly old fashioned about a study of international monetary power that treats financial markets largely as an afterthought.

BENJAMIN J. COHEN
University of California, Santa Barbara

Congress, The Press, and the Public *edited by Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein. Washington, DC, American Enterprise Institute and The Brookings Institution, 1994. 212 pp. Cloth, $36.95; paper, $16.95.*

American Enterprise Institute's Renewing Congress Project brought together scholars and journalists to discuss the role the media play in the public's disapproval of Congress. The book resulting from this conference contains chapters with interesting points and recommendations, which unfortunately assume answers to the big questions driving the inquiry. Sometimes findings in one chapter contradict points made in another. For example, if media coverage influences public opinion, why don't the changes in public opinion over time (presented on pages 46–47) roughly correspond to changes noted in media coverage (in Chapters 4 and 5)? Overall, the book fails to examine the connections and relationships between Congress, the press, and the public by exploring questions like: To what extent are public attitudes influenced by media coverage? To what extent do negative news stories accurately reflect the institution? How does low public support hinder the functioning of the institution?

Public opinion toward the institution and its members is examined in "Popular Support for Congress and Its Members" by Herb Asher and Mike Barr and "Public Opinion towards Congress: A Historical Look" by Karlyn Bowman and Everett Carll Ladd. Asher and Barr examine variables that influence support for Congress and for its members. Generally, they reaffirm what is already known: we like representatives and dislike Congress, and we prefer incumbents to challengers. Bowman and Ladd look at an interesting array of questions that measure public attitudes without explaining inconsistencies in the responses (for example, Table 3-2 seems to contradict Figures 3-2 and 3-3). Giving attention to nonattitudes, measurement problems, and what might be causing yearly volatility would be instructive.

"Press Coverage of Congress, 1946–92" by Mark J. Rozell and "Less News is Worse News: Television News Coverage of Congress, 1972–1992" by S. Robert Lichter and Daniel R. Amundson look at the content of congressional media coverage. The Rozell piece is long, detailed, descriptive, and ultimately unsatisfying, because the content analysis of magazine weeklies and prestige newspapers "during 10 important periods since World War II" (p. 59) is unsystematic and unrepresentative. The chapter's usefulness will be in directing scholarship

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toward testing the validity and generalizability of observations like: "Congress received the most favorable coverage when it aggressively asserted its policymaking and investigatory powers" (p. 112).

Television news coverage of Congress was examined by coding index entries for the month of April from 1972 to 1992 and videos of this coverage in 1972, 1982, and 1992. This analysis by Lichter and Amundson revealed a gradual decrease in congressional news, an increased focus on scandal, and an intensification of the negative/conflictual tone. The causes of these changes are left to speculation in part because of the lack of continuous data points and no independent measures of "reality."

"The Decline and Fall of Congressional News" by Stephen Hess and "How the Press Views Congress" by Kimberly Coursen Parker use elite interviews to look at attitudes of media employees. Hess shows how these attitudes, compounded by changes in the structure and technology of news organizations, have influenced congressional coverage. Parker demonstrates that radio talk shows hosts are the media representatives most hostile toward the institution. Whether or not this hostility is the cause or the effect of the public's attitudes should be explored.

The Introduction by the editors and the final chapter, "Brighter Lights, Wider Windows: Presenting Congress in the 1990s" by Ronald D. Elving offer specific recommendations for improving Congress's image. Whether these suggestions can improve public relations and the success of the institution and whether or not representatives (or reporters) will institute reforms that might be seen as incompatible with their personal self-interests is unclear.

STEPHANIE GRECO LARSON
Dickinson College

CA$H CLOUT: Political Money in Illinois Legislative Elections *by Kent D. Redfield. Springfield, Institute of Public Affairs, University of Illinois, 1995. 228 pp. Paper, $25.00.*

"Follow the money" is a basic rule in understanding patterns of political influence in American politics. That is the goal of Kent Redfield in this study of the sources and uses of campaign funds in the 1990 and 1992 Illinois state legislative election cycles. Using a data base laboriously assembled from campaign finance reports filed with the Illinois State Board of Elections, the research answers four questions. Who contributes? How much is contributed? What strategies are used by those who contribute? How is campaign money spent? The focus is on the sixty-five largest interest group and corporation contributors to legislative election campaigns, the Democratic and Republican House and Senate legislative party caucuses, the four legislative leaders' political committees, and the state's two major political parties.

Although focusing on the early 1990s, changes in campaign finance between the 1970s and the early 1990s are examined. State legislative campaign finance in the early 1990s is dominated by legislative leadership decisions, with the two parties' legislative leaders targeting electoral contests and channeling funds and in-kind assistance in both primary and general election races. The leaders recruit candidates for open seats and as challengers to opposition party incumbents and play a significant role in organizing and guiding the candidates' campaigns in targeted contests. Leaders use their political action committee (PAC) funds to influence primary election outcomes. They also dominate allocation decisions by their party's

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legislative caucus PACs, targeting selected general election contests. The greater the integration between leadership and legislative party caucus PACs, the greater the potential for electoral success in targeted contests. Legislative leaders target expenditures toward a small set of districts whose outcomes would determine legislative chamber control. The author's research indicates that district lines drawn to favor one party can be offset by the opposition through recruiting a good candidate, employing a smart campaign strategy, and expending sufficient money to run a competitive campaign.

Redfield also explores the impact of interest group PACs on legislative election outcomes, focusing on the sixty-five largest donors among interest groups and corporations. Examined are the types of interest groups and corporations active, the impact of statewide contests on the amounts given and strategies pursued, partisan v. bipartisan contribution patterns, and the timing of interest group contributions.

Examining the state party organizations' activities in funding legislative campaigns, their role is limited, as they focus on statewide races when the gubernatorial and other state offices elections are held. In the election cycles studied, the Democratic state party organization had a substantial advantage in fund raising, although business interests were the largest contributors to both state party organizations. Political sources (candidates, legislative leader PACs, and local and national party organizations) ranked second in total contributions to the state party organizations. However, these were often payments for goods and services provided or pass-through payments designed to conceal the origins or amounts of funds from a particular contributor to a state legislative candidate.

Redfield's examination of two election cycles suggests that state legislative outcomes can be significantly impacted by legislative leaders' influence over the campaign fund raising and allocation process. He concludes that "What makes recent legislative elections different is that legislative leaders now have sufficient resources to develop and execute comprehensive strategies that encompass the entire election for the house or senate" (p. 127).

This study is descriptive of the Illinois legislative election funding process over two electoral cycles. From it the reader can infer a number of hypotheses about state legislative campaign finance and its influence on the policy process. These could and should be tested in other state legislative settings.

M. Margaret Conway
University of Florida

Facing Up to the American Dream: Race, Class, and the Soul of the Nation *by Jennifer L. Hochschild. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1995. 412 pp. $29.95.*

Among the most dramatic illustrations of the present state of race relations in the United States was the difference between African-Americans and whites in their immediate responses to the verdict in the O. J. Simpson trial. In this important book, Jennifer Hochschild builds upon the concerns with the nature and meaning of inequality in America that have consistently informed her work to probe racial and class differences in orientation toward the invidualistic promise of the American dream. Bringing together a breathtaking amount of material from multiple disciplines, Hochschild's analysis helps us to understand why blacks and whites in America so often seem to be talking past one another.

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Serving as background to Hochschild's enterprise are, first, an exposition of the components of the ideology of the American dream and, second, a review of empirical data that show a mixed picture as to whether African-Americans are better off now than they were a generation ago. Especially noteworthy are data showing that the trend toward greater economic inequality widely noted for all Americans is even more pronounced among African-Americans.

Hochschild has assembled a remarkable array of information from which she discerns patterns of belief in the American dream—supplementing data from surveys with insights gleaned from political philosophy, diaries, letters, magazines and newspapers, even advertisements. Without ever losing sight of other fault lines of social inequality—especially class, but also gender—she documents important differences between the races. Although Americans almost universally subscribe to the tenets of the American dream, blacks are less convinced than whites that its promise applies to all regardless of race and that over recent decades opportunities have been equalized. Moreover, in an irony that Hochschild describes as "succeeding more and enjoying it less," middle-class blacks, who live by its dictates and have achieved some of its promise, are increasingly skeptical about the American dream. In contrast, the African-American poor, whose lives do not conform to its promises, continue to believe in the American dream at rates nearly comparable to thirty years ago. She considers entire configurations of beliefs to be a potential threat to the cultural glue that unites us as a nation.

An especially interesting chapter compares the experiences of blacks with that of white immigrants earlier in the century. Hochschild demonstrates that a key to the perpetuation of belief in the American dream has been that those who achieve upward mobility become committed both to the ideology and to the nation that embodies it. She concludes with the insoluble puzzle about the extent to which it is possible to draw analogies between the experiences between Europeans who came by choice within the past century and Africans who arrived in shackles hundreds of years ago. Presumably, the history, still in process, of today's immigrants—the overwhelming share of whom are not white and some of whom are black—will shed light on this question.

My only criticism is that for a book that is exceedingly well written, this volume is not an easy read. A great virtue of the analysis is its great complexity, Hochschild's willingness to explore each nuance of the argument. However, there is so much going on that it is sometimes difficult to follow. Even substituting old-fashioned footnote style would have given the reader a break. The analysis rests fundamentally on the sheer variety of sources that have been consulted and brought into Hochschild's purview. Alas, seeking full references to this rich lode of material, much of which was unfamiliar to me, was a challenge to my manual dexterity. Nevertheless, this is a mere quibble about a book with something very significant to say about a critical issue in American politics.

KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN
Boston College

Turning Back: The Retreat From Racial Justice in American Thought and Policy *by Stephen Steinberg. Boston, Beacon Press, 1995. 276 pp. $25.00.*

Stephen Steinberg sets for himself the task of "develop[ing] a critique of 'the scholarship of backlash,'" exposing the defense of the "racial status quo" in "American thought and policy"

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(p. x). However, Steinberg is not especially concerned about unabashed conservative opponents of racial liberalism, such as Charles Murray and Thomas Sowell, and does not pay close enough attention to practical politics to correctly identify the presidential aspirants in the 1988 elections. His animus and attention is primarily directed against academic liberals and social democrats who, he claims, have given aid and comfort to the forces of racial reaction. While Steinberg discusses other matters in *Turning Back*, it is his critique of the left that is likely to generate the most controversy: accordingly, I will restrict myself to this aspect of his argument.

Steinberg flays Myrdal's *American Dilemma* for whitewashing the significance of racial stratification in American society by describing the condition of blacks as a "dilemma." The dilemma approach makes white America the object of attention, giving the impression that the pain that whites have inflicted upon themselves is the most objectionable feature of racial oppression. Such a circuitous route to rectitude strikes Steinberg as immoral, since it directs action away from "directly combating racism and making restitution for past wrongs" (p. 43).

This is only the first of many examples of political naivete on Steinberg's part. Later in the book he quotes Malcolm X's demand that white Americans beg on their knees to black Americans for their forgiveness. As it turns out, this is the only form of political action that Steinberg will accept, which is why a defense of affirmative action is so central to this study. Only policies that openly involve preference for blacks to the exclusion of whites and that thereby symbolically represent white collective guilt pass Steinberg's stringent standards.

Why should we expect that white Americans would ever accept this symbolism, or that such demands are a reasonable way to advance the interests of blacks? Steinberg misses out on what is most significant in Myrdal, which is his appeal to the pride of white Americans. Like Frederick Douglass, Myrdal asked whites to do justice by blacks not out of guilt, shame, or love, but out of pride in their own ideals. He saw in the American creed a reason why a dominant population would want to reverse a pattern of exclusion.

Steinberg is especially critical of both Daniel Patrick Moynihan and William Julius Wilson for their unwillingness to propose a direct attack on white racism, and their preference for race-neutral approaches to improving the condition of blacks. He argues that the race-neutral school "accepts white racism as a given, or, at best, a political impediment to be circumvented" (p. 117). This is simplistic. What Moynihan and Wilson share is a conviction that tensions between groups, especially racial groups, are heightened under zero-sum distributional conditions, such as slack labor markets. Where groups are pitted against one another for scarce resources, appeals to racial chauvinism become plausible, and it is easy to exclude racially unpopular groups. Steinberg implicitly accepts the second part of this argument in his discussion of immigration where he argues that the mass influx of workers from other nations stunted black economic mobility. As in his critique of Myrdal, Steinberg dismisses politically plausible motivations for policies that would improve the status of black Americans, preferring radical sloganeering and doctrinal purity.

Perhaps the most noxious part of this study is Steinberg's attack on Cornel West. Through his discussion of nihilism, the loss of spiritual meaning, and the collapse of respect for oneself and others, West succeeds in "shifting the focus of blame [for their condition] onto the black community," (p. 130). Here Steinberg's intellectual dishonesty and ethical blindness come into sharpest focus. West is very clear as to the responsibilities of the larger community, and he in no way attempts to play down his social democratic support for large-scale economic reorganization and affirmative action, despite Steinberg's preposterous arguments to the contrary. What West *does* stand for, and what Steinberg is unwilling to accept, is that despite

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their oppression, black Americans retain spiritual and moral agency. Despite their incapacity to change the ultimate cause of their social condition, they do retain the capacity for ethical choice. Black Americans can work to "turn" souls against drugs, crime, anti-Semitism, and sexism, or they can choose to submit to these evils. This dual set of obligations—some individual, some social—is the core of all reasonable ethical discourse, but is entirely absent from Steinberg's thought.

If *Turning Back* serves any purpose, it is to remind responsible liberals and social democrats that even in an age of conservative ascendancy they retain enemies on the left.

STEVEN MICHAEL TELES
Harvard University

Turning Right in the Sixties: The Conservative Capture of the GOP *by Mary C. Brennan. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1995. 210 pp. $29.95.*

A bookshelf for academic studies of the Republican party will have plenty of leftover space. For a long time, anyone curious about the party of Barry Goldwater, Richard Nixon, and Ronald Reagan had to rely mainly on news clippings and mass-market books. Recent years, however, have brought some signs of scholarly interest in the field. Works by Philip Klinkner, Sidney Milkis, Nicol Rae, and A. James Reichley have deepened our understanding of the Republican party's structure and development, and offered new insights into its differences from the Democratic party. Mary C. Brennan's account of the rise of national GOP's conservative wing makes a welcome and worthy addition to the literature.

Based on extensive archival research, *Turning Right in the Sixties* tells how conservative activists carried out the intricate organizational tasks that enabled Barry Goldwater to win the Republican presidential nomination in 1964. When Goldwater hit the mat in November, many people thought that his campaign represented a mass political suicide; but as Brennan explains, the effort actually helped launch a national conservative network that would gain both in power and political sophistication.

This compact book offers a wealth of detail, and its sixty pages of endnotes and bibliographical references will prove a valuable resource for scholars conducting research on the GOP. In addition to filling out the narrative history of the time, the book also seeks to show how "[t]he power shift within the GOP mirrored the vast changes taking place in American society" (p. 82). On this score, the book could have benefitted from some additional analysis. Violent crime more than doubled during the 1960s, throwing a grim shadow on everyday life and recasting the national political agenda. The issue's increased prominence strengthened the conservative cause, leading to the now-familiar joke that "a conservative is a liberal who's been mugged." *Turning Right in the Sixties*, however, gives only cursory attention to crime. With this and other issues, it might have probed more deeply into the works of policy intellectuals (for example, Edward Banfield) who were starting to influence the Republican mind.

The book's subtitle reaches farther than its content. Although this study ably shows how conservative activists gained an upper hand in GOP presidential nomination contests, it scarcely mentions other levels of Republican politics, where the rise of the right took a longer and more fitful course. As late as 1969, moderate liberal Hugh Scott (Pennsylvania) could

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defeat moderate conservative Howard Baker (Tennessee) for the leadership of the Senate Republicans. In a number of statehouses, Rockefeller Republicanism fought a spirited rear-guard action throughout much of the 1970s.

Even the Nixon administration strayed from the conservative line, with affirmative action and wage-price controls, as well as proposals for national health insurance and a guaranteed income. While acknowledging such departures, Brennan says that "Nixon advanced the cause of conservatism" (p. 134) by governing well to the right of the Democratic position and laying the basis for Republican gains in the South. Many conservatives would disagree, arguing that their resurgence in the late 1970s owed less to Nixon's handiwork than to a revolt against the very policies that he and Gerald Ford pursued.

Scholars should look into such issues as they venture onto the largely untilled field of Republican studies. *Turning Right in the Sixties* will supply them with a useful point of departure.

JOHN J. PITNEY, JR.
Claremont McKenna College

Five Years After: The Long-Term Effects of Welfare to Work Programs *by Daniel Friedlander and Gary Burtless. New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 1994. 256 pp. $34.95.*

This is a report of an experimental versus control research project, conducted by the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation (MDRC) in Arkansas, Virginia, Baltimore, and San Diego, to determine the welfare-to-work program policies most likely to have a long-term effect on reducing welfare dependency. Arkansas and Virginia were low-cost, job-search first programs, while the programs in Baltimore and San Diego also provided moderately expensive education and training services. Experimental group participants were required to participate in special education and training programs, while control group members were not, although they were free to find and use alternative services in their communities.

MDRC data reveal that participants in the experimental groups found jobs and left Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) rolls faster than those in the control groups. However, with the exception of Baltimore, there was little difference between the groups in terms of the type of employment they found. Most enrollees found low-wage jobs and within a fairly short period of time were back on welfare. The big difference in the Baltimore program was its effort to provide education and training that matched the individual preferences of the participants; but this was more costly and produced no immediate reduction in the amount spent on AFDC. None of the programs significantly decreased long-term joblessness. MDRC concludes that those who have been on welfare for a short period of time and possess marketable skills will find jobs with limited assistance from welfare-to-work programs. But those recipients who have relied on welfare for a long time will need more intensive services. This presents a trade-off between income gains for welfare recipients and budgetary savings for the government.

MDRC acknowledges that its findings are inconclusive and that further research is needed, but nonetheless presents a good argument for mandatory participation in programs that provide extensive education and training for participants. It believes that if such programs are not in place, welfare-to-work programs are unlikely to have any long-term effect on the

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most disadvantaged, the population comprising a large percentage of welfare recipients. In addition, MDRC speculates that establishing and increasing the rewards of work would foster long-term employment. The researchers noticed that when enrollees became employed, they lost their Medicaid coverage and most employers did not provide health insurance. A universal national health insurance that covers *all* of the employed would eliminate this work disincentive. Parental support payments should be pursued more diligently to provide more cash to working single-parents, since this payment would increase the income of those who work but not those on welfare. The Earned Income Tax Credit would also help to raise the income of low-income employees and should be continued.

MDRC believes that low cost job-search-first programs with term limits for receiving welfare are most likely to result in a large supply of government workfare labor that will have no effect on the amount spent on AFDC, since those on workfare remain on welfare. But the authors fail to discuss the punitive nature of workfare programs and the assumptions that support them. Earlier attempts at welfare reform reveal a belief on the part of the policy makers that welfare recipients prefer welfare to work and must be forced to work. In addition, they tend to assume that jobs are readily available in the private sector labor market and fail to recognize the persistent long-term high unemployment rate among minorities. Perhaps welfare recipients would work if jobs were available. The issue of high unemployment needs to be included in welfare to work policy considerations.

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Safety Net: Welfare and Social Security, 1929–1979 *by Blanche D. Coll. New Brunswick, NJ, Rutgers University Press, 1995. 347 pp. $47.00.*

Despite perennial political debates about "welfare" and current threats to radically alter, if not abolish, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), there has been no comprehensive history of AFDC until now. *Safety Net* traces federal public assistance programs from their origins in the 1935 Social Security Act through forty years of legislative and administrative development. Although the book covers benefit programs for the elderly and the disabled, its primary focus is AFDC. Coll deftly charts critical turning points for AFDC, illuminating how it achieved the dubious honor of being the nation's most despised social welfare program.

Beginning with the 1929 stock market crash, Coll moves quickly to the social policies of President Franklin D. Roosefelt—first the temporary cash relief and public employment measures and then the "permanent" social insurance and public assistance titles of the Social Security Act. Coll devotes over a third of the book to the first fifteen years of administration of Aid to Dependent Children (AFDC's original name) and Old-Age Assistance (OAA), means-tested old-age benefits. These were crucial years for U.S. social welfare policy as increasingly generous OAA benefits threatened the undeveloped and politically vulnerable old-age insurance program—Social Security. In the meantime, AFDC limped along as an orphan program.

By the end of the 1940s, the Social Security Administration (SSA) still feared for the future of social insurance. In 1949 OAA had more beneficiaries than old-Age insurance,

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and benefits were generally higher. According to Coll, SSA hoped to broaden the insurance system to cover disability, sickness, and other conditions until it provided the main source of social welfare protection for most Americans; and make public assistance function as a safety net for those who fell through the cracks. To be sure, SSA wanted public assistance to be small and residual, but the agency nonetheless saw it as a necessary back-up to the insurance system.

Throughout the 1950s, Congress expanded eligibility for public assistance and increased the benefit levels subject to federal matching, all the while believing that such programs would gradually decline as insurance coverage increased. By the end of the decade, AFDC had surpassed OAA—which was losing beneficiaries to Social Security—to become the largest public assistance program. Rising caseloads and expenditures made it clear that the demand for public assistance was going up, not down. Meanwhile, AFDC had become the target of controversy in various states and localities. In July 1960, Louisiana dropped nearly 6,000 families, most of them black, from AFDC. A year later, the town of Newburgh, New York passed a series of draconian rules designed to restrict public assistance. Although state authorities prohibited implementation of the rules, Newburgh's efforts received much praise in the media.

The purpose of the 1962 public welfare amendments was to rein in public assistance, especially AFDC, by "rehabilitating" recipients through social services. This was the last hurrah for the social workers who controlled public welfare. By 1967, the services approach had been declared a failure and work incentives became the focus of national legislation. Coll tracks various incarnations of workfare, their notable lack of success, and then the failure of President Richard Nixon's Family Assistance Plan.

Although some of this material will be familiar to those who have managed to piece together the history of AFDC, *Saftey Net* is invaluable. First, Coll's treatment is comprehensive, and she uses archival materials not reviewed elsewhere. Second, unlike other works, Coll places the history of AFDC in the context of other public assistance programs as well as social insurance. Some of her interpretations challenge existing work, including the much repeated argument that SSA sacrificed public assistance for social insurance. Coll tells a more nuanced—and more compelling—story.

Coll ignores the voluminous social science literature on U.S. social welfare policy that has emerged over the last decade (most of the works she cites predate 1989). But this may prove to be one of the book's great strengths: Coll does not stuff her narrative into theoretical boxes in which it would not comfortably fit. I highly recommend *Safety Net* to anyone interested in social welfare policy—especially the politicians who are about to ignore the lessons of history.

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Roads to Dominion: Right-Wing Movements and Political Power in the United States
by Sara Diamond. New York, The Guilford Press, 1995. 445 pp. Paper, $19.95.

This chronicle of the American right wing since World War II organizes a mind-boggling mass of data. It should be required reading for any serious student of the subject.

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Although liberal in sensibility, Diamond resists the temptation to smear her subjects. While some rightists are bonafide neo-Nazis, the main thrust of right-wing activism in the second half of the twentieth century has been eminently nonextremist, involving voter education drives, lobbying, research, and fund-raising. To argue otherwise is to be intellectually dishonest, says Diamond. Biological racists, Jew baiters, assassins, incendiaries, and vigilantes have become so marginalized as to have had no practical political impact in America since 1950. In the meantime, the New Right, with Christian evangelicals in the vanguard, has evolved into "the largest and most influential grassroots movement on the political scene" since the 1960s (p. 311).

The book is guided by a simple model: social movement success is a function of advantageous environment plus effective resource mobilization. Tracing the first clumsy attempts by the right to capitalize on McCarthyite hysteria, then following it through Barry Goldwater's and George Wallace's campaigns to enlist ethnic and Southern Democrats to the cause, Diamond uses this model to explain the growing power of the right.

The ideological core of American rightism is isolationism, nonegalitarianism, and traditional morality. As the political-economic "context" has changed, says Diamond, these emphases have been tactically altered. During the cold war, for example, isolationist sentiment was repackaged into interventionism. This presumably "maintained the isolationists' preference for unilateralism . . ." (p. 33). After the collapse of the Soviets in 1990—another change in "context"—isolationism found expression in advocacy of protective tariffs and in insistence on bringing the troops home: "America first."

Diamond takes us through the intrigues of the so-called neo-conservatives (anticommunist liberals) against the "paleo-conservatives" during the last years of the cold war. Evidently, when big foundation grants and patronage are at stake, rightists can be just as mean-spirited and petty as leftists. There is also discussion of "dominionism," which advocated theocratic rule enforced by execution of homosexuals, adulterers, non-Christians, and disobedient children. This fantasy betrays the totalistic impulse of the American right, something on the line of "The Handmaid's Tale." Hence, the book's title.

Diamond correctly dismisses status insecurity as an explanation for American rightism. However, she invokes a bowdlerized Marxism to account for the racist right whose "backdrop," she claims, ". . . was a crisis in the U.S. agricultural economy . . ." in the 1980s (p. 259). But family farming has been in decline for a century in America without the accompaniment of racist movements. Furthermore, the Aryan Nations and Posse Comitatus were flourishing long before the 1980s recession. Diamond ignores the fact that racism and anti-Semitism in America have perenially found nourishment outside economics in theology.

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Public Attitudes towards Church and State *by Ted G. Jelen and Clyde Wilcox. Armonk, NY, M. E. Sharpe, 1995. 298 pp. Cloth, $50.00; paper, $19.95.*

Reality rarely fits neat ideological categories, especially media categories like the current culture wars paradigm. The so-called culture wars are battles between elites who claim to speak for large population groups but in fact are often spokespersons only for themselves. The failure of reality to fit such paradigms is the subject of this careful study of attitudes

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toward the relationship between church and state. The reality of public attitudes is dizzying in its complexity.

The authors propose a four-fold typology of church-state attitudes, structured by the "establishment" clause and the "free exercise" clause—accommodationists versus separationists for the former and communitarians versus libertarians for the latter. Christian preferentialists favor public displays of religious symbols but oppose the free exercise of non-Christian religious minorities (like the Santeria cult). Religious nonpreferentialists favor allowing religion in the public square and allowing all religious groups to participate. Religious free marketers wish the government to be neutral between religious groups and between religion and no religion. Finally, religious minimalists wish to maintain a separation of church and state and would restrict the free exercise of religious groups.

The public is evenly divided in theory between those who favor strong separation of church and state and those who favor stronger government endorsement of Christianity. In practice, however, large majorities favor the public display of Christian religious symbols and moments of prayer in public schools. Those who most strongly favor such accommodation to Christianity are the ones most likely to oppose freedom for the non-Christian religions.

Interestingly enough in some of their elite samples, which tend to support strict separation, the authors also found strong biases against Catholics and Evangelicals: 40 percent of the academics thought Catholics had too much power as did 43 percent of media people; 90 percent of the former and 52 percent of the latter think that the latter have too much power. Such biases deserve much more investigation. Those most likely to support both religious accommodation and the rights of non-Christians were especially likely to be well educated, white Catholics, and very liberal black Pentecostals. "Thus the group of respondents who most clearly regarded religious accommodationism as a component of religious free exercise were not evangelical Protestants but rather those who had been the historical victims of discrimination. . . . Catholics and Pentecostals were most supportive of the free-exercise rights of religious minorities" (p. 151).

The secularists have had it mostly their own way in the court decisions during the last fifty years, which were of course legislation disguised as judicial decisions. The authors note, however, that their data "suggest that a formidable coalition of white evangelicals, African Americans and Roman Catholics might be quite favorably disposed toward certain government supports for religious belief. As might be a surprising number of more secular citizens" (p. 155).

They add that there does not seem to be a consensus on the underlying rationale for the approval of such policies. A more important reason might be that there are no issues of sufficient importance around which the potential coalition members might rally. Most Americans are not willing to make either school prayer or public displays of religious symbols an issue on which they will vote in an election. It is not inconceivable, however, that in the future such issues might arise as the secularists continue their drive to force religion completely from public life in America. Then there would truly be a culture war. Secularists who read this study carefully would want to avoid such a war, because they would lose. The Supreme Court still follows the election returns.

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The Hudnut Years in Indianapolis, 1976–1991 *by William H. Hudnut III. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1995. 295 pp. $24.95.*

Few cities have been the butt of jokes as long as Indianapolis. "India no place," "nap town," and a "neon cornfield" are among the more gentle references to this Midwest city. The nation started to pay attention to the city when former President Richard Nixon declared Richard Lugar his favorite mayor. No one would have expected his successor, William H. Hudnut, to upstage the Lugar era. However, the Hudnut years were so dramatic that people now divide the city history into before and after Hudnut. How did this Republican, trained in theology, transform India no place into India show place? When scholars lament the rough road to urban renaissance, Indianapolis is rarely used as an example of a city that turned its life around. Yet the city has reinvented itself, and Hudnut led the mayor-centered coalition that created the new Indianapolis. This book is an attempt to answer the often asked question "How did you do it, Bill?"

The book is divided into three parts. The first is a retrospective on Hudnut's unprecedented four terms as mayor of Indianapolis (1976–1991). The centerpieces of the Hudnut transformation are: the building of the Hoosier Dome, attracting the U.S. Postal Sorting and United Airline maintenance facilities, bringing the National Football League Baltimore Colts to the Hoosier Dome, keeping the National Basketball Association Indiana Pacers in the city. Before Hudnut left office, he launched a major revitalization of the central business district, which includes a mall (Circle Center) and the renovation of Union Station. These projects were bold moves for a city with an unglamorous reputation. Hudnut devotes a chapter to what he calls "levering amenities," which makes for fascinating reading. The key to development for him is "packaging the amenity infrastructure" (p. 93). The sports facilities and convention center enable the boosters to bring big time sports events to the city. Hudnut also believes the performing arts and cultural events served to improve the quality of life in the city and also helped his development strategy.

Part two is written by what he calls academic critics. The critics offer their analyses of how Hudnut handled the fiscal problems of the city, sport facility politics, neighborhoods, the Unigov (consolidated government of Indianapolis and Marion County), the police department, education, environment, health, and affirmative action. These minipolicy briefs pointed out the persistent underlined economic deficiencies of the city, and some critics questioned whether a sport-centered downtown development strategy addresses these problems. Generally speaking, they gave the Hudnut administration favorable reviews.

Part three is devoted to commentaries from leading citizens. These evaluations were also short and attempted to outline disagreements with the priorities of Hudnut's downtown development strategy. These citizens worried about tax abatements, Unigov, race relations, neighborhoods, and public schools. Overall, they praised the mayor for transforming their once bland town. In the afterword, Hudnut did a fairly adequate job of answering his critics.

In summary, this is a highly readable account of the Hudnut years. Professional mayor watchers and urban political scientists will find much to quote from in this book. Although the book should not be read as the last word on the Hudnut years, all urban politicians, not just mayors and their staffs, will want to read what William Hudnut has written. I like Hudnut's attempt to promote a discourse on his record by allowing critics a forum. I highly recommend this approach to former mayors who wish to write a retrospection on their tenure.

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Fighting Words: Individuals, Communities, and Liberties of Speech *by Kent Greenawalt. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1995. 189 pp. $24.95.*

There are few areas of constitutional law as important and confusing as the First Amendment's Free Speech clause. What constitutes speech and what protections are due it—as against individuals or government—have changed with constitutional development. Even the purpose of the clause remains uncertain, often subject to change as succeeding generations of judges grapple with the uncertain intent of free speech and the values that prompt regulation. Thus for some, free speech is a means in the service of larger goals, such as the search for truth or facilitation of a vigorous democratic order. For others, free speech is an end unto itself and need not be justified in terms of utilitarian goals.

Without agreement about the "why" of the First Amendment's speech protection, the "what" of it becomes problematic. For instance, even the definition of obscenity, which has traditionally merited no speech protection, is affected by the perspective of the "why" of free speech. Questions of when actions seem to speak are similarly affected. Is flag burning speech? The issue, although not the answer, was presented clearly in *Texas v. Johnson* (1989), when the Supreme Court held 5–4 that a conviction under a Texas statute punishing flag desecration violated the First Amendment. The majority claimed that Texas's ban on flag burning curbed protected speech. The dissent maintained that the flag was a symbol, entitled to state protection.

In his most recent book, *Fighting Words*, Kent Greenawalt, professor at Columbia University School of Law, examines the flag burning case, adds a measure of analysis dealing with political reality, and places it in the context of free speech case law. Since speech, when it is found, has considerable protection, usually well beyond the protection accorded other interests, its definition and the scope of its protection is a matter of importance. In this case and in many others, Kent Greenawalt lucidly explains the Supreme Court's definition of speech, its scope, and the rationale for its protection. He places the principal cases in the context of other cases of the same general type.

The case law treatment in *Fighting Words* is divided into four topics: flag burning; insults, epithets and "Hate Speech"; campus speech codes and workplace harassment; and obscenity. In each area, Greenawalt discusses case law and commentary in a thoughtful and balanced presentation. His treatment of American constitutional law would be reason enough to read and appreciate *Fighting Words*. Two other features of the work add considerable value.

First is the extensive treatment of Canadian law on speech that is woven throughout the book. Canada's speech law is relatively new, but extremely well developed, drawing considerably from constitutional perspectives of other democracies. Canada's law has not been isolated from the rest of the world—as has that of the United States. Canadian law is more attentive to the groups and interests that make up society. They have a communitarian focus that measures the effects of speech upon the persons who hear and are affected by it. This is clearly seen in the way obscenity cases have been considered, and the treatment given to the impact of obscenity on people, particularly women. Greenawalt concludes that the limitations on obscenity developed by the Canadians, while they might hinder some expression, should be more acceptable to Americans given the flexibility and intelligence that mark Canada's treatment of obscenity. The second feature is the fine analysis that Greenawalt brings to his subject. His responses are balanced and pragmatic as he questions the way in which free-speech protections influence society. Rather than see speech in static or doctrinal terms, he examines the context of speech and its impact upon its audience. He creates a

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transition to a more communitarian perspective for American law and asks questions constantly about the value of what we are protecting. In doing so, he makes an important contribution to the field.

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The Anti-Federalists and Early American Political Thought *by Christopher M. Duncan. DeKalb, Northern Illinois University Press, 1995. 228 pp. $30.00.*

Christopher Duncan is a passionate critic of American liberalism. He contends that "The cure for what ails America has usually been *more* individualism, *more* **opportunity**, *more* freedom. But while Americans were progressively freed from want, from fear, from any real restraints on their life choices, they were also freed from their political and communal moorings" (p. 182). Duncan's ideal society is full of George Baileys (the hero of the film *It's A Wonderful Life*), a place in which we live our lives "among others" and contribute "to the public world in a committed and meaningful way" (p. 182). Reality, of course, is a nation full of Willy Lomans in Arthur Miller's *Death of a Salesman*.

Duncan's scholarly purpose is to offer the Anti-Federalists as models of localism, community, and diversity. He locates their criticisms of the Constitution in an intellectual tradition extending back to the Puritan settlers of New England. "[T]he Anti-Federalists, like the Congregationalists before them, viewed society as 'a covenant between *each* with *all*' " (p. 144). They feared the Constitution because they knew it would create an empire that would rob them of their dignity as well as their rights. What unites "Anti-Federalist thought" is "the notion that the Constitution as a centralizing, ultimately disempowering document will leave them bereft of their power to save themselves, that it will ultimately, in the words of Hannah Arendt, 'banish the citizens from the public realm into the privacy of their households, and demand of them that they mind their own private business' " (pp. 170–171). In short, Duncan wants us to see the Anti-Federalists as the icons of an alternative commonwealth political tradition whose ideological descendants include the authors of the 1962 *Port Huron Statement.*

I admire Duncan's idealism. Would that all monographs exuded such passion and demonstrated such moral purpose! And, of course, much of what he says makes sense. To a significant extent, our celebration of individual autonomy has created a nation in which nearly everyone feels more entitled than responsible, more isolated than meaningful.

A powerful appeal to our better selves, however, is not necessarily good scholarship. Unfortunately, Duncan's analysis is superficial, his argument wildly overstated. To hold the Federalists responsible for twentieth-century anomie is to ignore their eighteenth-century notions of the ways in which an enlightened republic would work. They were elitists, to be sure, but a society of irresponsible drifters was their nightmare, not their dream. Furthermore, the Anti-Federalists, as their closest current historian Saul Cornell has been making clear, were a diverse group of people. It is no longer enough to talk about what the Anti-Federalists believed (or the Federalists, for that matter), especially when that thought is deduced only from the collected published writings of prominent men. This reductionism is particularly striking in Duncan's case, for while insisting upon the importance of local diversity, he

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structures his argument as a gloss on the writings of the Anti-Federalist leadership. The result is a reading of Anti-Federalism, which, while interesting, is also breezy and conformist, allowing no room for internal contradictions or ideological conflict.

I do not like being critical of Duncan's book, because I enjoyed reading it so much. It is lively, witty, and literate. But in the end it is not persuasive. The Anti-Federalists deserve a more prominent place in the annals of American political culture than scholars have usually given them. But when we pay them the attention they deserve, we have to do so on their terms and not as stock characters in a jeremiad (however compelling) about the moral barrenness of modern American society.

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To Serve These Rights: The Declaration of Independence and Constitutional Interpretation *by Scott Douglas Gerber. New York, New York University Press, 1995. 315 pp. $45.00.*

At least since the 1930s, when Franklin Roosevelt wrestled with the Supreme Court over the New Deal, the question of how the judiciary should interpret the Constitution has been a focus of heated debate. In recent decades, views of judicial review have taken two main forms. Liberal nonoriginalists have argued that the Constitution is a living document, which the Court should interpret according to our evolving beliefs. By contrast, conservative originalists have argued that the Court should enforce only those rights that the Framers originally recognized; questions concerning rights outside original intent should be left for political majorities to decide, not the Court.

Scott Gerber defends a position between conservative originalism and its liberal adversary. He agrees with conservative originalists that constitutional provisions "can be given meaning and life only when they are construed in light of the moral and political principles upon which they are based" (p. 7). Evading such founding principles, liberal nonorginalists throw the Constitution open to personal judicial bias and threaten the rule of law. Yet conservative originalists are no better off. Gerber contends that conservative originalism raises the specter of irresponsible judicial power, because it is an antiliberal polemic without genuine concern for original intent.

In place of such appeals to partisan preference, Gerber offers liberal originalism: a theory anchoring constitutional interpretation in the natural rights of the Declaration of Independence. According to Gerber, the Declaration captures the Lockean common sense of the revolutionary period, enumerating the natural rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness that government is meant to protect. Gerber sees the Constitution as a means for realizing the ends of the Declaration, with the Supreme Court as the institution responsible for interpreting the Constitution so that such ends are achieved.

As the ultimate protector of natural rights, the Supreme Court has enormous potential power. But Gerber argues that the Court can be readily constrained by checks like judicial impeachment and merit-based appointments. Within this framework, a jurisprudence of Lockean natural rights would mean, among other things, an end to all class-based legal distinctions (including racial ones), stronger protections for economic liberty, and a guarantee of some public assistance.

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Gerber's argument is ambitious and risks criticism from specialists willing to quibble with his accounts of history or philosophy. Yet, the right question to ask of Gerber's study is not whether one part succeeds as a work of pure history or philosophy, but whether the study as a whole succeeds as a work of public law. Measured by this standard, Gerber persuasively establishes the historical pedigree of natural rights, but falls short of demonstrating the stability of natural rights jurisprudence. Gerber argues that the Declaration is "sufficiently determinate to be a practical guide" (p. 162), but he proves his point only by adopting a contestable reading of John Locke. Lockean philosophy may not be open to infinite manipulation, but Gerber's own footnotes show that interpreting Locke is a highly controversial enterprise. Even if everyone accepted Gerber's appeal to the Declaration, the strategy of reading the Constitution via Lockean natural rights would hardly prevent judges from relying on their personal political preferences—a point illustrated by the fact that Thomas Jefferson accused Chief Justice John Marshall of personal bias in one of the very cases Gerber uses to showcase natural rights jurisprudence (pp. 120, 131 n.148).

In the end, Gerber does not transcend the jurisprudential debate between liberals and conservatives so much as provide more ammunition for their on-going feud.

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Clarence Thomas and the Tough Love Crowd: Counterfeit Heroes and Unhappy Truths
by Ronald Suresh Roberts. New York, New York University Press, 1995. 221 pp. $24.95.

As black neoconservatism has captured national attention, probably out of proportion to the number of black neoconservatives in the population, it has been portrayed more as "a movement than an eccentricity" (p. xi). The doctrine has been cited as fresh and as a potential way out of the national stalemate on the race issue. Advocates, according to Ronald Roberts, often have gotten a free ride based upon their shared race and apparent sympathy toward others in the black community.

Roberts critiques the arguments of these advocates, ranging from the economist Thomas Sowell and the writers Shelby Steele and V. S. Naipaul to the law professors Randall Kennedy and Stephen Carter and Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas. Along the way, he also takes cracks at critical legal studies champion Duncan Kennedy and Milton scholar turned legal commentator Stanley Fish.

Roberts labels these advocates "the tough love crowd," because they "dish out harsh truths for other people's good" and would elevate "spare the rod and spoil the child to the policymaking arena" (xi). He criticizes such homespun wisdom by examining the accuracy of their assumptions, the flip-flops and inconsistencies in their views, and their misplaced reliance upon the writings of previous thinkers.

Drawing parallels with the French philosopher Julien Benda and the tradition of disinterested truth seeking, Roberts sees the black neoconservatives as futilely attempting to follow the ethos of modern science in areas where values are involved and should be acknowledged. He finds these writers intellectually untethered. Instead, he would assert the impossibility and undesirability of some "ideal of justice beyond politics" (p. 62). Indeed, he says he would expose "America's hidden ideology of whiteness" (p. 166).

In this way, of course, Roberts, though a lawyer rather than an academic, reflects political science thinking more than the black neoconservatives do. His three primary targets—

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Thomas, Carter, and Kennedy—not surprisingly are law school products who insist that legal analysis and decisions can be not only dispassionate but neutral and nonpolitical as well. Thus, they adopt, to varying degrees, the theory of original intent, presumably to avoid the use of any ideology. At the same time, they accept the hidden ideology inherent in the theory.

Roberts skewers Thomas, who as a justice occupies the most powerful position among the black neoconservatives. But rather than demonize him, as some have done, Roberts takes seriously his apparent concern for black people and evaluates him according to his own standard of seeking racial justice. This approach is more useful than simply branding him a reactionary or traitor to his race.

This literate and wide ranging critique, more helpful for academics and writers than for instructors to assign students, is perceptive and biting. Roberts chastises one of his subjects for having a "weak stomach for a fight" (p. 65). The same charge will not be leveled at Roberts. A more sympathetic critic might have examined the pressures on successful black professionals to conform to traditional expectations in white institutions. (He refers to one law professor's intellectual conversion shortly before his tenure decision.) Yet, these black neoconservatives have jumped into the national debate with provocative postures, so Roberts appropriately engages them as they have engaged the civil rights establishment, the Negro Crits, and others.

Roberts's facts seem accurate, except he states incorrectly that four justices can deny certiorari. The Supreme Court's "rule of four" means that it takes the votes of four justices to grant cert. Thus, it takes six to deny it.

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Post-Passage Politics: Bicameral Resolution in Congress *by Stephen D. Van Beek. Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh University Press, 1995. 227 pp. $34.95.*

This is a nicely written book on House/Senate conference committees and other aspects of post-passage policy making in Congress. It is based on case studies during the Bush administration of the savings and loan bailout of 1989, the omnibus trade bill of 1989, and the 1990 Budget Reconciliation Act. It focuses on the resolution of interchamber conflicts on megabills, a subject that has received little systematic attention. The book's main conclusion is that conference committees have a more important policy-making role on megabills than on other bills.

Why are conference committees more important on megabills? Van Beek suggests that the first reason is the greater likelihood that various parts of megabills will be referred to more than one committee in each chamber so that no committee will have jurisdiction over all aspects of the bill. Thus there will be more within-chamber disagreements as well as between-chamber disagreements to work out in conference. The second reason is that, because they contain so many provisions of interest to the executive branch, the president is more likely to use the veto threat to influence the conference outcome on megabills. This means that party leaders in both chambers must negotiate a conference bill that will avoid a presidential veto as well as gain the acceptance of their chamber.

Van Beek relates this view of megabill conferences to political scientists' general understanding of conference committees. Recent theories treat conference committees as instru-

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ments of other institutional actors, rather than as important policy-making centers in their own right. What might be called a committee instrument approach views conferences as instruments for helping House and Senate committees either to resolve their legislative differences or force parent chambers to accept committee decisions. A chamber instrument approach treats conferences as instruments for enabling the chamber that acts first on a bill to get the chamber that acts second to accept most of its decisions, forcing a chamber's standing committees to conform to the preferences of the average chamber member, and/or resolving conflicts between several committees or subcommittees that have jurisdiction over a bill. Van Beek also implies an outsider instrument approach in which conferences can be seen as manipulated by noncongressional actors with constitutional veto power over congressional decisions, like the president and, by implication, the Supreme Court.

Van Beek contends that a combination of instrumental approaches is more useful for explaining megabill conferences than is a committee instrument, an outsider instrument, or a chamber instrument approach by itself. The other approaches may be useful for earlier Congresses in which relatively simple bills were usually treated by a single House and Senate committee. They may also be useful for understanding conferences on current bills that are handled by a single committee in each chamber or by several committees that produce compatible decisions. But, because large and complex omnibus bills have been increasing in number and include the most important federal policies being enacted by Congress, an approach that acknowledges the instrumental strategies of several institutional actors and gives greater discretion to conferees themselves is now necessary.

Van Beek would minimize the extent to which his cases are artifacts of split control of Congress and the presidency. His argument relies on the exogeneity of big, complex, and controversial omnibus bills. But why are such megabills created? Why are they so controversial? Perhaps megabills reflect a presidential and/or congressional leadership strategy that would be unnecessary in a unified government. If so, the notion that conference committees should be interpreted as power centers in their own right and not as instruments of either committees or chambers is contingent upon split control as well as on multiple referrals and intercommittee disagreement. Would a return to unified government allow congressional scholars to again relegate conference committees to a marginal role in congressional policy making?

Overall, this carefully argued book merits the attention of anyone who has wondered about the politics of conference committees and megabills.

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The Growth of American Government: Governance from the Cleveland Era to the Present
by Ballard C. Campbell. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1995. 304 pp. Cloth, $35.00; paper $14.95.

Perhaps it is unfair to employ the disciplinary standards of political science to evaluate a work of history. History is the recording, narrating, and interpreting of past events; it does not necessarily aspire to systematic explanation in the fashion of modern political science. But the absence of guiding explanatory theory in a book on *The Growth of American Government* may disappoint and perhaps even frustrate political scientists expecting more than a

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narrative description of political eras. Certainly political science does not lack theories explaining the growth of government, from "Wagner's Law" (1883) and Vilfredo Pareto's early description of "rent-seeking" (1916), through Alan T. Peacock and Jack Wiseman's "substitution" theory (1961), Aaron Wildavsky's "incrementalism" (1964), and Theodore Lowi's "interest group liberalism" (1969), to modern public choice themes about fiscal illusion and bureaucratic expansionism.

Historian Campbell seems to be aware of much of this literature, but chooses instead to proffer a simplistic diagram of "The Process of Growth of American Government" featuring "environment," "structure," "constituents," "government" and "feedbacks." But even this less-than-satisfactory model is largely discarded by the author as he proceeds to write an unexceptional overview of American political history from "the Cleveland Era" through a "Transitional Polity" 1880s–1920s, and a "Claimant Polity" 1930s–1970s, to "the Reagan Era and the Restrained Polity" (only 18 pages). There are general references to the influence of industrialization, economic and wartime crises, party realignment, and claimant politics, but most of the narrative is familiar and commonplace. There are no graphs and few tables; occasional bits of data are buried in prose. But it is hard to differ with the author's conclusion, "the dynamics of growth are exceedingly complex" (p. 54).

THOMAS R. DYE
Florida State University

Autonomy or Power? The Franco-German Relationship and Europe's Strategic Choices, 1955–1995 *by Stephen A. Kocs. Westport, CT, Praeger, 1995. 280 pages. $59.95.*

In many respects, the Franco-German alliance of the past half century has been the odd couple of European interstate affairs. Totally unlike one another in taste, temperament, and geography, these two nations have been thrown together by the forces of history and compelled to cooperate with one another for the past forty years under a common roof of West European institutions. The resulting partnership has been one full of strains and recurrent tensions, even as it has scored some significant successes. These tensions have been particularly in evidence since the end of the cold war—strategically over the issue of how to respond to the crisis in the former Yugoslavia and economically in the negotiations over the Uruguay round. At times these strains have threatened to rip the partnership apart, plunging Europe back to the future, to a dangerous multipolar world of competing nation states. At other times it has promised to create a European superstate, one that potentially might supplant NATO.

Stephen Kocs's new book provides a comprehensive overview of the evolution of this critical relationship from its inception at the end of World War II to the early 1990s. Drawing extensively on primary and secondary sources in both languages, Kocs's study has the virtue of looking at all aspects of the Franco-German partnership—diplomatic, strategic, and military. Of particular value is Kocs's analysis of Franco-German collaboration in weapons development, an area largely ignored by scholars to date.

Kocs's main thesis is a convincing one and has important implications for our understanding of the current state of Franco-German relations. Kocs argues that the two nations' strategic perspectives remain heavily conditioned by the lessons of past strategic choices. In the wake of World War II, France and Germany were brought together by a common

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desire to regain their status as great powers, an objective that neither could achieve alone. The strategies by which they sought to achieve this objective, however, differed fundamentally and were only partially incompatible. Whereas France has sought to increase its room for maneuver in international affairs by seeking strategic autonomy vis-à-vis the superpowers, Germany has pursued power and influence by binding itself into an expanding network of international institutions. These strategies committed both nations to the project of European integration and in retrospect seemed to have served them well. At the same time, they also set sharp limits to the level of strategic and military cooperation that the two countries could achieve. As a result, Kocs argues, we are likely to see neither a renationalization of European security policies nor a breakthrough to some grand European confederation. What we are likely to witness, he contends, is an uneasy perpetuation of the status quo.

While I find myself in substantial agreement with Kocs's main thesis, I have some quibbles with the use he makes of his own data in making this argument. Kocs argues that the divergent strategic perspectives of the two countries are "a function of the evolution in the evolution in the strategic international context" (p. 12). Yet, he repeatedly suggests that these differences in fact derive mainly from their historical differences and factors of domestic politics. This stubborn insistence to restrict his analysis in a systemic explanatory scheme leads to a puzzling neglect of the domestic political debates in both countries. So for instance, this narrow analytical framework led the author to mention only in passing (in one page) the famous Atlantic-Gaullist debate inside the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union during the 1960s and 1970s. Likewise, only scant attention is paid to the heated domestic controversies in France over European integration in connection with the French referendum on Maastricht.

The book also suffers from a number of minor flaws, such as uneven editing and some debatable characterizations. For instance, Konrad Adenauer's famous pledge that Germany would forgo the production of weapons of mass destruction is described as having been "voluntary" (p. 17), when in fact Adenauer had been coerced by the United States and provided only provisional acceptance. Likewise, it is somewhat odd to see Helmut Schmidt's defense minister, Hans Apel, described as a dedicated pacifist, when at the time he was castigated by the peace movement as a crazed war monger (p. 139).

Despite these flaws, Stephen Kocs has produced a valuable study that should be of interest to a broad audience. It is sure to be read widely and will be of great use to those working on issues relating to European security and the politics of alliance. It could also serve well as a supplementary text for courses touching on West European security and interstate relations.

THOMAS U. BERGER
Johns Hopkins University

Economic Transition and Political Legitimacy in Post-Mao China: Ideology and Reform
by Feng Chen. Albany, State University of New York Press, 1995. 245 pp. Cloth, $79.50; paper, $16.95.

The central thesis of this readable, new account of the economic reform process in China is that ideas count. Moreover, ideas have unintended consequences. Ideas that were initially intended to deal with problems facing China's economy and society quickly opened up a path of exploration that led China's intellectuals and reform-minded officials to take up

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increasingly more radical ideas – thus opening up an increasingly large gap between the formal ideological system (which Feng calls "fundamental principles") and the policy initiatives being pursued (what Feng calls "instrumental principles"). This gap, far from rescuing the party from the crisis of faith prevalent in the late 1970s, has opened up a new and wider crisis of legitimacy. But it has not yet led to a fundamental transformation of the system. As Feng argues, problems confronting the economy "indicate that the fundamental-instrumental discrepancy has gone both-too-far and not far enough – too far because it challenges the current system by bringing in capitalism and not far enough because it has not brought an ontological breakthrough. . ." (p. 201).

The task that Feng Chen has set himself in this book has been to trace the development of reform ideas that have both paved the way for economic reform – justifying the use of capitalist methods through progressive reinterpretation of socialist ideology – and eroded that ideology. His exploration starts with the discussion on practice as the sole criterion of truth that inaugurated the Dengist period, progresses through the decollectivization of agriculture, the reunderstanding of ownership, the emergence and justification of the private economy, and the rethinking of distributional issues. In each aspect, Feng traces the emergence and development of ideas, giving a lucid description of the issues involved and how economic logic continuously eroded socialist orthodoxy.

Toward the end of the book, Feng explores the emergence of a capitalist vision among some sectors of the population and the emergence of "neo-authoritarianism" (which calls for a combination of a strong state and a market economy) among others. Feng points out correctly that the emergence of such distinctly non-Marxist visions suggest that the "fundamental-instrumental discrepancy" has evolved to the crisis point. The original ideological vision has disappeared. Left out of this discussion are other modes of thought that illustrate much the same point but could lead the polity in rather different directions. In particular, there is no discussion of neoconservative or similar modes of thought that have emerged in the years since Tiananmen in response both to the alleged naivety and utopianism of reform-minded thinkers and to the social crises that are confronting the system. Introducing such ideas would have added an important dimension to the story, namely that reform has proceeded (and still does) against important opposition.

Tracing the evolution of economic ideas is enormously complex: the Chinese literature on economic reform is enormous. Inevitably, there are lacunae in this rendering, but the story is told lucidly and well. Feng's focus on ideas, while valid and important, does tend to obscure the politics of reform. How these ideas are incorporated into the political process, how they are debated, and how they come out as public policy are left largely unexplored.

Such caveats aside, Feng has written an important account of the reform process. It is well written and persuasively argued. It makes an important contribution to the field and is likely to be adopted in a number of undergraduate courses on Chinese politics.

JOSEPH FEWSMITH
Boston University

Poverty and Inequality in Latin America: The Impact of Adjustment and Recovery in the 1980s *by Samuel A. Morley. Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 1995. 288 pp. $42.50.*

In the 1980s most Latin American countries underwent dramatic structural readjustment programs. The poor paid dearly for the adjustments and in most cases reaped few benefits.

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Poverty rolls grew by 40 million and there was an unprecedented transfer of resources from the less developed countries to the more developed. What was the impact of these adjustments on poverty and inequality, Samuel Morley asks, and why did these adjustments lead to growth, poverty reduction, and increased equity in some countries (Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Paraguay, and Uruguay) while other countries (Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Honduras, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru) bounced from recession to recession.

The adjustments were costly, Morley admits. In phase one, dramatic cuts in consumption and production were used to pay overly high interest rates to U.S. banks. In phase two, privatization, downsizing, and the elimination of subsidies increased poverty and unemployment. Balance of payments and fiscal deficits made these adjustments necessary, Morley argues, and in those countries with a sizable tradeable goods sector, structural adjustment set the basis for sustained growth and poverty reduction.

By comparing two countries with successful readjustments (Colombia and Costa Rica) with two that failed (Venezuela and Argentina) Morley contends that adjustments were most likely to lead to sustained growth in countries with flexible production structures and exports sensitive to monetary devaluations (prices rather than quotas).

Raises in the real minimum wage also helped reduce poverty, as did expanded educational access. In countries without substantial growth, however, education had no impact. In Venezuela, for instance, where petroleum exports were set by quotas, poverty tripled in the 1980s and was disproportionately concentrated among the most highly educated.

Despite some important insights, there are several problems with this book. First, Morley uses nonstandard measurements for poverty and inequality. This sometimes leads to conclusions at odds with both World Bank and country-specific figures. In the Chilean case, for instance, Morley argues that inequality decreased between 1987 and 1995. Yet even the former Chilean President Patricio Aylwin (1990–1994) admits that he failed to reduce inequality during his presidency and that inequality increased dramatically during the dictatorship that preceded him.

Second, Morley argues that orthodox adjustment policies were more successful than heterodox ones. Yet Colombia's success was directly related to the heterodox policies pursued prior to the adjustments. Uruguay also pursued heterodox policies, and in Chile new industries grew only after a drastic drop in real exchange rates protected them from foreign competition. All this suggests that some level of protection may be a necessary condition for industrial growth.

Third, the book is narrowly focused on economic data without sufficient attention to the political or social environment. Although Morley claims that democratic governments are better able to sustain the sacrifice necessary for successful adjustment, he blurs this distinction in his case studies. Chile's Augusto Pinochet is given credit for reducing poverty between 1987 and 1995, though almost all reduction occurred after the 1990 transition to democracy. Morley's failure to mention the drug trade in Colombia is also glaring.

Finally, Morley's claim that "in every country where there was recovery there was a significant reduction in poverty" (p. 189) means little when contrasted with one of the worst recessions in Latin American history. His continuing faith in neoliberal growth, when a decade of such growth has yet to reduce poverty to its 1970 level, when exports are still limited mainly to primary products, and when there has been almost no reduction in inequality on a continent with the largest income inequality in the world, seems overly sanguine.

CATHY LISA SCHNEIDER
American University

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Reference Books and Other Publications of Interest Received

America in the World: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations since 1941 *edited by Michael J. Hogan. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1996. 619 pp. Cloth, $54.95; paper, $19.95.*

Basic Documents on International Law and the Environment *compiled by Patricia W. Birnie and Alan Boyle. New York, Oxford University Press, 1995. 688 pp. Cloth, $98.00; paper, $38.00.*

Contemporary Italy: A Research Guide *by Martin J. Bull. Westport, CT, Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc., 1996. 160 pp. $65.00.*

Documentary History of the First Federal Congress of the United States, Volume XIV: Debates in the House of Representatives, Third Session, December 1790–March 1791 *edited by William C. Digiacomantonio, Kenneth R. Bowling, Charlene B. Bickford, and Helen E. Veit. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996. 955 pp. $75.00.*

From Stalinism to Pluralism: A Documentary History of Eastern Europe since 1945, 2nd ed. *edited by Gale Stokes. New York, Oxford University Press, 1996. 294 pp. Cloth, $39.95; paper, $16.95.*

German Unification and its Discontents: Documents from the Peaceful Revolution *edited and translated by Richard T. Gray and Sabine Wilke. Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1996. 324 pp. $40.00.*

The Guide to the Federal Budget: Fiscal 1997 *by Stanley E. Collender. Lanham, Maryland, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1996. 234 pp. Cloth, $56.00; paper, $22.95.*

How to Think Like a Social Scientist *by Thomas F. Pettigrew. New York, HarperCollins College Publishers, 1996. 198 pp. $22.50.*

Index to International Public Opinion, 1994–95 *prepared by Survey Research Consultants International and edited by Elizabeth Hann Hastings and Philip K. Hastings. Westport, CT, Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc., 1996. 760 pp. $275.00.*

The League of Nations: From 1919 to 1929 *by Gary B. Ostrower. Garden City Park, NY, Avery Publishing Group, 1996. 192 pp. $25.00.*

Let America Decide: Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Presidential Debates. *New York, Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1995. 188 pp. $9.95.*

The Ohio Politics Almanac *by Michael F. Curtin. Kent, Ohio, State University Press, 1996. 215 pp. $16.00.*

Oil, Gas, and Government: The U.S. Experience, Vol. 1–2 *by Robert L. Bradley, Jr. Lanham, Maryland, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1996. 1000 pp. $125.00.*

Open the Social Sciences: Report of the Gulbenkian Commission on the Restructuring of the Social Sciences *edited V. Y. Mudimbe. Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1996. 105 pp. Cloth, $37.50; paper, $10.95.*

Political Geography of the United States *by Fred M. Shelley, J. Clark Archer, Fiona M. Davidson, and Stanley D. Brunn. New York, Guilford Press, 1996. 364 pp. Cloth, $47.95; paper, $24.95.*

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

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

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

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

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